diff --git a/man/systemd-nspawn.xml b/man/systemd-nspawn.xml
index 51db003a67..eb411102bc 100644
--- a/man/systemd-nspawn.xml
+++ b/man/systemd-nspawn.xml
@@ -238,6 +238,15 @@
together with , .
+
+
+
+ Takes the path to an OCI runtime bundle to invoke, as specified in the OCI Runtime Specification. In
+ this case no .nspawn file is loaded, and the root directory and various settings are read
+ from the OCI runtime JSON data (but data passed on the command line takes precedence).
+
+
@@ -952,6 +961,16 @@
make them read-only, using .
+
+
+
+ Make the specified path inaccessible in the container. This over-mounts the specified path
+ (which must exist in the container) with a file node of the same type that is empty and has the most
+ restrictive access mode supported. This is an effective way to mask files, directories and other file system
+ objects from the container payload. This option may be used more than once in case all specified paths are
+ masked.
+
+
@@ -1084,6 +1103,42 @@
same as the one reported on the host.
+
+ MODE
+
+ Configures how to set up standard input, output and error output for the container payload, as
+ well as the /dev/console device for the container. Takes one of
+ , , or . If
+ a pseudo-TTY is allocated and made available as /dev/console
+ in the container. It is then bi-directionally connected to the standard input and output passed to
+ systemd-nspawn. is similar but only the output of the container
+ is propagated and no input from the caller is read. In mode a pseudo TTY is allocated,
+ but it is not connected anywhere. Finally, in mode no pseudo TTY is allocated, but the
+ passed standard input, output and error output file descriptors are passed on — as they are — to the container
+ payload. In this mode /dev/console will not exist in the container. Note that in this mode
+ the container payload generally cannot be a full init system as init systems tend to require
+ /dev/console to be available. On the other hand, in this mode container invocations can be
+ used within shell pipelines. This is because intermediary pseudo TTYs do not permit independent bidirectional
+ propagation of the end-of-file (EOF) condition, which is necessary for shell pipelines to work
+ correctly.
+
+ Note that the mode should be used carefully, as passing arbitrary file descriptors
+ to less trusted container payloads might open up unwanted interfaces for access by the container payload. For
+ example, if a passed file descriptor refers to a TTY of some form, APIs such as TIOCSTI
+ may be used to synthesize input that might be used for escaping the container. Hence mode
+ should only be used if the payload is sufficiently trusted or when the standard input/output/error output file
+ descriptors are known safe, for example pipes. Defaults to if
+ systemd-nspawn is invoked from a terminal, and
+ otherwise.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ Equivalent to .
+
+
diff --git a/man/systemd.nspawn.xml b/man/systemd.nspawn.xml
index 39e1d6fe73..1485a26f02 100644
--- a/man/systemd.nspawn.xml
+++ b/man/systemd.nspawn.xml
@@ -425,6 +425,17 @@
is privileged (see above).
+
+ Inaccessible=
+
+ Masks the specified file or directly in the container, by over-mounting it with an empty file
+ node of the same type with the most restrictive access mode. Takes a file system path as arugment. This option
+ may be used multiple times to mask multiple files or directories. This option is equivalent to the command line
+ switch , see
+ systemd-nspawn1 for details
+ about the specific options supported. This setting is privileged (see above).
