Systemd/src/core/namespace.c

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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
#include <errno.h>
#include <linux/loop.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <unistd.h>
2010-04-24 05:05:01 +02:00
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include "alloc-util.h"
#include "base-filesystem.h"
#include "dev-setup.h"
#include "fd-util.h"
#include "format-util.h"
#include "fs-util.h"
#include "label.h"
#include "list.h"
#include "loop-util.h"
#include "loopback-setup.h"
#include "mkdir.h"
#include "mount-util.h"
Split out part of mount-util.c into mountpoint-util.c The idea is that anything which is related to actually manipulating mounts is in mount-util.c, but functions for mountpoint introspection are moved to the new file. Anything which requires libmount must be in mount-util.c. This was supposed to be a preparation for further changes, with no functional difference, but it results in a significant change in linkage: $ ldd build/libnss_*.so.2 (before) build/libnss_myhostname.so.2: linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007fff77bf5000) librt.so.1 => /lib64/librt.so.1 (0x00007f4bbb7b2000) libmount.so.1 => /lib64/libmount.so.1 (0x00007f4bbb755000) libpthread.so.0 => /lib64/libpthread.so.0 (0x00007f4bbb734000) libc.so.6 => /lib64/libc.so.6 (0x00007f4bbb56e000) /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007f4bbb8c1000) libblkid.so.1 => /lib64/libblkid.so.1 (0x00007f4bbb51b000) libuuid.so.1 => /lib64/libuuid.so.1 (0x00007f4bbb512000) libselinux.so.1 => /lib64/libselinux.so.1 (0x00007f4bbb4e3000) libpcre2-8.so.0 => /lib64/libpcre2-8.so.0 (0x00007f4bbb45e000) libdl.so.2 => /lib64/libdl.so.2 (0x00007f4bbb458000) build/libnss_mymachines.so.2: linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007ffc19cc0000) librt.so.1 => /lib64/librt.so.1 (0x00007fdecb74b000) libcap.so.2 => /lib64/libcap.so.2 (0x00007fdecb744000) libmount.so.1 => /lib64/libmount.so.1 (0x00007fdecb6e7000) libpthread.so.0 => /lib64/libpthread.so.0 (0x00007fdecb6c6000) libc.so.6 => /lib64/libc.so.6 (0x00007fdecb500000) /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007fdecb8a9000) libblkid.so.1 => /lib64/libblkid.so.1 (0x00007fdecb4ad000) libuuid.so.1 => /lib64/libuuid.so.1 (0x00007fdecb4a2000) libselinux.so.1 => /lib64/libselinux.so.1 (0x00007fdecb475000) libpcre2-8.so.0 => /lib64/libpcre2-8.so.0 (0x00007fdecb3f0000) libdl.so.2 => /lib64/libdl.so.2 (0x00007fdecb3ea000) build/libnss_resolve.so.2: linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007ffe8ef8e000) librt.so.1 => /lib64/librt.so.1 (0x00007fcf314bd000) libcap.so.2 => /lib64/libcap.so.2 (0x00007fcf314b6000) libmount.so.1 => /lib64/libmount.so.1 (0x00007fcf31459000) libpthread.so.0 => /lib64/libpthread.so.0 (0x00007fcf31438000) libc.so.6 => /lib64/libc.so.6 (0x00007fcf31272000) /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007fcf31615000) libblkid.so.1 => /lib64/libblkid.so.1 (0x00007fcf3121f000) libuuid.so.1 => /lib64/libuuid.so.1 (0x00007fcf31214000) libselinux.so.1 => /lib64/libselinux.so.1 (0x00007fcf311e7000) libpcre2-8.so.0 => /lib64/libpcre2-8.so.0 (0x00007fcf31162000) libdl.so.2 => /lib64/libdl.so.2 (0x00007fcf3115c000) build/libnss_systemd.so.2: linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007ffda6d17000) librt.so.1 => /lib64/librt.so.1 (0x00007f610b83c000) libcap.so.2 => /lib64/libcap.so.2 (0x00007f610b835000) libmount.so.1 => /lib64/libmount.so.1 (0x00007f610b7d8000) libpthread.so.0 => /lib64/libpthread.so.0 (0x00007f610b7b7000) libc.so.6 => /lib64/libc.so.6 (0x00007f610b5f1000) /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007f610b995000) libblkid.so.1 => /lib64/libblkid.so.1 (0x00007f610b59e000) libuuid.so.1 => /lib64/libuuid.so.1 (0x00007f610b593000) libselinux.so.1 => /lib64/libselinux.so.1 (0x00007f610b566000) libpcre2-8.so.0 => /lib64/libpcre2-8.so.0 (0x00007f610b4e1000) libdl.so.2 => /lib64/libdl.so.2 (0x00007f610b4db000) (after) build/libnss_myhostname.so.2: linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007fff0b5e2000) librt.so.1 => /lib64/librt.so.1 (0x00007fde0c328000) libpthread.so.0 => /lib64/libpthread.so.0 (0x00007fde0c307000) libc.so.6 => /lib64/libc.so.6 (0x00007fde0c141000) /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007fde0c435000) build/libnss_mymachines.so.2: linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007ffdc30a7000) librt.so.1 => /lib64/librt.so.1 (0x00007f06ecabb000) libcap.so.2 => /lib64/libcap.so.2 (0x00007f06ecab4000) libpthread.so.0 => /lib64/libpthread.so.0 (0x00007f06eca93000) libc.so.6 => /lib64/libc.so.6 (0x00007f06ec8cd000) /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007f06ecc15000) build/libnss_resolve.so.2: linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007ffe95747000) librt.so.1 => /lib64/librt.so.1 (0x00007fa56a80f000) libcap.so.2 => /lib64/libcap.so.2 (0x00007fa56a808000) libpthread.so.0 => /lib64/libpthread.so.0 (0x00007fa56a7e7000) libc.so.6 => /lib64/libc.so.6 (0x00007fa56a621000) /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007fa56a964000) build/libnss_systemd.so.2: linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007ffe67b51000) librt.so.1 => /lib64/librt.so.1 (0x00007ffb32113000) libcap.so.2 => /lib64/libcap.so.2 (0x00007ffb3210c000) libpthread.so.0 => /lib64/libpthread.so.0 (0x00007ffb320eb000) libc.so.6 => /lib64/libc.so.6 (0x00007ffb31f25000) /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007ffb3226a000) I don't quite understand what is going on here, but let's not be too picky.
2018-11-29 10:24:39 +01:00
#include "mountpoint-util.h"
#include "namespace-util.h"
#include "namespace.h"
#include "nulstr-util.h"
#include "path-util.h"
#include "selinux-util.h"
#include "socket-util.h"
#include "sort-util.h"
#include "stat-util.h"
#include "string-table.h"
#include "string-util.h"
#include "strv.h"
#include "tmpfile-util.h"
#include "umask-util.h"
#include "user-util.h"
#define DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS (MS_NOSUID|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOEXEC)
typedef enum MountMode {
/* This is ordered by priority! */
INACCESSIBLE,
MOUNT_IMAGES,
BIND_MOUNT,
BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE,
PRIVATE_TMP,
PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY,
PRIVATE_DEV,
BIND_DEV,
execute: make StateDirectory= and friends compatible with DynamicUser=1 and RootDirectory=/RootImage= Let's clean up the interaction of StateDirectory= (and friends) to DynamicUser=1: instead of creating these directories directly below /var/lib, place them in /var/lib/private instead if DynamicUser=1 is set, making that directory 0700 and owned by root:root. This way, if a dynamic UID is later reused, access to the old run's state directory is prohibited for that user. Then, use file system namespacing inside the service to make /var/lib/private a readable tmpfs, hiding all state directories that are not listed in StateDirectory=, and making access to the actual state directory possible. Mount all directories listed in StateDirectory= to the same places inside the service (which means they'll now be mounted into the tmpfs instance). Finally, add a symlink from the state directory name in /var/lib/ to the one in /var/lib/private, so that both the host and the service can access the path under the same location. Here's an example: let's say a service runs with StateDirectory=foo. When DynamicUser=0 is set, it will get the following setup, and no difference between what the unit and what the host sees: /var/lib/foo (created as directory) Now, if DynamicUser=1 is set, we'll instead get this on the host: /var/lib/private (created as directory with mode 0700, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (created as directory) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (created as symlink) And from inside the unit: /var/lib/private (a tmpfs mount with mode 0755, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (bind mounted from the host) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (the same symlink as above) This takes inspiration from how container trees are protected below /var/lib/machines: they generally reuse UIDs/GIDs of the host, but because /var/lib/machines itself is set to 0700 host users cannot access files in the container tree even if the UIDs/GIDs are reused. However, for this commit we add one further trick: inside and outside of the unit /var/lib/private is a different thing: outside it is a plain, inaccessible directory, and inside it is a world-readable tmpfs mount with only the whitelisted subdirs below it, bind mounte din. This means, from the outside the dir acts as an access barrier, but from the inside it does not. And the symlink created in /var/lib/foo itself points across the barrier in both cases, so that root and the unit's user always have access to these dirs without knowing the details of this mounting magic. This logic resolves a major shortcoming of DynamicUser=1 units: previously they couldn't safely store persistant data. With this change they can have their own private state, log and data directories, which they can write to, but which are protected from UID recycling. With this change, if RootDirectory= or RootImage= are used it is ensured that the specified state/log/cache directories are always mounted in from the host. This change of semantics I think is much preferable since this means the root directory/image logic can be used easily for read-only resource bundling (as all writable data resides outside of the image). Note that this is a change of behaviour, but given that we haven't released any systemd version with StateDirectory= and friends implemented this should be a safe change to make (in particular as previously it wasn't clear what would actually happen when used in combination). Moreover, by making this change we can later add a "+" modifier to these setings too working similar to the same modifier in ReadOnlyPaths= and friends, making specified paths relative to the container itself.
2017-09-28 18:55:45 +02:00
EMPTY_DIR,
SYSFS,
PROCFS,
READONLY,
READWRITE,
TMPFS,
READWRITE_IMPLICIT, /* Should have the lowest priority. */
_MOUNT_MODE_MAX,
} MountMode;
typedef struct MountEntry {
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
const char *path_const; /* Memory allocated on stack or static */
MountMode mode:5;
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
bool ignore:1; /* Ignore if path does not exist? */
bool has_prefix:1; /* Already is prefixed by the root dir? */
bool read_only:1; /* Shall this mount point be read-only? */
bool nosuid:1; /* Shall set MS_NOSUID on the mount itself */
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
bool applied:1; /* Already applied */
2018-02-14 05:29:13 +01:00
char *path_malloc; /* Use this instead of 'path_const' if we had to allocate memory */
const char *source_const; /* The source path, for bind mounts or images */
char *source_malloc;
const char *options_const;/* Mount options for tmpfs */
char *options_malloc;
unsigned long flags; /* Mount flags used by EMPTY_DIR and TMPFS. Do not include MS_RDONLY here, but please use read_only. */
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
unsigned n_followed;
LIST_FIELDS(MountEntry, mount_entry);
} MountEntry;
/* If MountAPIVFS= is used, let's mount /sys and /proc into the it, but only as a fallback if the user hasn't mounted
2018-06-18 22:43:12 +02:00
* something there already. These mounts are hence overridden by any other explicitly configured mounts. */
static const MountEntry apivfs_table[] = {
{ "/proc", PROCFS, false },
{ "/dev", BIND_DEV, false },
{ "/sys", SYSFS, false },
};
/* ProtectKernelTunables= option and the related filesystem APIs */
static const MountEntry protect_kernel_tunables_table[] = {
{ "/proc/acpi", READONLY, true },
{ "/proc/apm", READONLY, true }, /* Obsolete API, there's no point in permitting access to this, ever */
{ "/proc/asound", READONLY, true },
{ "/proc/bus", READONLY, true },
{ "/proc/fs", READONLY, true },
{ "/proc/irq", READONLY, true },
{ "/proc/kallsyms", INACCESSIBLE, true },
{ "/proc/kcore", INACCESSIBLE, true },
{ "/proc/latency_stats", READONLY, true },
{ "/proc/mtrr", READONLY, true },
{ "/proc/scsi", READONLY, true },
{ "/proc/sys", READONLY, false },
{ "/proc/sysrq-trigger", READONLY, true },
{ "/proc/timer_stats", READONLY, true },
{ "/sys", READONLY, false },
{ "/sys/fs/bpf", READONLY, true },
{ "/sys/fs/cgroup", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* READONLY is set by ProtectControlGroups= option */
{ "/sys/fs/selinux", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true },
{ "/sys/kernel/debug", READONLY, true },
{ "/sys/kernel/tracing", READONLY, true },
};
/* ProtectKernelModules= option */
static const MountEntry protect_kernel_modules_table[] = {
#if HAVE_SPLIT_USR
{ "/lib/modules", INACCESSIBLE, true },
#endif
{ "/usr/lib/modules", INACCESSIBLE, true },
};
/* ProtectKernelLogs= option */
static const MountEntry protect_kernel_logs_table[] = {
{ "/proc/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true },
{ "/dev/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true },
};
/*
* ProtectHome=read-only table, protect $HOME and $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR and rest of
* system should be protected by ProtectSystem=
*/
static const MountEntry protect_home_read_only_table[] = {
{ "/home", READONLY, true },
{ "/run/user", READONLY, true },
{ "/root", READONLY, true },
};
/* ProtectHome=tmpfs table */
static const MountEntry protect_home_tmpfs_table[] = {
{ "/home", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
{ "/run/user", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
{ "/root", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0700" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
};
/* ProtectHome=yes table */
static const MountEntry protect_home_yes_table[] = {
{ "/home", INACCESSIBLE, true },
{ "/run/user", INACCESSIBLE, true },
{ "/root", INACCESSIBLE, true },
};
/* ProtectSystem=yes table */
static const MountEntry protect_system_yes_table[] = {
{ "/usr", READONLY, false },
{ "/boot", READONLY, true },
{ "/efi", READONLY, true },
#if HAVE_SPLIT_USR
{ "/lib", READONLY, true },
{ "/lib64", READONLY, true },
{ "/bin", READONLY, true },
# if HAVE_SPLIT_BIN
{ "/sbin", READONLY, true },
# endif
#endif
};
/* ProtectSystem=full includes ProtectSystem=yes */
static const MountEntry protect_system_full_table[] = {
{ "/usr", READONLY, false },
{ "/boot", READONLY, true },
{ "/efi", READONLY, true },
{ "/etc", READONLY, false },
#if HAVE_SPLIT_USR
{ "/lib", READONLY, true },
{ "/lib64", READONLY, true },
{ "/bin", READONLY, true },
# if HAVE_SPLIT_BIN
{ "/sbin", READONLY, true },
# endif
#endif
};
/*
* ProtectSystem=strict table. In this strict mode, we mount everything
* read-only, except for /proc, /dev, /sys which are the kernel API VFS,
* which are left writable, but PrivateDevices= + ProtectKernelTunables=
* protect those, and these options should be fully orthogonal.
