2017-11-18 17:09:20 +01:00
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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
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2017-05-09 20:57:40 +02:00
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/*
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* Port to systemd-boot
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2018-06-12 19:00:24 +02:00
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* Copyright © 2017 Max Resch <resch.max@gmail.com>
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2017-05-09 20:57:40 +02:00
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*
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* Security Policy Handling
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2018-06-12 19:00:24 +02:00
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* Copyright © 2012 <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
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2017-05-09 20:57:40 +02:00
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* https://github.com/mjg59/efitools
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*/
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#include <efi.h>
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#include <efilib.h>
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#include "util.h"
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#include "shim.h"
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/* well known shim lock guid */
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#define SHIM_LOCK_GUID
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struct ShimLock {
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EFI_STATUS __attribute__((sysv_abi)) (*shim_verify) (VOID *buffer, UINT32 size);
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/* context is actually a struct for the PE header, but it isn't needed so void is sufficient just do define the interface
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* see shim.c/shim.h and PeHeader.h in the github shim repo */
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EFI_STATUS __attribute__((sysv_abi)) (*generate_hash) (VOID *data, UINT32 datasize, VOID *context, UINT8 *sha256hash, UINT8 *sha1hash);
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EFI_STATUS __attribute__((sysv_abi)) (*read_header) (VOID *data, UINT32 datasize, VOID *context);
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};
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static const EFI_GUID simple_fs_guid = SIMPLE_FILE_SYSTEM_PROTOCOL;
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static const EFI_GUID global_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE;
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static const EFI_GUID security_protocol_guid = { 0xa46423e3, 0x4617, 0x49f1, {0xb9, 0xff, 0xd1, 0xbf, 0xa9, 0x11, 0x58, 0x39 } };
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static const EFI_GUID security2_protocol_guid = { 0x94ab2f58, 0x1438, 0x4ef1, {0x91, 0x52, 0x18, 0x94, 0x1a, 0x3a, 0x0e, 0x68 } };
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static const EFI_GUID shim_lock_guid = { 0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300, {0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23} };
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BOOLEAN shim_loaded(void) {
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struct ShimLock *shim_lock;
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return uefi_call_wrapper(BS->LocateProtocol, 3, (EFI_GUID*) &shim_lock_guid, NULL, (VOID**) &shim_lock) == EFI_SUCCESS;
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}
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static BOOLEAN shim_validate(VOID *data, UINT32 size) {
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struct ShimLock *shim_lock;
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if (!data)
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return FALSE;
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if (uefi_call_wrapper(BS->LocateProtocol, 3, (EFI_GUID*) &shim_lock_guid, NULL, (VOID**) &shim_lock) != EFI_SUCCESS)
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return FALSE;
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if (!shim_lock)
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return FALSE;
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2017-11-27 14:31:46 +01:00
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return shim_lock->shim_verify(data, size) == EFI_SUCCESS;
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2017-05-09 20:57:40 +02:00
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}
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BOOLEAN secure_boot_enabled(void) {
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2018-03-13 10:47:17 +01:00
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_cleanup_freepool_ CHAR8 *b = NULL;
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2017-05-09 20:57:40 +02:00
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UINTN size;
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2018-03-13 10:47:17 +01:00
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if (efivar_get_raw(&global_guid, L"SecureBoot", &b, &size) == EFI_SUCCESS)
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return *b > 0;
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2017-05-09 20:57:40 +02:00
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return FALSE;
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}
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/*
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* See the UEFI Platform Initialization manual (Vol2: DXE) for this
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*/
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struct _EFI_SECURITY2_PROTOCOL;
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struct _EFI_SECURITY_PROTOCOL;
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struct _EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL;
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typedef struct _EFI_SECURITY2_PROTOCOL EFI_SECURITY2_PROTOCOL;
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typedef struct _EFI_SECURITY_PROTOCOL EFI_SECURITY_PROTOCOL;
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typedef struct _EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL;
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typedef EFI_STATUS (EFIAPI *EFI_SECURITY_FILE_AUTHENTICATION_STATE) (
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const EFI_SECURITY_PROTOCOL *This,
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UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,
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const EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File
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);
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typedef EFI_STATUS (EFIAPI *EFI_SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION) (
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const EFI_SECURITY2_PROTOCOL *This,
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const EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePath,
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VOID *FileBuffer,
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UINTN FileSize,
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BOOLEAN BootPolicy
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);
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struct _EFI_SECURITY2_PROTOCOL {
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EFI_SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION FileAuthentication;
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};
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struct _EFI_SECURITY_PROTOCOL {
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EFI_SECURITY_FILE_AUTHENTICATION_STATE FileAuthenticationState;
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};
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/* Handle to the original authenticator for security1 protocol */
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static EFI_SECURITY_FILE_AUTHENTICATION_STATE esfas = NULL;
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/* Handle to the original authenticator for security2 protocol */
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static EFI_SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION es2fa = NULL;
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/*
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* Perform shim/MOK and Secure Boot authentication on a binary that's already been
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* loaded into memory. This function does the platform SB authentication first
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* but preserves its return value in case of its failure, so that it can be
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* returned in case of a shim/MOK authentication failure. This is done because
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* the SB failure code seems to vary from one implementation to another, and I
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* don't want to interfere with that at this time.