+
+
Overlay=
OverlayReadOnly=
diff --git a/src/basic/capability-util.c b/src/basic/capability-util.c
index b944ee6ea1..45fadb9faa 100644
--- a/src/basic/capability-util.c
+++ b/src/basic/capability-util.c
@@ -47,6 +47,13 @@ unsigned long cap_last_cap(void) {
if (r >= 0) {
r = safe_atolu(content, &p);
if (r >= 0) {
+
+ if (p > 63) /* Safety for the future: if one day the kernel learns more than 64 caps,
+ * then we are in trouble (since we, as much userspace and kernel space
+ * store capability masks in uint64_t types. Let's hence protect
+ * ourselves against that and always cap at 63 for now. */
+ p = 63;
+
saved = p;
valid = true;
return p;
@@ -58,17 +65,15 @@ unsigned long cap_last_cap(void) {
if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ, p) < 0) {
- /* Hmm, look downwards, until we find one that
- * works */
+ /* Hmm, look downwards, until we find one that works */
for (p--; p > 0; p --)
if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ, p) >= 0)
break;
} else {
- /* Hmm, look upwards, until we find one that doesn't
- * work */
- for (;; p++)
+ /* Hmm, look upwards, until we find one that doesn't work */
+ for (; p < 63; p++)
if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ, p+1) < 0)
break;
}
@@ -363,6 +368,7 @@ bool ambient_capabilities_supported(void) {
int capability_quintet_enforce(const CapabilityQuintet *q) {
_cleanup_cap_free_ cap_t c = NULL;
+ bool need_set_proc_again = false;
int r;
if (q->ambient != (uint64_t) -1) {
@@ -393,7 +399,6 @@ int capability_quintet_enforce(const CapabilityQuintet *q) {
if (cap_set_flag(c, CAP_INHERITABLE, 1, &cv, CAP_SET) < 0)
return -errno;
-
if (cap_set_flag(c, CAP_PERMITTED, 1, &cv, CAP_SET) < 0)
return -errno;
@@ -426,8 +431,15 @@ int capability_quintet_enforce(const CapabilityQuintet *q) {
if (q->inheritable != (uint64_t) -1) {
cap_flag_value_t old_value, new_value;
- if (cap_get_flag(c, cv, CAP_INHERITABLE, &old_value) < 0)
+ if (cap_get_flag(c, cv, CAP_INHERITABLE, &old_value) < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINVAL) /* If the kernel knows more caps than this
+ * version of libcap, then this will return
+ * EINVAL. In that case, simply ignore it,
+ * pretend it doesn't exist. */
+ continue;
+
return -errno;
+ }
new_value = (q->inheritable & m) ? CAP_SET : CAP_CLEAR;
@@ -442,8 +454,12 @@ int capability_quintet_enforce(const CapabilityQuintet *q) {
if (q->permitted != (uint64_t) -1) {
cap_flag_value_t old_value, new_value;
- if (cap_get_flag(c, cv, CAP_PERMITTED, &old_value) < 0)
+ if (cap_get_flag(c, cv, CAP_PERMITTED, &old_value) < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINVAL)
+ continue;
+
return -errno;
+ }
new_value = (q->permitted & m) ? CAP_SET : CAP_CLEAR;
@@ -458,8 +474,12 @@ int capability_quintet_enforce(const CapabilityQuintet *q) {
if (q->effective != (uint64_t) -1) {
cap_flag_value_t old_value, new_value;
- if (cap_get_flag(c, cv, CAP_EFFECTIVE, &old_value) < 0)
+ if (cap_get_flag(c, cv, CAP_EFFECTIVE, &old_value) < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINVAL)
+ continue;
+
return -errno;
+ }
new_value = (q->effective & m) ? CAP_SET : CAP_CLEAR;
@@ -472,9 +492,39 @@ int capability_quintet_enforce(const CapabilityQuintet *q) {
}
}
- if (changed)
- if (cap_set_proc(c) < 0)
+ if (changed) {
+ _cleanup_cap_free_ cap_t modified = NULL;
+
+ /* In order to change the bounding caps, we need to keep CAP_SETPCAP for a bit
+ * longer. Let's add it to our list hence for now. */
+ if (q->bounding != (uint64_t) -1) {
+ cap_value_t cv = CAP_SETPCAP;
+
+ modified = cap_dup(c);
+ if (!modified)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (cap_set_flag(modified, CAP_PERMITTED, 1, &cv, CAP_SET) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+ if (cap_set_flag(modified, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 1, &cv, CAP_SET) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (cap_compare(modified, c) == 0) {
+ /* No change? then drop this nonsense again */
+ cap_free(modified);