* (And of course /home and friends are also left writable, as ProtectHome=
* shall manage those, orthogonally).
*/
static const MountEntry protect_system_strict_table[] = {
{ "/", READONLY, false },
{ "/proc", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */
{ "/sys", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */
{ "/dev", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* PrivateDevices= */
{ "/home", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
{ "/run/user", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
{ "/root", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
};
static const char * const mount_mode_table[_MOUNT_MODE_MAX] = {
[INACCESSIBLE] = "inaccessible",
[BIND_MOUNT] = "bind",
[BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE] = "rbind",
[PRIVATE_TMP] = "private-tmp",
[PRIVATE_DEV] = "private-dev",
[BIND_DEV] = "bind-dev",
[EMPTY_DIR] = "empty",
[SYSFS] = "sysfs",
[PROCFS] = "procfs",
[READONLY] = "read-only",
[READWRITE] = "read-write",
[TMPFS] = "tmpfs",
[MOUNT_IMAGES] = "mount-images",
[READWRITE_IMPLICIT] = "rw-implicit",
};
DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(mount_mode, MountMode);
static const char *mount_entry_path(const MountEntry *p) {
assert(p);
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
/* Returns the path of this bind mount. If the malloc()-allocated ->path_buffer field is set we return that,
* otherwise the stack/static ->path field is returned. */
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
return p->path_malloc ?: p->path_const;
}
static bool mount_entry_read_only(const MountEntry *p) {
assert(p);
return p->read_only || IN_SET(p->mode, READONLY, INACCESSIBLE, PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY);
}
static const char *mount_entry_source(const MountEntry *p) {
assert(p);
return p->source_malloc ?: p->source_const;
}
static const char *mount_entry_options(const MountEntry *p) {
assert(p);
return p->options_malloc ?: p->options_const;
}
static void mount_entry_done(MountEntry *p) {
assert(p);
p->path_malloc = mfree(p->path_malloc);
p->source_malloc = mfree(p->source_malloc);
p->options_malloc = mfree(p->options_malloc);
}
static int append_access_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv, MountMode mode, bool forcibly_require_prefix) {
char **i;
assert(p);
/* Adds a list of user-supplied READWRITE/READWRITE_IMPLICIT/READONLY/INACCESSIBLE entries */
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) {
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
bool ignore = false, needs_prefix = false;
const char *e = *i;
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
/* Look for any prefixes */
if (startswith(e, "-")) {
e++;
ignore = true;
}
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
if (startswith(e, "+")) {
e++;
needs_prefix = true;
}
if (!path_is_absolute(e))
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"Path is not absolute: %s", e);
*((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
.path_const = e,
.mode = mode,
.ignore = ignore,
.has_prefix = !needs_prefix && !forcibly_require_prefix,
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
};
}
return 0;
}
execute: make StateDirectory= and friends compatible with DynamicUser=1 and RootDirectory=/RootImage= Let's clean up the interaction of StateDirectory= (and friends) to DynamicUser=1: instead of creating these directories directly below /var/lib, place them in /var/lib/private instead if DynamicUser=1 is set, making that directory 0700 and owned by root:root. This way, if a dynamic UID is later reused, access to the old run's state directory is prohibited for that user. Then, use file system namespacing inside the service to make /var/lib/private a readable tmpfs, hiding all state directories that are not listed in StateDirectory=, and making access to the actual state directory possible. Mount all directories listed in StateDirectory= to the same places inside the service (which means they'll now be mounted into the tmpfs instance). Finally, add a symlink from the state directory name in /var/lib/ to the one in /var/lib/private, so that both the host and the service can access the path under the same location. Here's an example: let's say a service runs with StateDirectory=foo. When DynamicUser=0 is set, it will get the following setup, and no difference between what the unit and what the host sees: /var/lib/foo (created as directory) Now, if DynamicUser=1 is set, we'll instead get this on the host: /var/lib/private (created as directory with mode 0700, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (created as directory) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (created as symlink) And from inside the unit: /var/lib/private (a tmpfs mount with mode 0755, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (bind mounted from the host) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (the same symlink as above) This takes inspiration from how container trees are protected below /var/lib/machines: they generally reuse UIDs/GIDs of the host, but because /var/lib/machines itself is set to 0700 host users cannot access files in the container tree even if the UIDs/GIDs are reused. However, for this commit we add one further trick: inside and outside of the unit /var/lib/private is a different thing: outside it is a plain, inaccessible directory, and inside it is a world-readable tmpfs mount with only the whitelisted subdirs below it, bind mounte din. This means, from the outside the dir acts as an access barrier, but from the inside it does not. And the symlink created in /var/lib/foo itself points across the barrier in both cases, so that root and the unit's user always have access to these dirs without knowing the details of this mounting magic. This logic resolves a major shortcoming of DynamicUser=1 units: previously they couldn't safely store persistant data. With this change they can have their own private state, log and data directories, which they can write to, but which are protected from UID recycling. With this change, if RootDirectory= or RootImage= are used it is ensured that the specified state/log/cache directories are always mounted in from the host. This change of semantics I think is much preferable since this means the root directory/image logic can be used easily for read-only resource bundling (as all writable data resides outside of the image). Note that this is a change of behaviour, but given that we haven't released any systemd version with StateDirectory= and friends implemented this should be a safe change to make (in particular as previously it wasn't clear what would actually happen when used in combination). Moreover, by making this change we can later add a "+" modifier to these setings too working similar to the same modifier in ReadOnlyPaths= and friends, making specified paths relative to the container itself.
2017-09-28 18:55:45 +02:00
static int append_empty_dir_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv) {
char **i;
assert(p);
/* Adds tmpfs mounts to provide readable but empty directories. This is primarily used to implement the
* "/private/" boundary directories for DynamicUser=1. */
STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) {
*((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = *i,
.mode = EMPTY_DIR,
.ignore = false,
.read_only = true,
.options_const = "mode=755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST,
.flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME,
execute: make StateDirectory= and friends compatible with DynamicUser=1 and RootDirectory=/RootImage= Let's clean up the interaction of StateDirectory= (and friends) to DynamicUser=1: instead of creating these directories directly below /var/lib, place them in /var/lib/private instead if DynamicUser=1 is set, making that directory 0700 and owned by root:root. This way, if a dynamic UID is later reused, access to the old run's state directory is prohibited for that user. Then, use file system namespacing inside the service to make /var/lib/private a readable tmpfs, hiding all state directories that are not listed in StateDirectory=, and making access to the actual state directory possible. Mount all directories listed in StateDirectory= to the same places inside the service (which means they'll now be mounted into the tmpfs instance). Finally, add a symlink from the state directory name in /var/lib/ to the one in /var/lib/private, so that both the host and the service can access the path under the same location. Here's an example: let's say a service runs with StateDirectory=foo. When DynamicUser=0 is set, it will get the following setup, and no difference between what the unit and what the host sees: /var/lib/foo (created as directory) Now, if DynamicUser=1 is set, we'll instead get this on the host: /var/lib/private (created as directory with mode 0700, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (created as directory) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (created as symlink) And from inside the unit: /var/lib/private (a tmpfs mount with mode 0755, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (bind mounted from the host) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (the same symlink as above) This takes inspiration from how container trees are protected below /var/lib/machines: they generally reuse UIDs/GIDs of the host, but because /var/lib/machines itself is set to 0700 host users cannot access files in the container tree even if the UIDs/GIDs are reused. However, for this commit we add one further trick: inside and outside of the unit /var/lib/private is a different thing: outside it is a plain, inaccessible directory, and inside it is a world-readable tmpfs mount with only the whitelisted subdirs below it, bind mounte din. This means, from the outside the dir acts as an access barrier, but from the inside it does not. And the symlink created in /var/lib/foo itself points across the barrier in both cases, so that root and the unit's user always have access to these dirs without knowing the details of this mounting magic. This logic resolves a major shortcoming of DynamicUser=1 units: previously they couldn't safely store persistant data. With this change they can have their own private state, log and data directories, which they can write to, but which are protected from UID recycling. With this change, if RootDirectory= or RootImage= are used it is ensured that the specified state/log/cache directories are always mounted in from the host. This change of semantics I think is much preferable since this means the root directory/image logic can be used easily for read-only resource bundling (as all writable data resides outside of the image). Note that this is a change of behaviour, but given that we haven't released any systemd version with StateDirectory= and friends implemented this should be a safe change to make (in particular as previously it wasn't clear what would actually happen when used in combination). Moreover, by making this change we can later add a "+" modifier to these setings too working similar to the same modifier in ReadOnlyPaths= and friends, making specified paths relative to the container itself.
2017-09-28 18:55:45 +02:00
};
}
return 0;
}
static int append_bind_mounts(MountEntry **p, const BindMount *binds, size_t n) {
size_t i;
assert(p);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
const BindMount *b = binds + i;
*((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = b->destination,
.mode = b->recursive ? BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE : BIND_MOUNT,
.read_only = b->read_only,
.nosuid = b->nosuid,
.source_const = b->source,
.ignore = b->ignore_enoent,
};
}
return 0;
}
static int append_mount_images(MountEntry **p, const MountImage *mount_images, size_t n) {
assert(p);
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
const MountImage *m = mount_images + i;
*((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = m->destination,
.mode = MOUNT_IMAGES,
.source_const = m->source,
.ignore = m->ignore_enoent,
};
}
return 0;
}
static int append_tmpfs_mounts(MountEntry **p, const TemporaryFileSystem *tmpfs, size_t n) {
assert(p);
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
const TemporaryFileSystem *t = tmpfs + i;
_cleanup_free_ char *o = NULL, *str = NULL;
unsigned long flags;
bool ro = false;
int r;
if (!path_is_absolute(t->path))
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"Path is not absolute: %s",
t->path);
str = strjoin("mode=0755" NESTED_TMPFS_LIMITS ",", t->options);
if (!str)
return -ENOMEM;
r = mount_option_mangle(str, MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME, &flags, &o);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse mount option '%s': %m", str);
ro = flags & MS_RDONLY;
if (ro)
flags ^= MS_RDONLY;
*((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = t->path,
.mode = TMPFS,
.read_only = ro,
.options_malloc = TAKE_PTR(o),
.flags = flags,
};
}
return 0;
}
static int append_static_mounts(MountEntry **p, const MountEntry *mounts, size_t n, bool ignore_protect) {
size_t i;
assert(p);
assert(mounts);
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
/* Adds a list of static pre-defined entries */
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
*((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = mount_entry_path(mounts+i),
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
.mode = mounts[i].mode,
.ignore = mounts[i].ignore || ignore_protect,
};
return 0;
}
static int append_protect_home(MountEntry **p, ProtectHome protect_home, bool ignore_protect) {
assert(p);
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
switch (protect_home) {
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
case PROTECT_HOME_NO:
return 0;
case PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY:
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_read_only_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table), ignore_protect);
case PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS:
return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_tmpfs_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table), ignore_protect);
case PROTECT_HOME_YES:
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table), ignore_protect);
default:
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
assert_not_reached("Unexpected ProtectHome= value");
}
}
static int append_protect_system(MountEntry **p, ProtectSystem protect_system, bool ignore_protect) {
assert(p);
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
switch (protect_system) {
case PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO:
return 0;
case PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT:
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_strict_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table), ignore_protect);
case PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES:
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table), ignore_protect);
case PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL:
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_full_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table), ignore_protect);
default:
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
assert_not_reached("Unexpected ProtectSystem= value");
}
}
2018-09-18 01:39:24 +02:00
static int mount_path_compare(const MountEntry *a, const MountEntry *b) {
int d;
/* If the paths are not equal, then order prefixes first */
2018-09-18 01:39:24 +02:00
d = path_compare(mount_entry_path(a), mount_entry_path(b));
if (d != 0)
return d;
/* If the paths are equal, check the mode */
2018-09-18 01:39:24 +02:00
return CMP((int) a->mode, (int) b->mode);
}
static int prefix_where_needed(MountEntry *m, size_t n, const char *root_directory) {
size_t i;
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
/* Prefixes all paths in the bind mount table with the root directory if the entry needs that. */
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
char *s;
if (m[i].has_prefix)
continue;
s = path_join(root_directory, mount_entry_path(m+i));
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
if (!s)
return -ENOMEM;
2018-02-12 06:27:49 +01:00
free_and_replace(m[i].path_malloc, s);
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
m[i].has_prefix = true;
}
return 0;
}
static void drop_duplicates(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
MountEntry *f, *t, *previous;
assert(m);
assert(n);
/* Drops duplicate entries. Expects that the array is properly ordered already. */
for (f = m, t = m, previous = NULL; f < m + *n; f++) {
/* The first one wins (which is the one with the more restrictive mode), see mount_path_compare()
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
* above. Note that we only drop duplicates that haven't been mounted yet. */
if (previous &&
path_equal(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(previous)) &&
!f->applied && !previous->applied) {
log_debug("%s (%s) is duplicate.", mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode));
previous->read_only = previous->read_only || mount_entry_read_only(f); /* Propagate the read-only flag to the remaining entry */
mount_entry_done(f);
continue;
}
*t = *f;
previous = t;
t++;
}
*n = t - m;
}
static void drop_inaccessible(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
MountEntry *f, *t;
const char *clear = NULL;
assert(m);
assert(n);
/* Drops all entries obstructed by another entry further up the tree. Expects that the array is properly
* ordered already. */
for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
/* If we found a path set for INACCESSIBLE earlier, and this entry has it as prefix we should drop
* it, as inaccessible paths really should drop the entire subtree. */
if (clear && path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), clear)) {
log_debug("%s is masked by %s.", mount_entry_path(f), clear);
mount_entry_done(f);
continue;
}
clear = f->mode == INACCESSIBLE ? mount_entry_path(f) : NULL;
*t = *f;
t++;
}
*n = t - m;
}
static void drop_nop(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
MountEntry *f, *t;
assert(m);
assert(n);
/* Drops all entries which have an immediate parent that has the same type, as they are redundant. Assumes the
* list is ordered by prefixes. */
for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
/* Only suppress such subtrees for READONLY, READWRITE and READWRITE_IMPLICIT entries */
if (IN_SET(f->mode, READONLY, READWRITE, READWRITE_IMPLICIT)) {
MountEntry *p;
bool found = false;
/* Now let's find the first parent of the entry we are looking at. */
for (p = t-1; p >= m; p--) {
if (path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(p))) {
found = true;
break;
}
}
/* We found it, let's see if it's the same mode, if so, we can drop this entry */
if (found && p->mode == f->mode) {
log_debug("%s (%s) is made redundant by %s (%s)",
mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode),
mount_entry_path(p), mount_mode_to_string(p->mode));
mount_entry_done(f);
continue;
}
}
*t = *f;
t++;
}
*n = t - m;
}
static void drop_outside_root(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
MountEntry *f, *t;
assert(m);
assert(n);
/* Nothing to do */
if (!root_directory)
return;
/* Drops all mounts that are outside of the root directory. */
for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
if (!path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), root_directory)) {
log_debug("%s is outside of root directory.", mount_entry_path(f));
mount_entry_done(f);
continue;
}
*t = *f;
t++;
}
*n = t - m;
}
static int clone_device_node(
const char *d,
const char *temporary_mount,
bool *make_devnode) {
_cleanup_free_ char *sl = NULL;
const char *dn, *bn, *t;
struct stat st;
int r;
if (stat(d, &st) < 0) {
if (errno == ENOENT) {
log_debug_errno(errno, "Device node '%s' to clone does not exist, ignoring.", d);
return -ENXIO;
}
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to stat() device node '%s' to clone, ignoring: %m", d);
}
if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode) &&
!S_ISCHR(st.st_mode))
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"Device node '%s' to clone is not a device node, ignoring.",
d);
dn = strjoina(temporary_mount, d);
/* First, try to create device node properly */
if (*make_devnode) {
mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(d, st.st_mode);
r = mknod(dn, st.st_mode, st.st_rdev);
mac_selinux_create_file_clear();
if (r >= 0)
goto add_symlink;
if (errno != EPERM)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod failed for %s: %m", d);
/* This didn't work, let's not try this again for the next iterations. */
*make_devnode = false;
}
/* We're about to fall back to bind-mounting the device
* node. So create a dummy bind-mount target.
