basic: be more careful when closing fds based on RLIMIT_NOFILE

Let's make sure we properly handle cases where RLIMIT_NOFILE is set to
infinity, zero or values outside of the "int" range.
This commit is contained in:
Lennart Poettering 2018-05-07 17:54:59 +02:00
parent 1752d69a8b
commit 37bc14de5b
1 changed files with 11 additions and 4 deletions

View File

@ -199,15 +199,22 @@ int close_all_fds(const int except[], size_t n_except) {
d = opendir("/proc/self/fd");
if (!d) {
int fd;
struct rlimit rl;
int fd, max_fd;
/* When /proc isn't available (for example in chroots)
* the fallback is brute forcing through the fd
/* When /proc isn't available (for example in chroots) the fallback is brute forcing through the fd
* table */
assert_se(getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl) >= 0);
for (fd = 3; fd < (int) rl.rlim_max; fd ++) {
if (rl.rlim_max == 0)
return -EINVAL;
/* Let's take special care if the resource limit is set to unlimited, or actually larger than the range
* of 'int'. Let's avoid implicit overflows. */
max_fd = (rl.rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY || rl.rlim_max > INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int) (rl.rlim_max - 1);
for (fd = 3; fd >= 0; fd = fd < max_fd ? fd + 1 : -1) {
int q;
if (fd_in_set(fd, except, n_except))