resolved: make MulticastDNS support configurable in resolved.conf

The option is already there, but wasn't exported in the configuration
file so far. Fix that.
This commit is contained in:
Lennart Poettering 2016-01-05 17:37:09 +01:00
parent aaa297d4e5
commit b83d91c029
3 changed files with 31 additions and 13 deletions

View File

@ -124,23 +124,39 @@
global setting is on.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term><varname>MulticastDNS=</varname></term>
<listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument or
<literal>resolve</literal>. Controls Multicast DNS support
(<ulink url="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6762">RFC
6762</ulink>) on the local host. If true, enables full
Multicast DNS responder and resolver support. If false,
disables both. If set to <literal>resolve</literal>, only
resolution support is enabled, but responding is
disabled. Note that
<citerefentry><refentrytitle>systemd-networkd.service</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry>
also maintains per-interface Multicast DNS settings. Multicast
DNS will be enabled on an interface only if the per-interface
and the global setting is on.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term><varname>DNSSEC=</varname></term>
<listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument or
<literal>downgrade-ok</literal>. If true all DNS lookups are
DNSSEC-validated locally. If a response for a lookup request
is detected invalid this is returned as lookup failure to
applications. Note that this mode requires a DNS server that
supports DNSSEC. If the DNS server does not properly support
DNSSEC all validations will fail. If set to
<literal>downgrade-ok</literal> DNSSEC validation is
attempted, but if the server does not support DNSSEC properly,
DNSSEC mode is automatically disabled. Note that this mode
makes DNSSEC validation vulnerable to "downgrade" attacks,
where an attacker might be able to trigger a downgrade to
non-DNSSEC mode by synthesizing a DNS response that suggests
DNSSEC was not supported. If set to false, DNS lookups are not
DNSSEC validated.</para>
DNSSEC-validated locally (excluding LLMNR and Multicast
DNS). If a response for a lookup request is detected invalid
this is returned as lookup failure to applications. Note that
this mode requires a DNS server that supports DNSSEC. If the
DNS server does not properly support DNSSEC all validations
will fail. If set to <literal>downgrade-ok</literal> DNSSEC
validation is attempted, but if the server does not support
DNSSEC properly, DNSSEC mode is automatically disabled. Note
that this mode makes DNSSEC validation vulnerable to
"downgrade" attacks, where an attacker might be able to
trigger a downgrade to non-DNSSEC mode by synthesizing a DNS
response that suggests DNSSEC was not supported. If set to
false, DNS lookups are not DNSSEC validated.</para>
<para>Note that DNSSEC validation requires retrieval of
additional DNS data, and thus results in a small DNS look-up

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@ -18,4 +18,5 @@ Resolve.DNS, config_parse_dns_servers, DNS_SERVER_SYSTEM, 0
Resolve.FallbackDNS, config_parse_dns_servers, DNS_SERVER_FALLBACK, 0
Resolve.Domains, config_parse_search_domains, 0, 0
Resolve.LLMNR, config_parse_resolve_support,0, offsetof(Manager, llmnr_support)
Resolve.MulticastDNS, config_parse_resolve_support,0, offsetof(Manager, mdns_support)
Resolve.DNSSEC, config_parse_dnssec, 0, 0

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@ -16,4 +16,5 @@
#FallbackDNS=@DNS_SERVERS@
#Domains=
#LLMNR=yes
#MulticastDNS=no
#DNSSEC=no