* Do not prepare device-node SELinux label (see issue 13762) */
r = mknod(dn, S_IFREG, 0);
if (r < 0 && errno != EEXIST)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod() fallback failed for '%s': %m", d);
/* Fallback to bind-mounting:
* The assumption here is that all used device nodes carry standard
* properties. Specifically, the devices nodes we bind-mount should
* either be owned by root:root or root:tty (e.g. /dev/tty, /dev/ptmx)
* and should not carry ACLs. */
if (mount(d, dn, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Bind mounting failed for '%s': %m", d);
add_symlink:
bn = path_startswith(d, "/dev/");
if (!bn)
return 0;
/* Create symlinks like /dev/char/1:9 → ../urandom */
if (asprintf(&sl, "%s/dev/%s/%u:%u",
temporary_mount,
S_ISCHR(st.st_mode) ? "char" : "block",
major(st.st_rdev), minor(st.st_rdev)) < 0)
return log_oom();
(void) mkdir_parents(sl, 0755);
t = strjoina("../", bn);
if (symlink(t, sl) < 0)
2018-09-03 17:31:05 +02:00
log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to symlink '%s' to '%s', ignoring: %m", t, sl);
return 0;
}
static int mount_private_dev(MountEntry *m) {
static const char devnodes[] =
"/dev/null\0"
"/dev/zero\0"
"/dev/full\0"
"/dev/random\0"
"/dev/urandom\0"
"/dev/tty\0";
char temporary_mount[] = "/tmp/namespace-dev-XXXXXX";
const char *d, *dev = NULL, *devpts = NULL, *devshm = NULL, *devhugepages = NULL, *devmqueue = NULL, *devlog = NULL, *devptmx = NULL;
bool can_mknod = true;
_cleanup_umask_ mode_t u;
int r;
assert(m);
u = umask(0000);
if (!mkdtemp(temporary_mount))
2018-09-03 17:31:05 +02:00
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create temporary directory '%s': %m", temporary_mount);
dev = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev");
(void) mkdir(dev, 0755);
if (mount("tmpfs", dev, "tmpfs", DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS, "mode=755" TMPFS_LIMITS_DEV) < 0) {
2018-09-03 17:31:05 +02:00
r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to mount tmpfs on '%s': %m", dev);
goto fail;
}
r = label_fix_container(dev, "/dev", 0);
if (r < 0) {
log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as /dev: %m", dev);
goto fail;
}
devpts = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/pts");
(void) mkdir(devpts, 0755);
if (mount("/dev/pts", devpts, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
2018-09-03 17:31:05 +02:00
r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to bind mount /dev/pts on '%s': %m", devpts);
goto fail;
}
2018-09-03 17:31:05 +02:00
/* /dev/ptmx can either be a device node or a symlink to /dev/pts/ptmx.
* When /dev/ptmx a device node, /dev/pts/ptmx has 000 permissions making it inaccessible.
* Thus, in that case make a clone.
* In nspawn and other containers it will be a symlink, in that case make it a symlink. */
r = is_symlink("/dev/ptmx");
2018-09-03 17:31:05 +02:00
if (r < 0) {
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect whether /dev/ptmx is a symlink or not: %m");
goto fail;
2018-09-03 17:31:05 +02:00
} else if (r > 0) {
devptmx = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/ptmx");
if (symlink("pts/ptmx", devptmx) < 0) {
2018-09-03 17:31:05 +02:00
r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to pts/ptmx: %m", devptmx);
goto fail;
}
} else {
r = clone_device_node("/dev/ptmx", temporary_mount, &can_mknod);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
}
devshm = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/shm");
(void) mkdir(devshm, 0755);
r = mount("/dev/shm", devshm, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
if (r < 0) {
2018-09-03 17:31:05 +02:00
r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to bind mount /dev/shm on '%s': %m", devshm);
goto fail;
}
devmqueue = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/mqueue");
(void) mkdir(devmqueue, 0755);
2018-09-03 17:31:05 +02:00
if (mount("/dev/mqueue", devmqueue, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0)
log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to bind mount /dev/mqueue on '%s', ignoring: %m", devmqueue);
devhugepages = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/hugepages");
(void) mkdir(devhugepages, 0755);
2018-09-03 17:31:05 +02:00
if (mount("/dev/hugepages", devhugepages, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0)
log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to bind mount /dev/hugepages on '%s', ignoring: %m", devhugepages);
devlog = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/log");
2018-09-03 17:31:05 +02:00
if (symlink("/run/systemd/journal/dev-log", devlog) < 0)
log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to /run/systemd/journal/dev-log, ignoring: %m", devlog);
NULSTR_FOREACH(d, devnodes) {
r = clone_device_node(d, temporary_mount, &can_mknod);
/* ENXIO means the *source* is not a device file, skip creation in that case */
if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO)
goto fail;
}
2018-09-03 17:31:05 +02:00
r = dev_setup(temporary_mount, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
if (r < 0)
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up basic device tree at '%s', ignoring: %m", temporary_mount);
/* Create the /dev directory if missing. It is more likely to be
* missing when the service is started with RootDirectory. This is
* consistent with mount units creating the mount points when missing.
*/
(void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
/* Unmount everything in old /dev */
2018-09-03 17:31:05 +02:00
r = umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0);
if (r < 0)
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to unmount directories below '%s', ignoring: %m", mount_entry_path(m));
if (mount(dev, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL) < 0) {
2018-09-03 17:31:05 +02:00
r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to move mount point '%s' to '%s': %m", dev, mount_entry_path(m));
goto fail;
}
(void) rmdir(dev);
(void) rmdir(temporary_mount);
return 0;
fail:
if (devpts)
(void) umount(devpts);
if (devshm)
(void) umount(devshm);
if (devhugepages)
(void) umount(devhugepages);
if (devmqueue)
(void) umount(devmqueue);
(void) umount(dev);
(void) rmdir(dev);
(void) rmdir(temporary_mount);
return r;
}
static int mount_bind_dev(const MountEntry *m) {
int r;
assert(m);
/* Implements the little brother of mount_private_dev(): simply bind mounts the host's /dev into the service's
* /dev. This is only used when RootDirectory= is set. */
(void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /dev is already mounted: %m");
if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /dev is already a mount point */
return 0;
if (mount("/dev", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL) < 0)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to bind mount %s: %m", mount_entry_path(m));
return 1;
}
static int mount_sysfs(const MountEntry *m) {
int r;
assert(m);
(void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /sys is already mounted: %m");
if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /sys is already a mount point */
return 0;
/* Bind mount the host's version so that we get all child mounts of it, too. */
if (mount("/sys", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL) < 0)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to mount %s: %m", mount_entry_path(m));
return 1;
}
static int mount_procfs(const MountEntry *m) {
int r;
assert(m);
(void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /proc is already mounted: %m");
if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /proc is already a mount point */
return 0;
/* Mount a new instance, so that we get the one that matches our user namespace, if we are running in one */
if (mount("proc", mount_entry_path(m), "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, NULL) < 0)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to mount %s: %m", mount_entry_path(m));
return 1;
}
static int mount_tmpfs(const MountEntry *m) {
int r;
const char *entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
const char *source_path = m->path_const;
execute: make StateDirectory= and friends compatible with DynamicUser=1 and RootDirectory=/RootImage= Let's clean up the interaction of StateDirectory= (and friends) to DynamicUser=1: instead of creating these directories directly below /var/lib, place them in /var/lib/private instead if DynamicUser=1 is set, making that directory 0700 and owned by root:root. This way, if a dynamic UID is later reused, access to the old run's state directory is prohibited for that user. Then, use file system namespacing inside the service to make /var/lib/private a readable tmpfs, hiding all state directories that are not listed in StateDirectory=, and making access to the actual state directory possible. Mount all directories listed in StateDirectory= to the same places inside the service (which means they'll now be mounted into the tmpfs instance). Finally, add a symlink from the state directory name in /var/lib/ to the one in /var/lib/private, so that both the host and the service can access the path under the same location. Here's an example: let's say a service runs with StateDirectory=foo. When DynamicUser=0 is set, it will get the following setup, and no difference between what the unit and what the host sees: /var/lib/foo (created as directory) Now, if DynamicUser=1 is set, we'll instead get this on the host: /var/lib/private (created as directory with mode 0700, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (created as directory) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (created as symlink) And from inside the unit: /var/lib/private (a tmpfs mount with mode 0755, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (bind mounted from the host) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (the same symlink as above) This takes inspiration from how container trees are protected below /var/lib/machines: they generally reuse UIDs/GIDs of the host, but because /var/lib/machines itself is set to 0700 host users cannot access files in the container tree even if the UIDs/GIDs are reused. However, for this commit we add one further trick: inside and outside of the unit /var/lib/private is a different thing: outside it is a plain, inaccessible directory, and inside it is a world-readable tmpfs mount with only the whitelisted subdirs below it, bind mounte din. This means, from the outside the dir acts as an access barrier, but from the inside it does not. And the symlink created in /var/lib/foo itself points across the barrier in both cases, so that root and the unit's user always have access to these dirs without knowing the details of this mounting magic. This logic resolves a major shortcoming of DynamicUser=1 units: previously they couldn't safely store persistant data. With this change they can have their own private state, log and data directories, which they can write to, but which are protected from UID recycling. With this change, if RootDirectory= or RootImage= are used it is ensured that the specified state/log/cache directories are always mounted in from the host. This change of semantics I think is much preferable since this means the root directory/image logic can be used easily for read-only resource bundling (as all writable data resides outside of the image). Note that this is a change of behaviour, but given that we haven't released any systemd version with StateDirectory= and friends implemented this should be a safe change to make (in particular as previously it wasn't clear what would actually happen when used in combination). Moreover, by making this change we can later add a "+" modifier to these setings too working similar to the same modifier in ReadOnlyPaths= and friends, making specified paths relative to the container itself.