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*/
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static EFIAPI EFI_STATUS security2_policy_authentication (const EFI_SECURITY2_PROTOCOL *this,
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const EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *device_path,
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VOID *file_buffer, UINTN file_size, BOOLEAN boot_policy) {
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EFI_STATUS status;
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/* Chain original security policy */
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status = uefi_call_wrapper(es2fa, 5, this, device_path, file_buffer, file_size, boot_policy);
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/* if OK, don't bother with MOK check */
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if (status == EFI_SUCCESS)
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return status;
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if (shim_validate(file_buffer, file_size))
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return EFI_SUCCESS;
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return status;
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}
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/*
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* Perform both shim/MOK and platform Secure Boot authentication. This function loads
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* the file and performs shim/MOK authentication first simply to avoid double loads
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* of Linux kernels, which are much more likely to be shim/MOK-signed than platform-signed,
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* since kernels are big and can take several seconds to load on some computers and
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* filesystems. This also has the effect of returning whatever the platform code is for
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* authentication failure, be it EFI_ACCESS_DENIED, EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION, or something
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* else. (This seems to vary between implementations.)
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*/
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static EFIAPI EFI_STATUS security_policy_authentication (const EFI_SECURITY_PROTOCOL *this, UINT32 authentication_status,
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const EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *device_path_const) {
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EFI_STATUS status;
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2018-03-13 10:47:17 +01:00
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_cleanup_freepool_ EFI_DEVICE_PATH *dev_path = NULL;
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_cleanup_freepool_ CHAR16 *dev_path_str = NULL;
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2017-05-09 20:57:40 +02:00
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EFI_HANDLE h;
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EFI_FILE *root;
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2018-03-13 10:47:17 +01:00
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_cleanup_freepool_ CHAR8 *file_buffer = NULL;
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2017-05-09 20:57:40 +02:00
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UINTN file_size;
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if (!device_path_const)
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return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
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dev_path = DuplicateDevicePath((EFI_DEVICE_PATH*) device_path_const);
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status = uefi_call_wrapper(BS->LocateDevicePath, 3, (EFI_GUID*) &simple_fs_guid, &dev_path, &h);
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2018-03-13 10:47:17 +01:00
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if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
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2017-05-09 20:57:40 +02:00
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return status;
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/* No need to check return value, this already happend in efi_main() */
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root = LibOpenRoot(h);
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dev_path_str = DevicePathToStr(dev_path);
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2018-01-07 11:53:34 +01:00
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status = file_read(root, dev_path_str, 0, 0, &file_buffer, &file_size);
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if (EFI_ERROR(status))
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return status;
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2017-05-09 20:57:40 +02:00
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uefi_call_wrapper(root->Close, 1, root);
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if (shim_validate(file_buffer, file_size))
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2018-03-13 10:47:17 +01:00
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return EFI_SUCCESS;
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2017-05-09 20:57:40 +02:00
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2018-03-13 10:47:17 +01:00
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/* Try using the platform's native policy.... */
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return uefi_call_wrapper(esfas, 3, this, authentication_status, device_path_const);
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2017-05-09 20:57:40 +02:00
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}
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EFI_STATUS security_policy_install(void) {
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EFI_SECURITY_PROTOCOL *security_protocol;
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EFI_SECURITY2_PROTOCOL *security2_protocol = NULL;
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EFI_STATUS status;
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/* Already Installed */
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if (esfas)
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return EFI_ALREADY_STARTED;
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/*
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2017-11-27 13:22:56 +01:00
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* Don't bother with status here. The call is allowed
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* to fail, since SECURITY2 was introduced in PI 1.2.1.
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* Use security2_protocol == NULL as indicator.
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2017-05-09 20:57:40 +02:00
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*/
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uefi_call_wrapper(BS->LocateProtocol, 3, (EFI_GUID*) &security2_protocol_guid, NULL, (VOID**) &security2_protocol);
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status = uefi_call_wrapper(BS->LocateProtocol, 3, (EFI_GUID*) &security_protocol_guid, NULL, (VOID**) &security_protocol);
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/* This one is mandatory, so there's a serious problem */
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if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
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return status;
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2017-11-27 13:22:56 +01:00
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esfas = security_protocol->FileAuthenticationState;
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security_protocol->FileAuthenticationState = security_policy_authentication;
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if (security2_protocol) {
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2017-05-09 20:57:40 +02:00
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es2fa = security2_protocol->FileAuthentication;
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security2_protocol->FileAuthentication = security2_policy_authentication;
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}
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return EFI_SUCCESS;
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}
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EFI_STATUS security_policy_uninstall(void) {
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EFI_STATUS status;
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if (esfas) {
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EFI_SECURITY_PROTOCOL *security_protocol;
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status = uefi_call_wrapper(BS->LocateProtocol, 3, (EFI_GUID*) &security_protocol_guid, NULL, (VOID**) &security_protocol);
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if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
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return status;
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security_protocol->FileAuthenticationState = esfas;
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esfas = NULL;
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} else
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/* nothing installed */
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return EFI_NOT_STARTED;
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if (es2fa) {
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EFI_SECURITY2_PROTOCOL *security2_protocol;
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status = uefi_call_wrapper(BS->LocateProtocol, 3, (EFI_GUID*) &security2_protocol_guid, NULL, (VOID**) &security2_protocol);
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if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
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return status;
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security2_protocol->FileAuthentication = es2fa;
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es2fa = NULL;
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}
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return EFI_SUCCESS;
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}
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