2017-09-28 18:55:45 +02:00
assert(m);
/* First, get rid of everything that is below if there is anything. Then, overmount with our new tmpfs */
execute: make StateDirectory= and friends compatible with DynamicUser=1 and RootDirectory=/RootImage= Let's clean up the interaction of StateDirectory= (and friends) to DynamicUser=1: instead of creating these directories directly below /var/lib, place them in /var/lib/private instead if DynamicUser=1 is set, making that directory 0700 and owned by root:root. This way, if a dynamic UID is later reused, access to the old run's state directory is prohibited for that user. Then, use file system namespacing inside the service to make /var/lib/private a readable tmpfs, hiding all state directories that are not listed in StateDirectory=, and making access to the actual state directory possible. Mount all directories listed in StateDirectory= to the same places inside the service (which means they'll now be mounted into the tmpfs instance). Finally, add a symlink from the state directory name in /var/lib/ to the one in /var/lib/private, so that both the host and the service can access the path under the same location. Here's an example: let's say a service runs with StateDirectory=foo. When DynamicUser=0 is set, it will get the following setup, and no difference between what the unit and what the host sees: /var/lib/foo (created as directory) Now, if DynamicUser=1 is set, we'll instead get this on the host: /var/lib/private (created as directory with mode 0700, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (created as directory) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (created as symlink) And from inside the unit: /var/lib/private (a tmpfs mount with mode 0755, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (bind mounted from the host) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (the same symlink as above) This takes inspiration from how container trees are protected below /var/lib/machines: they generally reuse UIDs/GIDs of the host, but because /var/lib/machines itself is set to 0700 host users cannot access files in the container tree even if the UIDs/GIDs are reused. However, for this commit we add one further trick: inside and outside of the unit /var/lib/private is a different thing: outside it is a plain, inaccessible directory, and inside it is a world-readable tmpfs mount with only the whitelisted subdirs below it, bind mounte din. This means, from the outside the dir acts as an access barrier, but from the inside it does not. And the symlink created in /var/lib/foo itself points across the barrier in both cases, so that root and the unit's user always have access to these dirs without knowing the details of this mounting magic. This logic resolves a major shortcoming of DynamicUser=1 units: previously they couldn't safely store persistant data. With this change they can have their own private state, log and data directories, which they can write to, but which are protected from UID recycling. With this change, if RootDirectory= or RootImage= are used it is ensured that the specified state/log/cache directories are always mounted in from the host. This change of semantics I think is much preferable since this means the root directory/image logic can be used easily for read-only resource bundling (as all writable data resides outside of the image). Note that this is a change of behaviour, but given that we haven't released any systemd version with StateDirectory= and friends implemented this should be a safe change to make (in particular as previously it wasn't clear what would actually happen when used in combination). Moreover, by making this change we can later add a "+" modifier to these setings too working similar to the same modifier in ReadOnlyPaths= and friends, making specified paths relative to the container itself.
2017-09-28 18:55:45 +02:00
(void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
(void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
execute: make StateDirectory= and friends compatible with DynamicUser=1 and RootDirectory=/RootImage= Let's clean up the interaction of StateDirectory= (and friends) to DynamicUser=1: instead of creating these directories directly below /var/lib, place them in /var/lib/private instead if DynamicUser=1 is set, making that directory 0700 and owned by root:root. This way, if a dynamic UID is later reused, access to the old run's state directory is prohibited for that user. Then, use file system namespacing inside the service to make /var/lib/private a readable tmpfs, hiding all state directories that are not listed in StateDirectory=, and making access to the actual state directory possible. Mount all directories listed in StateDirectory= to the same places inside the service (which means they'll now be mounted into the tmpfs instance). Finally, add a symlink from the state directory name in /var/lib/ to the one in /var/lib/private, so that both the host and the service can access the path under the same location. Here's an example: let's say a service runs with StateDirectory=foo. When DynamicUser=0 is set, it will get the following setup, and no difference between what the unit and what the host sees: /var/lib/foo (created as directory) Now, if DynamicUser=1 is set, we'll instead get this on the host: /var/lib/private (created as directory with mode 0700, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (created as directory) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (created as symlink) And from inside the unit: /var/lib/private (a tmpfs mount with mode 0755, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (bind mounted from the host) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (the same symlink as above) This takes inspiration from how container trees are protected below /var/lib/machines: they generally reuse UIDs/GIDs of the host, but because /var/lib/machines itself is set to 0700 host users cannot access files in the container tree even if the UIDs/GIDs are reused. However, for this commit we add one further trick: inside and outside of the unit /var/lib/private is a different thing: outside it is a plain, inaccessible directory, and inside it is a world-readable tmpfs mount with only the whitelisted subdirs below it, bind mounte din. This means, from the outside the dir acts as an access barrier, but from the inside it does not. And the symlink created in /var/lib/foo itself points across the barrier in both cases, so that root and the unit's user always have access to these dirs without knowing the details of this mounting magic. This logic resolves a major shortcoming of DynamicUser=1 units: previously they couldn't safely store persistant data. With this change they can have their own private state, log and data directories, which they can write to, but which are protected from UID recycling. With this change, if RootDirectory= or RootImage= are used it is ensured that the specified state/log/cache directories are always mounted in from the host. This change of semantics I think is much preferable since this means the root directory/image logic can be used easily for read-only resource bundling (as all writable data resides outside of the image). Note that this is a change of behaviour, but given that we haven't released any systemd version with StateDirectory= and friends implemented this should be a safe change to make (in particular as previously it wasn't clear what would actually happen when used in combination). Moreover, by making this change we can later add a "+" modifier to these setings too working similar to the same modifier in ReadOnlyPaths= and friends, making specified paths relative to the container itself.
2017-09-28 18:55:45 +02:00
if (mount("tmpfs", entry_path, "tmpfs", m->flags, mount_entry_options(m)) < 0)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to mount %s: %m", entry_path);
r = label_fix_container(entry_path, source_path, 0);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as '%s': %m", entry_path, source_path);
execute: make StateDirectory= and friends compatible with DynamicUser=1 and RootDirectory=/RootImage= Let's clean up the interaction of StateDirectory= (and friends) to DynamicUser=1: instead of creating these directories directly below /var/lib, place them in /var/lib/private instead if DynamicUser=1 is set, making that directory 0700 and owned by root:root. This way, if a dynamic UID is later reused, access to the old run's state directory is prohibited for that user. Then, use file system namespacing inside the service to make /var/lib/private a readable tmpfs, hiding all state directories that are not listed in StateDirectory=, and making access to the actual state directory possible. Mount all directories listed in StateDirectory= to the same places inside the service (which means they'll now be mounted into the tmpfs instance). Finally, add a symlink from the state directory name in /var/lib/ to the one in /var/lib/private, so that both the host and the service can access the path under the same location. Here's an example: let's say a service runs with StateDirectory=foo. When DynamicUser=0 is set, it will get the following setup, and no difference between what the unit and what the host sees: /var/lib/foo (created as directory) Now, if DynamicUser=1 is set, we'll instead get this on the host: /var/lib/private (created as directory with mode 0700, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (created as directory) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (created as symlink) And from inside the unit: /var/lib/private (a tmpfs mount with mode 0755, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (bind mounted from the host) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (the same symlink as above) This takes inspiration from how container trees are protected below /var/lib/machines: they generally reuse UIDs/GIDs of the host, but because /var/lib/machines itself is set to 0700 host users cannot access files in the container tree even if the UIDs/GIDs are reused. However, for this commit we add one further trick: inside and outside of the unit /var/lib/private is a different thing: outside it is a plain, inaccessible directory, and inside it is a world-readable tmpfs mount with only the whitelisted subdirs below it, bind mounte din. This means, from the outside the dir acts as an access barrier, but from the inside it does not. And the symlink created in /var/lib/foo itself points across the barrier in both cases, so that root and the unit's user always have access to these dirs without knowing the details of this mounting magic. This logic resolves a major shortcoming of DynamicUser=1 units: previously they couldn't safely store persistant data. With this change they can have their own private state, log and data directories, which they can write to, but which are protected from UID recycling. With this change, if RootDirectory= or RootImage= are used it is ensured that the specified state/log/cache directories are always mounted in from the host. This change of semantics I think is much preferable since this means the root directory/image logic can be used easily for read-only resource bundling (as all writable data resides outside of the image). Note that this is a change of behaviour, but given that we haven't released any systemd version with StateDirectory= and friends implemented this should be a safe change to make (in particular as previously it wasn't clear what would actually happen when used in combination). Moreover, by making this change we can later add a "+" modifier to these setings too working similar to the same modifier in ReadOnlyPaths= and friends, making specified paths relative to the container itself.
2017-09-28 18:55:45 +02:00
return 1;
}
static int mount_images(const MountEntry *m) {
_cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *loop_device = NULL;
_cleanup_(decrypted_image_unrefp) DecryptedImage *decrypted_image = NULL;
_cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp) DissectedImage *dissected_image = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ void *root_hash_decoded = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *verity_data = NULL, *hash_sig = NULL;
DissectImageFlags dissect_image_flags = m->read_only ? DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY : 0;
size_t root_hash_size = 0;
int r;
r = verity_metadata_load(mount_entry_source(m), NULL, &root_hash_decoded, &root_hash_size, &verity_data, &hash_sig);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to load root hash: %m");
dissect_image_flags |= verity_data ? DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE : 0;
r = loop_device_make_by_path(mount_entry_source(m),
m->read_only ? O_RDONLY : -1 /* < 0 means writable if possible, read-only as fallback */,
verity_data ? 0 : LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN,
&loop_device);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create loop device for image: %m");
r = dissect_image(loop_device->fd, root_hash_decoded, root_hash_size, verity_data, NULL, dissect_image_flags, &dissected_image);
/* No partition table? Might be a single-filesystem image, try again */
if (!verity_data && r < 0 && r == -ENOPKG)
r = dissect_image(loop_device->fd, root_hash_decoded, root_hash_size, verity_data, NULL, dissect_image_flags|DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE, &dissected_image);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to dissect image: %m");
r = dissected_image_decrypt(dissected_image, NULL, root_hash_decoded, root_hash_size, verity_data, hash_sig, NULL, 0, dissect_image_flags, &decrypted_image);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to decrypt dissected image: %m");
r = mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create destination directory %s: %m", mount_entry_path(m));
r = umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to umount under destination directory %s: %m", mount_entry_path(m));
r = dissected_image_mount(dissected_image, mount_entry_path(m), UID_INVALID, dissect_image_flags);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount image: %m");
if (decrypted_image) {
r = decrypted_image_relinquish(decrypted_image);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to relinquish decrypted image: %m");
}
loop_device_relinquish(loop_device);
return 1;
}
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
static int follow_symlink(
const char *root_directory,
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
MountEntry *m) {
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
_cleanup_free_ char *target = NULL;
int r;
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
/* Let's chase symlinks, but only one step at a time. That's because depending where the symlink points we
* might need to change the order in which we mount stuff. Hence: let's normalize piecemeal, and do one step at
* a time by specifying CHASE_STEP. This function returns 0 if we resolved one step, and > 0 if we reached the
* end and already have a fully normalized name. */
r = chase_symlinks(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, CHASE_STEP|CHASE_NONEXISTENT, &target, NULL);
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to chase symlinks '%s': %m", mount_entry_path(m));
if (r > 0) /* Reached the end, nothing more to resolve */
return 1;
if (m->n_followed >= CHASE_SYMLINKS_MAX) /* put a boundary on things */
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP),
"Symlink loop on '%s'.",
mount_entry_path(m));
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
log_debug("Followed mount entry path symlink %s → %s.", mount_entry_path(m), target);
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
free_and_replace(m->path_malloc, target);
m->has_prefix = true;
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
m->n_followed ++;
return 0;
}
static int apply_mount(
const char *root_directory,
MountEntry *m) {
_cleanup_free_ char *inaccessible = NULL;
bool rbind = true, make = false;
const char *what;
int r;
assert(m);
log_debug("Applying namespace mount on %s", mount_entry_path(m));
switch (m->mode) {
case INACCESSIBLE: {
_cleanup_free_ char *tmp = NULL;
const char *runtime_dir;
struct stat target;
/* First, get rid of everything that is below if there
* is anything... Then, overmount it with an
* inaccessible path. */
(void) umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0);
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
if (lstat(mount_entry_path(m), &target) < 0) {
if (errno == ENOENT && m->ignore)
return 0;
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to lstat() %s to determine what to mount over it: %m",
mount_entry_path(m));
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
}
if (geteuid() == 0)
runtime_dir = "/run";
else {
if (asprintf(&tmp, "/run/user/" UID_FMT, geteuid()) < 0)
return -ENOMEM;
runtime_dir = tmp;
}
r = mode_to_inaccessible_node(runtime_dir, target.st_mode, &inaccessible);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP),
"File type not supported for inaccessible mounts. Note that symlinks are not allowed");
what = inaccessible;
break;
}
case READONLY:
case READWRITE:
case READWRITE_IMPLICIT:
r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, 0);
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
return 0;
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine whether %s is already a mount point: %m",
mount_entry_path(m));
if (r > 0) /* Nothing to do here, it is already a mount. We just later toggle the MS_RDONLY
* bit for the mount point if needed. */
namespace: rework how ReadWritePaths= is applied Previously, if ReadWritePaths= was nested inside a ReadOnlyPaths= specification, then we'd first recursively apply the ReadOnlyPaths= paths, and make everything below read-only, only in order to then flip the read-only bit again for the subdirs listed in ReadWritePaths= below it. This is not only ugly (as for the dirs in question we first turn on the RO bit, only to turn it off again immediately after), but also problematic in containers, where a container manager might have marked a set of dirs read-only and this code will undo this is ReadWritePaths= is set for any. With this patch behaviour in this regard is altered: ReadOnlyPaths= will not be applied to the children listed in ReadWritePaths= in the first place, so that we do not need to turn off the RO bit for those after all. This means that ReadWritePaths=/ReadOnlyPaths= may only be used to turn on the RO bit, but never to turn it off again. Or to say this differently: if some dirs are marked read-only via some external tool, then ReadWritePaths= will not undo it. This is not only the safer option, but also more in-line with what the man page currently claims: "Entries (files or directories) listed in ReadWritePaths= are accessible from within the namespace with the same access rights as from outside." To implement this change bind_remount_recursive() gained a new "blacklist" string list parameter, which when passed may contain subdirs that shall be excluded from the read-only mounting. A number of functions are updated to add more debug logging to make this more digestable.
2016-09-25 10:40:51 +02:00
return 0;
/* This isn't a mount point yet, let's make it one. */
what = mount_entry_path(m);
namespace: rework how ReadWritePaths= is applied Previously, if ReadWritePaths= was nested inside a ReadOnlyPaths= specification, then we'd first recursively apply the ReadOnlyPaths= paths, and make everything below read-only, only in order to then flip the read-only bit again for the subdirs listed in ReadWritePaths= below it. This is not only ugly (as for the dirs in question we first turn on the RO bit, only to turn it off again immediately after), but also problematic in containers, where a container manager might have marked a set of dirs read-only and this code will undo this is ReadWritePaths= is set for any. With this patch behaviour in this regard is altered: ReadOnlyPaths= will not be applied to the children listed in ReadWritePaths= in the first place, so that we do not need to turn off the RO bit for those after all. This means that ReadWritePaths=/ReadOnlyPaths= may only be used to turn on the RO bit, but never to turn it off again. Or to say this differently: if some dirs are marked read-only via some external tool, then ReadWritePaths= will not undo it. This is not only the safer option, but also more in-line with what the man page currently claims: "Entries (files or directories) listed in ReadWritePaths= are accessible from within the namespace with the same access rights as from outside." To implement this change bind_remount_recursive() gained a new "blacklist" string list parameter, which when passed may contain subdirs that shall be excluded from the read-only mounting. A number of functions are updated to add more debug logging to make this more digestable.
2016-09-25 10:40:51 +02:00
break;
case BIND_MOUNT:
rbind = false;
_fallthrough_;
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
case BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE: {
_cleanup_free_ char *chased = NULL;
/* Since mount() will always follow symlinks we chase the symlinks on our own first. Note
* that bind mount source paths are always relative to the host root, hence we pass NULL as
* root directory to chase_symlinks() here. */
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
r = chase_symlinks(mount_entry_source(m), NULL, CHASE_TRAIL_SLASH, &chased, NULL);
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) {
log_debug_errno(r, "Path %s does not exist, ignoring.", mount_entry_source(m));
return 0;
}
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to follow symlinks on %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
log_debug("Followed source symlinks %s → %s.", mount_entry_source(m), chased);
free_and_replace(m->source_malloc, chased);
what = mount_entry_source(m);
make = true;
break;
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
}
execute: make StateDirectory= and friends compatible with DynamicUser=1 and RootDirectory=/RootImage= Let's clean up the interaction of StateDirectory= (and friends) to DynamicUser=1: instead of creating these directories directly below /var/lib, place them in /var/lib/private instead if DynamicUser=1 is set, making that directory 0700 and owned by root:root. This way, if a dynamic UID is later reused, access to the old run's state directory is prohibited for that user. Then, use file system namespacing inside the service to make /var/lib/private a readable tmpfs, hiding all state directories that are not listed in StateDirectory=, and making access to the actual state directory possible. Mount all directories listed in StateDirectory= to the same places inside the service (which means they'll now be mounted into the tmpfs instance). Finally, add a symlink from the state directory name in /var/lib/ to the one in /var/lib/private, so that both the host and the service can access the path under the same location. Here's an example: let's say a service runs with StateDirectory=foo. When DynamicUser=0 is set, it will get the following setup, and no difference between what the unit and what the host sees: /var/lib/foo (created as directory) Now, if DynamicUser=1 is set, we'll instead get this on the host: /var/lib/private (created as directory with mode 0700, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (created as directory) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (created as symlink) And from inside the unit: /var/lib/private (a tmpfs mount with mode 0755, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (bind mounted from the host) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (the same symlink as above) This takes inspiration from how container trees are protected below /var/lib/machines: they generally reuse UIDs/GIDs of the host, but because /var/lib/machines itself is set to 0700 host users cannot access files in the container tree even if the UIDs/GIDs are reused. However, for this commit we add one further trick: inside and outside of the unit /var/lib/private is a different thing: outside it is a plain, inaccessible directory, and inside it is a world-readable tmpfs mount with only the whitelisted subdirs below it, bind mounte din. This means, from the outside the dir acts as an access barrier, but from the inside it does not. And the symlink created in /var/lib/foo itself points across the barrier in both cases, so that root and the unit's user always have access to these dirs without knowing the details of this mounting magic. This logic resolves a major shortcoming of DynamicUser=1 units: previously they couldn't safely store persistant data. With this change they can have their own private state, log and data directories, which they can write to, but which are protected from UID recycling. With this change, if RootDirectory= or RootImage= are used it is ensured that the specified state/log/cache directories are always mounted in from the host. This change of semantics I think is much preferable since this means the root directory/image logic can be used easily for read-only resource bundling (as all writable data resides outside of the image). Note that this is a change of behaviour, but given that we haven't released any systemd version with StateDirectory= and friends implemented this should be a safe change to make (in particular as previously it wasn't clear what would actually happen when used in combination). Moreover, by making this change we can later add a "+" modifier to these setings too working similar to the same modifier in ReadOnlyPaths= and friends, making specified paths relative to the container itself.
2017-09-28 18:55:45 +02:00
case EMPTY_DIR:
case TMPFS:
return mount_tmpfs(m);
execute: make StateDirectory= and friends compatible with DynamicUser=1 and RootDirectory=/RootImage= Let's clean up the interaction of StateDirectory= (and friends) to DynamicUser=1: instead of creating these directories directly below /var/lib, place them in /var/lib/private instead if DynamicUser=1 is set, making that directory 0700 and owned by root:root. This way, if a dynamic UID is later reused, access to the old run's state directory is prohibited for that user. Then, use file system namespacing inside the service to make /var/lib/private a readable tmpfs, hiding all state directories that are not listed in StateDirectory=, and making access to the actual state directory possible. Mount all directories listed in StateDirectory= to the same places inside the service (which means they'll now be mounted into the tmpfs instance). Finally, add a symlink from the state directory name in /var/lib/ to the one in /var/lib/private, so that both the host and the service can access the path under the same location. Here's an example: let's say a service runs with StateDirectory=foo. When DynamicUser=0 is set, it will get the following setup, and no difference between what the unit and what the host sees: /var/lib/foo (created as directory) Now, if DynamicUser=1 is set, we'll instead get this on the host: /var/lib/private (created as directory with mode 0700, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (created as directory) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (created as symlink) And from inside the unit: /var/lib/private (a tmpfs mount with mode 0755, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (bind mounted from the host) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (the same symlink as above) This takes inspiration from how container trees are protected below /var/lib/machines: they generally reuse UIDs/GIDs of the host, but because /var/lib/machines itself is set to 0700 host users cannot access files in the container tree even if the UIDs/GIDs are reused. However, for this commit we add one further trick: inside and outside of the unit /var/lib/private is a different thing: outside it is a plain, inaccessible directory, and inside it is a world-readable tmpfs mount with only the whitelisted subdirs below it, bind mounte din. This means, from the outside the dir acts as an access barrier, but from the inside it does not. And the symlink created in /var/lib/foo itself points across the barrier in both cases, so that root and the unit's user always have access to these dirs without knowing the details of this mounting magic. This logic resolves a major shortcoming of DynamicUser=1 units: previously they couldn't safely store persistant data. With this change they can have their own private state, log and data directories, which they can write to, but which are protected from UID recycling. With this change, if RootDirectory= or RootImage= are used it is ensured that the specified state/log/cache directories are always mounted in from the host. This change of semantics I think is much preferable since this means the root directory/image logic can be used easily for read-only resource bundling (as all writable data resides outside of the image). Note that this is a change of behaviour, but given that we haven't released any systemd version with StateDirectory= and friends implemented this should be a safe change to make (in particular as previously it wasn't clear what would actually happen when used in combination). Moreover, by making this change we can later add a "+" modifier to these setings too working similar to the same modifier in ReadOnlyPaths= and friends, making specified paths relative to the container itself.
2017-09-28 18:55:45 +02:00
case PRIVATE_TMP:
case PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY:
what = mount_entry_source(m);
make = true;
break;
case PRIVATE_DEV:
return mount_private_dev(m);
case BIND_DEV:
return mount_bind_dev(m);
case SYSFS:
return mount_sysfs(m);
case PROCFS:
return mount_procfs(m);
case MOUNT_IMAGES:
return mount_images(m);
default:
assert_not_reached("Unknown mode");
}
assert(what);
if (mount(what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL) < 0) {
bool try_again = false;
r = -errno;
if (r == -ENOENT && make) {
struct stat st;
/* Hmm, either the source or the destination are missing. Let's see if we can create
the destination, then try again. */
if (stat(what, &st) < 0)
log_error_errno(errno, "Mount point source '%s' is not accessible: %m", what);
else {
int q;
(void) mkdir_parents(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
q = mkdir(mount_entry_path(m), 0755) < 0 ? -errno : 0;
else
q = touch(mount_entry_path(m));
if (q < 0)
log_error_errno(q, "Failed to create destination mount point node '%s': %m",
mount_entry_path(m));
else
try_again = true;
}
}
if (try_again) {
if (mount(what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL) < 0)
r = -errno;
else
r = 0;
}
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to mount %s to %s: %m", what, mount_entry_path(m));
}
namespace: rework how ReadWritePaths= is applied Previously, if ReadWritePaths= was nested inside a ReadOnlyPaths= specification, then we'd first recursively apply the ReadOnlyPaths= paths, and make everything below read-only, only in order to then flip the read-only bit again for the subdirs listed in ReadWritePaths= below it. This is not only ugly (as for the dirs in question we first turn on the RO bit, only to turn it off again immediately after), but also problematic in containers, where a container manager might have marked a set of dirs read-only and this code will undo this is ReadWritePaths= is set for any. With this patch behaviour in this regard is altered: ReadOnlyPaths= will not be applied to the children listed in ReadWritePaths= in the first place, so that we do not need to turn off the RO bit for those after all. This means that ReadWritePaths=/ReadOnlyPaths= may only be used to turn on the RO bit, but never to turn it off again. Or to say this differently: if some dirs are marked read-only via some external tool, then ReadWritePaths= will not undo it. This is not only the safer option, but also more in-line with what the man page currently claims: "Entries (files or directories) listed in ReadWritePaths= are accessible from within the namespace with the same access rights as from outside." To implement this change bind_remount_recursive() gained a new "blacklist" string list parameter, which when passed may contain subdirs that shall be excluded from the read-only mounting. A number of functions are updated to add more debug logging to make this more digestable.
2016-09-25 10:40:51 +02:00
log_debug("Successfully mounted %s to %s", what, mount_entry_path(m));
namespace: rework how ReadWritePaths= is applied Previously, if ReadWritePaths= was nested inside a ReadOnlyPaths= specification, then we'd first recursively apply the ReadOnlyPaths= paths, and make everything below read-only, only in order to then flip the read-only bit again for the subdirs listed in ReadWritePaths= below it. This is not only ugly (as for the dirs in question we first turn on the RO bit, only to turn it off again immediately after), but also problematic in containers, where a container manager might have marked a set of dirs read-only and this code will undo this is ReadWritePaths= is set for any. With this patch behaviour in this regard is altered: ReadOnlyPaths= will not be applied to the children listed in ReadWritePaths= in the first place, so that we do not need to turn off the RO bit for those after all. This means that ReadWritePaths=/ReadOnlyPaths= may only be used to turn on the RO bit, but never to turn it off again. Or to say this differently: if some dirs are marked read-only via some external tool, then ReadWritePaths= will not undo it. This is not only the safer option, but also more in-line with what the man page currently claims: "Entries (files or directories) listed in ReadWritePaths= are accessible from within the namespace with the same access rights as from outside." To implement this change bind_remount_recursive() gained a new "blacklist" string list parameter, which when passed may contain subdirs that shall be excluded from the read-only mounting. A number of functions are updated to add more debug logging to make this more digestable.
2016-09-25 10:40:51 +02:00
return 0;
}
static int make_read_only(const MountEntry *m, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
unsigned long new_flags = 0, flags_mask = 0;
bool submounts = false;
namespace: rework how ReadWritePaths= is applied Previously, if ReadWritePaths= was nested inside a ReadOnlyPaths= specification, then we'd first recursively apply the ReadOnlyPaths= paths, and make everything below read-only, only in order to then flip the read-only bit again for the subdirs listed in ReadWritePaths= below it. This is not only ugly (as for the dirs in question we first turn on the RO bit, only to turn it off again immediately after), but also problematic in containers, where a container manager might have marked a set of dirs read-only and this code will undo this is ReadWritePaths= is set for any. With this patch behaviour in this regard is altered: ReadOnlyPaths= will not be applied to the children listed in ReadWritePaths= in the first place, so that we do not need to turn off the RO bit for those after all. This means that ReadWritePaths=/ReadOnlyPaths= may only be used to turn on the RO bit, but never to turn it off again. Or to say this differently: if some dirs are marked read-only via some external tool, then ReadWritePaths= will not undo it. This is not only the safer option, but also more in-line with what the man page currently claims: "Entries (files or directories) listed in ReadWritePaths= are accessible from within the namespace with the same access rights as from outside." To implement this change bind_remount_recursive() gained a new "blacklist" string list parameter, which when passed may contain subdirs that shall be excluded from the read-only mounting. A number of functions are updated to add more debug logging to make this more digestable.
2016-09-25 10:40:51 +02:00
int r = 0;
assert(m);
assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
if (mount_entry_read_only(m) || m->mode == PRIVATE_DEV) {
new_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
flags_mask |= MS_RDONLY;
}
if (m->nosuid) {
new_flags |= MS_NOSUID;
flags_mask |= MS_NOSUID;
}
if (flags_mask == 0) /* No Change? */
namespace: rework how ReadWritePaths= is applied Previously, if ReadWritePaths= was nested inside a ReadOnlyPaths= specification, then we'd first recursively apply the ReadOnlyPaths= paths, and make everything below read-only, only in order to then flip the read-only bit again for the subdirs listed in ReadWritePaths= below it. This is not only ugly (as for the dirs in question we first turn on the RO bit, only to turn it off again immediately after), but also problematic in containers, where a container manager might have marked a set of dirs read-only and this code will undo this is ReadWritePaths= is set for any. With this patch behaviour in this regard is altered: ReadOnlyPaths= will not be applied to the children listed in ReadWritePaths= in the first place, so that we do not need to turn off the RO bit for those after all. This means that ReadWritePaths=/ReadOnlyPaths= may only be used to turn on the RO bit, but never to turn it off again. Or to say this differently: if some dirs are marked read-only via some external tool, then ReadWritePaths= will not undo it. This is not only the safer option, but also more in-line with what the man page currently claims: "Entries (files or directories) listed in ReadWritePaths= are accessible from within the namespace with the same access rights as from outside." To implement this change bind_remount_recursive() gained a new "blacklist" string list parameter, which when passed may contain subdirs that shall be excluded from the read-only mounting. A number of functions are updated to add more debug logging to make this more digestable.
2016-09-25 10:40:51 +02:00
return 0;
/* We generally apply these changes recursively, except for /dev, and the cases we know there's
* nothing further down. Set /dev readonly, but not submounts like /dev/shm. Also, we only set the
* per-mount read-only flag. We can't set it on the superblock, if we are inside a user namespace
* and running Linux <= 4.17. */
submounts =
mount_entry_read_only(m) &&
!IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS);
if (submounts)
r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
else
r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, proc_self_mountinfo);
/* Not that we only turn on the MS_RDONLY flag here, we never turn it off. Something that was marked
* read-only already stays this way. This improves compatibility with container managers, where we
* won't attempt to undo read-only mounts already applied. */
if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
return 0;
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
return 0;
}
static bool namespace_info_mount_apivfs(const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
assert(ns_info);
/*
* ProtectControlGroups= and ProtectKernelTunables= imply MountAPIVFS=,
* since to protect the API VFS mounts, they need to be around in the
* first place...
*/
return ns_info->mount_apivfs ||
ns_info->protect_control_groups ||
ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables;
}
static size_t namespace_calculate_mounts(
const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
char** read_write_paths,
char** read_only_paths,
char** inaccessible_paths,
execute: make StateDirectory= and friends compatible with DynamicUser=1 and RootDirectory=/RootImage= Let's clean up the interaction of StateDirectory= (and friends) to DynamicUser=1: instead of creating these directories directly below /var/lib, place them in /var/lib/private instead if DynamicUser=1 is set, making that directory 0700 and owned by root:root. This way, if a dynamic UID is later reused, access to the old run's state directory is prohibited for that user. Then, use file system namespacing inside the service to make /var/lib/private a readable tmpfs, hiding all state directories that are not listed in StateDirectory=, and making access to the actual state directory possible. Mount all directories listed in StateDirectory= to the same places inside the service (which means they'll now be mounted into the tmpfs instance). Finally, add a symlink from the state directory name in /var/lib/ to the one in /var/lib/private, so that both the host and the service can access the path under the same location. Here's an example: let's say a service runs with StateDirectory=foo. When DynamicUser=0 is set, it will get the following setup, and no difference between what the unit and what the host sees: /var/lib/foo (created as directory) Now, if DynamicUser=1 is set, we'll instead get this on the host: /var/lib/private (created as directory with mode 0700, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (created as directory) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (created as symlink) And from inside the unit: /var/lib/private (a tmpfs mount with mode 0755, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (bind mounted from the host) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (the same symlink as above) This takes inspiration from how container trees are protected below /var/lib/machines: they generally reuse UIDs/GIDs of the host, but because /var/lib/machines itself is set to 0700 host users cannot access files in the container tree even if the UIDs/GIDs are reused. However, for this commit we add one further trick: inside and outside of the unit /var/lib/private is a different thing: outside it is a plain, inaccessible directory, and inside it is a world-readable tmpfs mount with only the whitelisted subdirs below it, bind mounte din. This means, from the outside the dir acts as an access barrier, but from the inside it does not. And the symlink created in /var/lib/foo itself points across the barrier in both cases, so that root and the unit's user always have access to these dirs without knowing the details of this mounting magic. This logic resolves a major shortcoming of DynamicUser=1 units: previously they couldn't safely store persistant data. With this change they can have their own private state, log and data directories, which they can write to, but which are protected from UID recycling. With this change, if RootDirectory= or RootImage= are used it is ensured that the specified state/log/cache directories are always mounted in from the host. This change of semantics I think is much preferable since this means the root directory/image logic can be used easily for read-only resource bundling (as all writable data resides outside of the image). Note that this is a change of behaviour, but given that we haven't released any systemd version with StateDirectory= and friends implemented this should be a safe change to make (in particular as previously it wasn't clear what would actually happen when used in combination). Moreover, by making this change we can later add a "+" modifier to these setings too working similar to the same modifier in ReadOnlyPaths= and friends, making specified paths relative to the container itself.
2017-09-28 18:55:45 +02:00
char** empty_directories,
size_t n_bind_mounts,
size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
size_t n_mount_images,
const char* tmp_dir,
const char* var_tmp_dir,
const char* log_namespace,
ProtectHome protect_home,
ProtectSystem protect_system) {
size_t protect_home_cnt;
size_t protect_system_cnt =
(protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT ?
ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table) :
((protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL) ?
ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table) :
((protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES) ?
ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table) : 0)));
protect_home_cnt =
(protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_YES ?
ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table) :
((protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY) ?
ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table) :
((protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS) ?
ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table) : 0)));
return !!tmp_dir + !!var_tmp_dir +
strv_length(read_write_paths) +
strv_length(read_only_paths) +
strv_length(inaccessible_paths) +
execute: make StateDirectory= and friends compatible with DynamicUser=1 and RootDirectory=/RootImage= Let's clean up the interaction of StateDirectory= (and friends) to DynamicUser=1: instead of creating these directories directly below /var/lib, place them in /var/lib/private instead if DynamicUser=1 is set, making that directory 0700 and owned by root:root. This way, if a dynamic UID is later reused, access to the old run's state directory is prohibited for that user. Then, use file system namespacing inside the service to make /var/lib/private a readable tmpfs, hiding all state directories that are not listed in StateDirectory=, and making access to the actual state directory possible. Mount all directories listed in StateDirectory= to the same places inside the service (which means they'll now be mounted into the tmpfs instance). Finally, add a symlink from the state directory name in /var/lib/ to the one in /var/lib/private, so that both the host and the service can access the path under the same location. Here's an example: let's say a service runs with StateDirectory=foo. When DynamicUser=0 is set, it will get the following setup, and no difference between what the unit and what the host sees: /var/lib/foo (created as directory) Now, if DynamicUser=1 is set, we'll instead get this on the host: /var/lib/private (created as directory with mode 0700, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (created as directory) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (created as symlink) And from inside the unit: /var/lib/private (a tmpfs mount with mode 0755, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (bind mounted from the host) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (the same symlink as above) This takes inspiration from how container trees are protected below /var/lib/machines: they generally reuse UIDs/GIDs of the host, but because /var/lib/machines itself is set to 0700 host users cannot access files in the container tree even if the UIDs/GIDs are reused. However, for this commit we add one further trick: inside and outside of the unit /var/lib/private is a different thing: outside it is a plain, inaccessible directory, and inside it is a world-readable tmpfs mount with only the whitelisted subdirs below it, bind mounte din. This means, from the outside the dir acts as an access barrier, but from the inside it does not. And the symlink created in /var/lib/foo itself points across the barrier in both cases, so that root and the unit's user always have access to these dirs without knowing the details of this mounting magic. This logic resolves a major shortcoming of DynamicUser=1 units: previously they couldn't safely store persistant data. With this change they can have their own private state, log and data directories, which they can write to, but which are protected from UID recycling. With this change, if RootDirectory= or RootImage= are used it is ensured that the specified state/log/cache directories are always mounted in from the host. This change of semantics I think is much preferable since this means the root directory/image logic can be used easily for read-only resource bundling (as all writable data resides outside of the image). Note that this is a change of behaviour, but given that we haven't released any systemd version with StateDirectory= and friends implemented this should be a safe change to make (in particular as previously it wasn't clear what would actually happen when used in combination). Moreover, by making this change we can later add a "+" modifier to these setings too working similar to the same modifier in ReadOnlyPaths= and friends, making specified paths relative to the container itself.
2017-09-28 18:55:45 +02:00
strv_length(empty_directories) +
n_bind_mounts +
n_mount_images +
n_temporary_filesystems +
ns_info->private_dev +
(ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_table) : 0) +
(ns_info->protect_kernel_modules ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table) : 0) +
(ns_info->protect_kernel_logs ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_table) : 0) +
(ns_info->protect_control_groups ? 1 : 0) +
protect_home_cnt + protect_system_cnt +
(ns_info->protect_hostname ? 2 : 0) +
(namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info) ? ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table) : 0) +
!!log_namespace;
}
static void normalize_mounts(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *mounts, size_t *n_mounts) {
assert(root_directory);
assert(n_mounts);
assert(mounts || *n_mounts == 0);
2018-09-18 01:39:24 +02:00
typesafe_qsort(mounts, *n_mounts, mount_path_compare);
drop_duplicates(mounts, n_mounts);
drop_outside_root(root_directory, mounts, n_mounts);
drop_inaccessible(mounts, n_mounts);
drop_nop(mounts, n_mounts);
}
static bool root_read_only(
char **read_only_paths,
ProtectSystem protect_system) {
/* Determine whether the root directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. */
if (protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT)
return true;
if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/"))
return true;
return false;
}
static bool home_read_only(
char** read_only_paths,
char** inaccessible_paths,
char** empty_directories,
const BindMount *bind_mounts,
size_t n_bind_mounts,
const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems,
size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
ProtectHome protect_home) {
size_t i;
/* Determine whether the /home directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. Yes,
* this is a bit sloppy, since we don't bother checking for cases where / is affected by multiple
* settings. */
if (protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO)
return true;
if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/home") ||
prefixed_path_strv_contains(inaccessible_paths, "/home") ||
prefixed_path_strv_contains(empty_directories, "/home"))
return true;
for (i = 0; i < n_temporary_filesystems; i++)
if (path_equal(temporary_filesystems[i].path, "/home"))
return true;
/* If /home is overmounted with some dir from the host it's not writable. */
for (i = 0; i < n_bind_mounts; i++)
if (path_equal(bind_mounts[i].destination, "/home"))
return true;
return false;
}
int setup_namespace(
const char* root_directory,
const char* root_image,
const MountOptions *root_image_options,
const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
char** read_write_paths,
char** read_only_paths,
char** inaccessible_paths,
execute: make StateDirectory= and friends compatible with DynamicUser=1 and RootDirectory=/RootImage= Let's clean up the interaction of StateDirectory= (and friends) to DynamicUser=1: instead of creating these directories directly below /var/lib, place them in /var/lib/private instead if DynamicUser=1 is set, making that directory 0700 and owned by root:root. This way, if a dynamic UID is later reused, access to the old run's state directory is prohibited for that user. Then, use file system namespacing inside the service to make /var/lib/private a readable tmpfs, hiding all state directories that are not listed in StateDirectory=, and making access to the actual state directory possible. Mount all directories listed in StateDirectory= to the same places inside the service (which means they'll now be mounted into the tmpfs instance). Finally, add a symlink from the state directory name in /var/lib/ to the one in /var/lib/private, so that both the host and the service can access the path under the same location. Here's an example: let's say a service runs with StateDirectory=foo. When DynamicUser=0 is set, it will get the following setup, and no difference between what the unit and what the host sees: /var/lib/foo (created as directory) Now, if DynamicUser=1 is set, we'll instead get this on the host: /var/lib/private (created as directory with mode 0700, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (created as directory) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (created as symlink) And from inside the unit: /var/lib/private (a tmpfs mount with mode 0755, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (bind mounted from the host) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (the same symlink as above) This takes inspiration from how container trees are protected below /var/lib/machines: they generally reuse UIDs/GIDs of the host, but because /var/lib/machines itself is set to 0700 host users cannot access files in the container tree even if the UIDs/GIDs are reused. However, for this commit we add one further trick: inside and outside of the unit /var/lib/private is a different thing: outside it is a plain, inaccessible directory, and inside it is a world-readable tmpfs mount with only the whitelisted subdirs below it, bind mounte din. This means, from the outside the dir acts as an access barrier, but from the inside it does not. And the symlink created in /var/lib/foo itself points across the barrier in both cases, so that root and the unit's user always have access to these dirs without knowing the details of this mounting magic. This logic resolves a major shortcoming of DynamicUser=1 units: previously they couldn't safely store persistant data. With this change they can have their own private state, log and data directories, which they can write to, but which are protected from UID recycling. With this change, if RootDirectory= or RootImage= are used it is ensured that the specified state/log/cache directories are always mounted in from the host. This change of semantics I think is much preferable since this means the root directory/image logic can be used easily for read-only resource bundling (as all writable data resides outside of the image). Note that this is a change of behaviour, but given that we haven't released any systemd version with StateDirectory= and friends implemented this should be a safe change to make (in particular as previously it wasn't clear what would actually happen when used in combination). Moreover, by making this change we can later add a "+" modifier to these setings too working similar to the same modifier in ReadOnlyPaths= and friends, making specified paths relative to the container itself.
2017-09-28 18:55:45 +02:00
char** empty_directories,
const BindMount *bind_mounts,
size_t n_bind_mounts,
const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems,
size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
const MountImage *mount_images,
size_t n_mount_images,
const char* tmp_dir,
const char* var_tmp_dir,
const char *log_namespace,
ProtectHome protect_home,
ProtectSystem protect_system,
unsigned long mount_flags,
const void *root_hash,
size_t root_hash_size,
const char *root_hash_path,
const void *root_hash_sig,
size_t root_hash_sig_size,
const char *root_hash_sig_path,
const char *root_verity,
DissectImageFlags dissect_image_flags,
char **error_path) {
_cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *loop_device = NULL;
_cleanup_(decrypted_image_unrefp) DecryptedImage *decrypted_image = NULL;
_cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp) DissectedImage *dissected_image = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ void *root_hash_decoded = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *verity_data = NULL, *hash_sig_path = NULL;
MountEntry *m = NULL, *mounts = NULL;
size_t n_mounts;
bool require_prefix = false;
const char *root;
int r = 0;
assert(ns_info);
if (mount_flags == 0)
mount_flags = MS_SHARED;
if (root_image) {
dissect_image_flags |= DISSECT_IMAGE_REQUIRE_ROOT;
/* Make the whole image read-only if we can determine that we only access it in a read-only fashion. */
if (root_read_only(read_only_paths,
protect_system) &&
home_read_only(read_only_paths, inaccessible_paths, empty_directories,
bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems,
protect_home) &&
strv_isempty(read_write_paths))
dissect_image_flags |= DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY;
r = loop_device_make_by_path(root_image,
FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY) ? O_RDONLY : -1 /* < 0 means writable if possible, read-only as fallback */,
LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN,
&loop_device);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create loop device for root image: %m");
r = verity_metadata_load(root_image,
root_hash_path,
root_hash ? NULL : &root_hash_decoded,
root_hash ? NULL : &root_hash_size,
root_verity ? NULL : &verity_data,
root_hash_sig || root_hash_sig_path ? NULL : &hash_sig_path);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to load root hash: %m");
dissect_image_flags |= root_verity || verity_data ? DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE : 0;
r = dissect_image(loop_device->fd,
root_hash ?: root_hash_decoded,
root_hash_size,
root_verity ?: verity_data,
root_image_options,
dissect_image_flags,
&dissected_image);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to dissect image: %m");
r = dissected_image_decrypt(dissected_image,
NULL,
root_hash ?: root_hash_decoded,
root_hash_size,
root_verity ?: verity_data,
root_hash_sig_path ?: hash_sig_path,
root_hash_sig,
root_hash_sig_size,
dissect_image_flags,
&decrypted_image);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to decrypt dissected image: %m");
}
if (root_directory)
root = root_directory;
else {
/* Always create the mount namespace in a temporary directory, instead of operating
* directly in the root. The temporary directory prevents any mounts from being
* potentially obscured my other mounts we already applied.
* We use the same mount point for all images, which is safe, since they all live
* in their own namespaces after all, and hence won't see each other. */
root = "/run/systemd/unit-root";
(void) mkdir_label(root, 0700);
require_prefix = true;
}
n_mounts = namespace_calculate_mounts(
ns_info,
read_write_paths,
read_only_paths,
inaccessible_paths,
execute: make StateDirectory= and friends compatible with DynamicUser=1 and RootDirectory=/RootImage= Let's clean up the interaction of StateDirectory= (and friends) to DynamicUser=1: instead of creating these directories directly below /var/lib, place them in /var/lib/private instead if DynamicUser=1 is set, making that directory 0700 and owned by root:root. This way, if a dynamic UID is later reused, access to the old run's state directory is prohibited for that user. Then, use file system namespacing inside the service to make /var/lib/private a readable tmpfs, hiding all state directories that are not listed in StateDirectory=, and making access to the actual state directory possible. Mount all directories listed in StateDirectory= to the same places inside the service (which means they'll now be mounted into the tmpfs instance). Finally, add a symlink from the state directory name in /var/lib/ to the one in /var/lib/private, so that both the host and the service can access the path under the same location. Here's an example: let's say a service runs with StateDirectory=foo. When DynamicUser=0 is set, it will get the following setup, and no difference between what the unit and what the host sees: /var/lib/foo (created as directory) Now, if DynamicUser=1 is set, we'll instead get this on the host: /var/lib/private (created as directory with mode 0700, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (created as directory) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (created as symlink) And from inside the unit: /var/lib/private (a tmpfs mount with mode 0755, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (bind mounted from the host) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (the same symlink as above) This takes inspiration from how container trees are protected below /var/lib/machines: they generally reuse UIDs/GIDs of the host, but because /var/lib/machines itself is set to 0700 host users cannot access files in the container tree even if the UIDs/GIDs are reused. However, for this commit we add one further trick: inside and outside of the unit /var/lib/private is a different thing: outside it is a plain, inaccessible directory, and inside it is a world-readable tmpfs mount with only the whitelisted subdirs below it, bind mounte din. This means, from the outside the dir acts as an access barrier, but from the inside it does not. And the symlink created in /var/lib/foo itself points across the barrier in both cases, so that root and the unit's user always have access to these dirs without knowing the details of this mounting magic. This logic resolves a major shortcoming of DynamicUser=1 units: previously they couldn't safely store persistant data. With this change they can have their own private state, log and data directories, which they can write to, but which are protected from UID recycling. With this change, if RootDirectory= or RootImage= are used it is ensured that the specified state/log/cache directories are always mounted in from the host. This change of semantics I think is much preferable since this means the root directory/image logic can be used easily for read-only resource bundling (as all writable data resides outside of the image). Note that this is a change of behaviour, but given that we haven't released any systemd version with StateDirectory= and friends implemented this should be a safe change to make (in particular as previously it wasn't clear what would actually happen when used in combination). Moreover, by making this change we can later add a "+" modifier to these setings too working similar to the same modifier in ReadOnlyPaths= and friends, making specified paths relative to the container itself.
2017-09-28 18:55:45 +02:00
empty_directories,
2018-02-13 06:21:13 +01:00
n_bind_mounts,
n_temporary_filesystems,
n_mount_images,
tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir,
log_namespace,
protect_home, protect_system);
if (n_mounts > 0) {
m = mounts = new0(MountEntry, n_mounts);
if (!mounts)
return -ENOMEM;
r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_write_paths, READWRITE, require_prefix);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_only_paths, READONLY, require_prefix);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
r = append_access_mounts(&m, inaccessible_paths, INACCESSIBLE, require_prefix);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
execute: make StateDirectory= and friends compatible with DynamicUser=1 and RootDirectory=/RootImage= Let's clean up the interaction of StateDirectory= (and friends) to DynamicUser=1: instead of creating these directories directly below /var/lib, place them in /var/lib/private instead if DynamicUser=1 is set, making that directory 0700 and owned by root:root. This way, if a dynamic UID is later reused, access to the old run's state directory is prohibited for that user. Then, use file system namespacing inside the service to make /var/lib/private a readable tmpfs, hiding all state directories that are not listed in StateDirectory=, and making access to the actual state directory possible. Mount all directories listed in StateDirectory= to the same places inside the service (which means they'll now be mounted into the tmpfs instance). Finally, add a symlink from the state directory name in /var/lib/ to the one in /var/lib/private, so that both the host and the service can access the path under the same location. Here's an example: let's say a service runs with StateDirectory=foo. When DynamicUser=0 is set, it will get the following setup, and no difference between what the unit and what the host sees: /var/lib/foo (created as directory) Now, if DynamicUser=1 is set, we'll instead get this on the host: /var/lib/private (created as directory with mode 0700, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (created as directory) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (created as symlink) And from inside the unit: /var/lib/private (a tmpfs mount with mode 0755, root:root) /var/lib/private/foo (bind mounted from the host) /var/lib/foo → private/foo (the same symlink as above) This takes inspiration from how container trees are protected below /var/lib/machines: they generally reuse UIDs/GIDs of the host, but because /var/lib/machines itself is set to 0700 host users cannot access files in the container tree even if the UIDs/GIDs are reused. However, for this commit we add one further trick: inside and outside of the unit /var/lib/private is a different thing: outside it is a plain, inaccessible directory, and inside it is a world-readable tmpfs mount with only the whitelisted subdirs below it, bind mounte din. This means, from the outside the dir acts as an access barrier, but from the inside it does not. And the symlink created in /var/lib/foo itself points across the barrier in both cases, so that root and the unit's user always have access to these dirs without knowing the details of this mounting magic. This logic resolves a major shortcoming of DynamicUser=1 units: previously they couldn't safely store persistant data. With this change they can have their own private state, log and data directories, which they can write to, but which are protected from UID recycling. With this change, if RootDirectory= or RootImage= are used it is ensured that the specified state/log/cache directories are always mounted in from the host. This change of semantics I think is much preferable since this means the root directory/image logic can be used easily for read-only resource bundling (as all writable data resides outside of the image). Note that this is a change of behaviour, but given that we haven't released any systemd version with StateDirectory= and friends implemented this should be a safe change to make (in particular as previously it wasn't clear what would actually happen when used in combination). Moreover, by making this change we can later add a "+" modifier to these setings too working similar to the same modifier in ReadOnlyPaths= and friends, making specified paths relative to the container itself.
2017-09-28 18:55:45 +02:00
r = append_empty_dir_mounts(&m, empty_directories);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
r = append_bind_mounts(&m, bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
r = append_tmpfs_mounts(&m, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
if (tmp_dir) {
bool ro = streq(tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
*(m++) = (MountEntry) {
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
.path_const = "/tmp",
.mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP,
.source_const = tmp_dir,
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
};
}
if (var_tmp_dir) {
bool ro = streq(var_tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
*(m++) = (MountEntry) {
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
.path_const = "/var/tmp",
.mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP,
.source_const = var_tmp_dir,
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
};
}
r = append_mount_images(&m, mount_images, n_mount_images);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
if (ns_info->private_dev) {
*(m++) = (MountEntry) {
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
.path_const = "/dev",
.mode = PRIVATE_DEV,
.flags = DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS,
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
};
}
if (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables) {
r = append_static_mounts(&m,
protect_kernel_tunables_table,
ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_table),
ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
}
if (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules) {
r = append_static_mounts(&m,
protect_kernel_modules_table,
ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table),
ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
}
if (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs) {
r = append_static_mounts(&m,
protect_kernel_logs_table,
ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_table),
ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
}
if (ns_info->protect_control_groups) {
*(m++) = (MountEntry) {
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
.path_const = "/sys/fs/cgroup",
.mode = READONLY,
};
}
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
r = append_protect_home(&m, protect_home, ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
r = append_protect_system(&m, protect_system, false);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
if (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info)) {
r = append_static_mounts(&m,
apivfs_table,
ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table),
ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
}
if (ns_info->protect_hostname) {
*(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/hostname",
.mode = READONLY,
};
*(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/domainname",
.mode = READONLY,
};
}
if (log_namespace) {
_cleanup_free_ char *q;
q = strjoin("/run/systemd/journal.", log_namespace);
if (!q) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto finish;
}
*(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/run/systemd/journal",
.mode = BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE,
.read_only = true,
.source_malloc = TAKE_PTR(q),
};
}
assert(mounts + n_mounts == m);
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
/* Prepend the root directory where that's necessary */
r = prefix_where_needed(mounts, n_mounts, root);
namespace: simplify, optimize and extend handling of mounts for namespace This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling: It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same, hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields. This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const" and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a BindMount structure. While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is implicited prefixed. This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead, which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done. This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough to be called directly. Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra bit in the BindMount structure.
2016-11-15 01:42:54 +01:00
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
normalize_mounts(root, mounts, &n_mounts);
}
/* All above is just preparation, figuring out what to do. Let's now actually start doing something. */
if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) < 0) {
r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to unshare the mount namespace: %m");
if (IN_SET(r, -EACCES, -EPERM, -EOPNOTSUPP, -ENOSYS))
/* If the kernel doesn't support namespaces, or when there's a MAC or seccomp filter
* in place that doesn't allow us to create namespaces (or a missing cap), then
* propagate a recognizable error back, which the caller can use to detect this case
* (and only this) and optionally continue without namespacing applied. */
r = -ENOANO;
goto finish;
}
/* Remount / as SLAVE so that nothing now mounted in the namespace
* shows up in the parent */
if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_SLAVE|MS_REC, NULL) < 0) {
r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' as SLAVE: %m");
goto finish;
}
if (root_image) {
/* A root image is specified, mount it to the right place */
r = dissected_image_mount(dissected_image, root, UID_INVALID, dissect_image_flags);
if (r < 0) {
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root image: %m");
goto finish;
}
if (decrypted_image) {
r = decrypted_image_relinquish(decrypted_image);
if (r < 0) {
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to relinquish decrypted image: %m");
goto finish;
}
}
loop_device_relinquish(loop_device);
} else if (root_directory) {
/* A root directory is specified. Turn its directory into bind mount, if it isn't one yet. */
r = path_is_mount_point(root, NULL, AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW);
if (r < 0) {
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect that %s is a mount point or not: %m", root);
goto finish;
}
if (r == 0) {
if (mount(root, root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL) < 0) {
r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to bind mount '%s': %m", root);
goto finish;
}
}
} else {
/* Let's mount the main root directory to the root directory to use */
if (mount("/", root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL) < 0) {
r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to bind mount '/' on '%s': %m", root);
goto finish;
}
}
/* Try to set up the new root directory before mounting anything else there. */
if (root_image || root_directory)
(void) base_filesystem_create(root, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
if (n_mounts > 0) {
_cleanup_fclose_ FILE *proc_self_mountinfo = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char **deny_list = NULL;
size_t j;
namespace: rework how ReadWritePaths= is applied Previously, if ReadWritePaths= was nested inside a ReadOnlyPaths= specification, then we'd first recursively apply the ReadOnlyPaths= paths, and make everything below read-only, only in order to then flip the read-only bit again for the subdirs listed in ReadWritePaths= below it. This is not only ugly (as for the dirs in question we first turn on the RO bit, only to turn it off again immediately after), but also problematic in containers, where a container manager might have marked a set of dirs read-only and this code will undo this is ReadWritePaths= is set for any. With this patch behaviour in this regard is altered: ReadOnlyPaths= will not be applied to the children listed in ReadWritePaths= in the first place, so that we do not need to turn off the RO bit for those after all. This means that ReadWritePaths=/ReadOnlyPaths= may only be used to turn on the RO bit, but never to turn it off again. Or to say this differently: if some dirs are marked read-only via some external tool, then ReadWritePaths= will not undo it. This is not only the safer option, but also more in-line with what the man page currently claims: "Entries (files or directories) listed in ReadWritePaths= are accessible from within the namespace with the same access rights as from outside." To implement this change bind_remount_recursive() gained a new "blacklist" string list parameter, which when passed may contain subdirs that shall be excluded from the read-only mounting. A number of functions are updated to add more debug logging to make this more digestable.
2016-09-25 10:40:51 +02:00
/* Open /proc/self/mountinfo now as it may become unavailable if we mount anything on top of
* /proc. For example, this is the case with the option: 'InaccessiblePaths=/proc'. */
proc_self_mountinfo = fopen("/proc/self/mountinfo", "re");
if (!proc_self_mountinfo) {
r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to open /proc/self/mountinfo: %m");
if (error_path)
*error_path = strdup("/proc/self/mountinfo");
goto finish;
}
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
/* First round, establish all mounts we need */
for (;;) {
bool again = false;
for (m = mounts; m < mounts + n_mounts; ++m) {
if (m->applied)
continue;
r = follow_symlink(root, m);
if (r < 0) {
if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
*error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
goto finish;
}
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
if (r == 0) {
/* We hit a symlinked mount point. The entry got rewritten and might
* point to a very different place now. Let's normalize the changed
* list, and start from the beginning. After all to mount the entry
* at the new location we might need some other mounts first */
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
again = true;
break;
}
r = apply_mount(root, m);
if (r < 0) {
if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
*error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
goto finish;
}
namespace: rework how we resolve symlinks in mount points Before this patch we'd resolve all symlinks of bind mounts and other mount points to establish for a service in advance, and only then start mounting them. This is problematic, if symlink chains jump around between directories in a namespace tree, so that to resolve a specific symlink chain we need to establish another mount already. A typical case where this happens is if /etc/resolv.conf is a symlink to some file in /run: in that case we'd normally resolve and mount /etc/resolv.conf early on, but that's broken, as to do this properly we'd need to resolve /etc/resolv.conf first, then figure out that /run needs to be mounted before we can proceed, and thus reorder the order in which we apply mounts dynamically. With this change, whenever we are about to apply a mount, we'll do a single step of the symlink normalization process, patch the mount entry accordingly, and then sort the list of mounts to establish again, taking the new path into account. This means that we can correctly deal with the example above: we might start with wanting to mount /etc/resolv.conf early, but after resolving it to the path in /run/ we'd push it to the end of the list, ensuring that /run is mounted first. (Note that this also fixes another bug: we were following symlinks on the bind mount source relative to the root directory of the service, rather than of the host. That's wrong though as we explicitly document tha the source of bind mounts is always on the host.)
2018-04-04 10:14:43 +02:00
m->applied = true;
}
if (!again)
break;
normalize_mounts(root, mounts, &n_mounts);
}
/* Create a deny list we can pass to bind_mount_recursive() */
deny_list = new(char*, n_mounts+1);
if (!deny_list) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto finish;
}
for (j = 0; j < n_mounts; j++)
deny_list[j] = (char*) mount_entry_path(mounts+j);
deny_list[j] = NULL;
namespace: rework how ReadWritePaths= is applied Previously, if ReadWritePaths= was nested inside a ReadOnlyPaths= specification, then we'd first recursively apply the ReadOnlyPaths= paths, and make everything below read-only, only in order to then flip the read-only bit again for the subdirs listed in ReadWritePaths= below it. This is not only ugly (as for the dirs in question we first turn on the RO bit, only to turn it off again immediately after), but also problematic in containers, where a container manager might have marked a set of dirs read-only and this code will undo this is ReadWritePaths= is set for any. With this patch behaviour in this regard is altered: ReadOnlyPaths= will not be applied to the children listed in ReadWritePaths= in the first place, so that we do not need to turn off the RO bit for those after all. This means that ReadWritePaths=/ReadOnlyPaths= may only be used to turn on the RO bit, but never to turn it off again. Or to say this differently: if some dirs are marked read-only via some external tool, then ReadWritePaths= will not undo it. This is not only the safer option, but also more in-line with what the man page currently claims: "Entries (files or directories) listed in ReadWritePaths= are accessible from within the namespace with the same access rights as from outside." To implement this change bind_remount_recursive() gained a new "blacklist" string list parameter, which when passed may contain subdirs that shall be excluded from the read-only mounting. A number of functions are updated to add more debug logging to make this more digestable.
2016-09-25 10:40:51 +02:00
/* Second round, flip the ro bits if necessary. */
for (m = mounts; m < mounts + n_mounts; ++m) {
r = make_read_only(m, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
if (r < 0) {
if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
*error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
goto finish;
}
}
}
/* MS_MOVE does not work on MS_SHARED so the remount MS_SHARED will be done later */
r = mount_move_root(root);
if (r < 0) {
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root with MS_MOVE: %m");
goto finish;
}
2018-02-14 05:29:13 +01:00
/* Remount / as the desired mode. Note that this will not
* reestablish propagation from our side to the host, since
* what's disconnected is disconnected. */
if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, mount_flags | MS_REC, NULL) < 0) {
r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' with desired mount flags: %m");
goto finish;
}
r = 0;
finish:
if (n_mounts > 0)
for (m = mounts; m < mounts + n_mounts; m++)
mount_entry_done(m);
free(mounts);
return r;
}
void bind_mount_free_many(BindMount *b, size_t n) {
size_t i;
assert(b || n == 0);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
free(b[i].source);
free(b[i].destination);
}
free(b);
}
int bind_mount_add(BindMount **b, size_t *n, const BindMount *item) {
_cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL;
BindMount *c;
assert(b);
assert(n);
assert(item);
s = strdup(item->source);
if (!s)
return -ENOMEM;
d = strdup(item->destination);
if (!d)
return -ENOMEM;
c = reallocarray(*b, *n + 1, sizeof(BindMount));
if (!c)
return -ENOMEM;
*b = c;
c[(*n) ++] = (BindMount) {
.source = TAKE_PTR(s),
.destination = TAKE_PTR(d),
.read_only = item->read_only,
.nosuid = item->nosuid,
.recursive = item->recursive,
.ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent,
};
return 0;
}
MountImage* mount_image_free_many(MountImage *m, size_t *n) {
size_t i;
assert(n);
assert(m || *n == 0);
for (i = 0; i < *n; i++) {
free(m[i].source);
free(m[i].destination);
}
free(m);
*n = 0;
return NULL;
}
int mount_image_add(MountImage **m, size_t *n, const MountImage *item) {
_cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL;
MountImage *c;
assert(m);
assert(n);
assert(item);
s = strdup(item->source);
if (!s)
return -ENOMEM;
d = strdup(item->destination);
if (!d)
return -ENOMEM;
c = reallocarray(*m, *n + 1, sizeof(MountImage));
if (!c)
return -ENOMEM;
*m = c;
c[(*n) ++] = (MountImage) {
.source = TAKE_PTR(s),
.destination = TAKE_PTR(d),
.ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent,
};
return 0;
}
void temporary_filesystem_free_many(TemporaryFileSystem *t, size_t n) {
size_t i;
assert(t || n == 0);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
free(t[i].path);
free(t[i].options);
}
free(t);
}
int temporary_filesystem_add(
TemporaryFileSystem **t,
size_t *n,
const char *path,
const char *options) {
_cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *o = NULL;
TemporaryFileSystem *c;
assert(t);
assert(n);
assert(path);
p = strdup(path);
if (!p)
return -ENOMEM;
if (!isempty(options)) {
o = strdup(options);
if (!o)
return -ENOMEM;
}
c = reallocarray(*t, *n + 1, sizeof(TemporaryFileSystem));
if (!c)
return -ENOMEM;
*t = c;
c[(*n) ++] = (TemporaryFileSystem) {
.path = TAKE_PTR(p),
.options = TAKE_PTR(o),
};
return 0;
}
static int make_tmp_prefix(const char *prefix) {
_cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
int r;
/* Don't do anything unless we know the dir is actually missing */
r = access(prefix, F_OK);
if (r >= 0)
return 0;
if (errno != ENOENT)
return -errno;
r = mkdir_parents(prefix, 0755);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = tempfn_random(prefix, NULL, &t);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (mkdir(t, 0777) < 0)
return -errno;
if (chmod(t, 01777) < 0) {
r = -errno;
(void) rmdir(t);
return r;
}
if (rename(t, prefix) < 0) {
r = -errno;
(void) rmdir(t);
return r == -EEXIST ? 0 : r; /* it's fine if someone else created the dir by now */
}
return 0;
}
static int make_tmp_subdir(const char *parent, char **ret) {
_cleanup_free_ char *y = NULL;
2020-08-14 11:07:18 +02:00
y = path_join(parent, "/tmp");
if (!y)
return -ENOMEM;
2020-08-14 11:07:18 +02:00
RUN_WITH_UMASK(0000) {
if (mkdir(y, 0777 | S_ISVTX) < 0)
return -errno;
}
if (ret)
*ret = TAKE_PTR(y);
return 0;
}
static int setup_one_tmp_dir(const char *id, const char *prefix, char **path, char **tmp_path) {
_cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL;
char bid[SD_ID128_STRING_MAX];
sd_id128_t boot_id;
bool rw = true;
int r;
assert(id);
assert(prefix);
assert(path);
/* We include the boot id in the directory so that after a
* reboot we can easily identify obsolete directories. */
r = sd_id128_get_boot(&boot_id);
if (r < 0)
return r;
x = strjoin(prefix, "/systemd-private-", sd_id128_to_string(boot_id, bid), "-", id, "-XXXXXX");
if (!x)
return -ENOMEM;
r = make_tmp_prefix(prefix);
if (r < 0)
return r;
RUN_WITH_UMASK(0077)
if (!mkdtemp(x)) {
if (errno == EROFS || ERRNO_IS_DISK_SPACE(errno))
rw = false;
else
return -errno;
}
if (rw) {
r = make_tmp_subdir(x, tmp_path);
if (r < 0)
return r;
} else {
/* Trouble: we failed to create the directory. Instead of failing, let's simulate /tmp being
* read-only. This way the service will get the EROFS result as if it was writing to the real
* file system. */
r = mkdir_p(RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY, 0500);
if (r < 0)
return r;
2020-08-14 11:07:18 +02:00
r = free_and_strdup(&x, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
*path = TAKE_PTR(x);
return 0;
}
int setup_tmp_dirs(const char *id, char **tmp_dir, char **var_tmp_dir) {
_cleanup_(namespace_cleanup_tmpdirp) char *a = NULL;
_cleanup_(rmdir_and_freep) char *a_tmp = NULL;
char *b;
int r;
assert(id);
assert(tmp_dir);
assert(var_tmp_dir);
r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/tmp", &a, &a_tmp);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/var/tmp", &b, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
a_tmp = mfree(a_tmp); /* avoid rmdir */
*tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(a);
*var_tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(b);
return 0;
}
int setup_netns(const int netns_storage_socket[static 2]) {
_cleanup_close_ int netns = -1;
int r, q;
assert(netns_storage_socket);
assert(netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0);
assert(netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0);
/* We use the passed socketpair as a storage buffer for our
2013-11-27 20:31:51 +01:00
* namespace reference fd. Whatever process runs this first
* shall create a new namespace, all others should just join
* it. To serialize that we use a file lock on the socket
* pair.
*
* It's a bit crazy, but hey, works great! */
if (lockf(netns_storage_socket[0], F_LOCK, 0) < 0)
return -errno;
netns = receive_one_fd(netns_storage_socket[0], MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (netns == -EAGAIN) {
2019-03-07 16:40:06 +01:00
/* Nothing stored yet, so let's create a new namespace. */
if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNET) < 0) {
r = -errno;
goto fail;
}
2019-03-07 16:40:06 +01:00
(void) loopback_setup();
netns = open("/proc/self/ns/net", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
if (netns < 0) {
r = -errno;
goto fail;
}
r = 1;
} else if (netns < 0) {
r = netns;
goto fail;
} else {
/* Yay, found something, so let's join the namespace */
if (setns(netns, CLONE_NEWNET) < 0) {
r = -errno;
goto fail;
}
r = 0;
}
q = send_one_fd(netns_storage_socket[1], netns, MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (q < 0) {
r = q;
goto fail;
}
fail:
2016-07-14 12:28:54 +02:00
(void) lockf(netns_storage_socket[0], F_ULOCK, 0);
return r;
}
int open_netns_path(const int netns_storage_socket[static 2], const char *path) {
_cleanup_close_ int netns = -1;
int q, r;
assert(netns_storage_socket);
assert(netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0);
assert(netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0);
assert(path);
/* If the storage socket doesn't contain a netns fd yet, open one via the file system and store it in
* it. This is supposed to be called ahead of time, i.e. before setup_netns() which will allocate a
* new anonymous netns if needed. */
if (lockf(netns_storage_socket[0], F_LOCK, 0) < 0)
return -errno;
netns = receive_one_fd(netns_storage_socket[0], MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (netns == -EAGAIN) {
/* Nothing stored yet. Open the file from the file system. */
netns = open(path, O_RDONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC);
if (netns < 0) {
r = -errno;
goto fail;
}
r = fd_is_network_ns(netns);
if (r == 0) { /* Not a netns? Refuse early. */
r = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
if (r < 0 && r != -EUCLEAN) /* EUCLEAN: we don't know */
goto fail;
r = 1;
} else if (netns < 0) {
r = netns;
goto fail;
} else
r = 0; /* Already allocated */
q = send_one_fd(netns_storage_socket[1], netns, MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (q < 0) {
r = q;
goto fail;
}
fail:
(void) lockf(netns_storage_socket[0], F_ULOCK, 0);
return r;
}
bool ns_type_supported(NamespaceType type) {
const char *t, *ns_proc;
t = namespace_type_to_string(type);
if (!t) /* Don't know how to translate this? Then it's not supported */
return false;
ns_proc = strjoina("/proc/self/ns/", t);
return access(ns_proc, F_OK) == 0;
}
static const char *const protect_home_table[_PROTECT_HOME_MAX] = {
[PROTECT_HOME_NO] = "no",
[PROTECT_HOME_YES] = "yes",
[PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY] = "read-only",
[PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS] = "tmpfs",
};
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_home, ProtectHome, PROTECT_HOME_YES);
static const char *const protect_system_table[_PROTECT_SYSTEM_MAX] = {
[PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO] = "no",
[PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES] = "yes",
[PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL] = "full",
[PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT] = "strict",
};
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_system, ProtectSystem, PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES);
static const char* const namespace_type_table[] = {
[NAMESPACE_MOUNT] = "mnt",
[NAMESPACE_CGROUP] = "cgroup",
[NAMESPACE_UTS] = "uts",
[NAMESPACE_IPC] = "ipc",
[NAMESPACE_USER] = "user",
[NAMESPACE_PID] = "pid",
[NAMESPACE_NET] = "net",
};
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(namespace_type, NamespaceType);