+ modified = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Now, let's enforce the caps for the first time. Note that this is where we acquire
+ * caps in any of the sets we currently don't have. We have to do this before
+ * droppoing the bounding caps below, since at that point we can never acquire new
+ * caps in inherited/permitted/effective anymore, but only lose them.*/
+ if (cap_set_proc(modified ?: c) < 0)
return -errno;
+
+ need_set_proc_again = !!modified;
+ }
}
if (q->bounding != (uint64_t) -1) {
@@ -483,5 +533,13 @@ int capability_quintet_enforce(const CapabilityQuintet *q) {
return r;
}
+ /* If needed, let's now set the caps again, this time in the final version, which differs from what
+ * we have already set only in the CAP_SETPCAP bit, which we needed for dropping the bounding
+ * bits. This call only undoes bits and doesn't acquire any which means the bounding caps don't
+ * matter. */
+ if (need_set_proc_again)
+ if (cap_set_proc(c) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
return 0;
}
diff --git a/src/basic/capability-util.h b/src/basic/capability-util.h
index 02c7d5c3e2..e69b2fbb95 100644
--- a/src/basic/capability-util.h
+++ b/src/basic/capability-util.h
@@ -33,10 +33,12 @@ static inline void cap_free_charpp(char **p) {
}
#define _cleanup_cap_free_charp_ _cleanup_(cap_free_charpp)
+static inline uint64_t all_capabilities(void) {
+ return UINT64_MAX >> (63 - cap_last_cap());
+}
+
static inline bool cap_test_all(uint64_t caps) {
- uint64_t m;
- m = (UINT64_C(1) << (cap_last_cap() + 1)) - 1;
- return FLAGS_SET(caps, m);
+ return FLAGS_SET(caps, all_capabilities());
}
bool ambient_capabilities_supported(void);
diff --git a/src/nspawn/meson.build b/src/nspawn/meson.build
index be54ba36c5..31217c7b46 100644
--- a/src/nspawn/meson.build
+++ b/src/nspawn/meson.build
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ libnspawn_core_sources = files('''
nspawn-mount.h
nspawn-network.c
nspawn-network.h
+ nspawn-oci.c
+ nspawn-oci.h
nspawn-patch-uid.c
nspawn-patch-uid.h
nspawn-register.c
diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-cgroup.c b/src/nspawn/nspawn-cgroup.c
index 97fa092cae..4a16f56d1c 100644
--- a/src/nspawn/nspawn-cgroup.c
+++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-cgroup.c
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ static int mount_legacy_cgroup_hierarchy(
if (r > 0)
return 0;
- mkdir_p(to, 0755);
+ (void) mkdir_p(to, 0755);
/* The superblock mount options of the mount point need to be
* identical to the hosts', and hence writable... */
diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-gperf.gperf b/src/nspawn/nspawn-gperf.gperf
index dec53a06f3..79304d21ab 100644
--- a/src/nspawn/nspawn-gperf.gperf
+++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-gperf.gperf
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ Files.Volatile, config_parse_volatile_mode, 0, of
Files.Bind, config_parse_bind, 0, 0
Files.BindReadOnly, config_parse_bind, 1, 0
Files.TemporaryFileSystem, config_parse_tmpfs, 0, 0
+Files.Inaccessible, config_parse_inaccessible, 0, 0
Files.Overlay, config_parse_overlay, 0, 0
Files.OverlayReadOnly, config_parse_overlay, 1, 0
Files.PrivateUsersChown, config_parse_tristate, 0, offsetof(Settings, userns_chown)
diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.c b/src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.c
index 4878586c4e..cf093cd0a2 100644
--- a/src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.c
+++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.c
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ void custom_mount_free_all(CustomMount *l, size_t n) {
}
strv_free(m->lower);
+ free(m->type_argument);
}
free(l);
@@ -116,32 +117,40 @@ int custom_mount_prepare_all(const char *dest, CustomMount *l, size_t n) {
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
CustomMount *m = l + i;
- if (m->source) {
- char *s;
+ /* /proc we mount in the inner child, i.e. when we acquired CLONE_NEWPID. All other mounts we mount
+ * already in the outer child, so that the mounts are already established before CLONE_NEWPID and in
+ * particular CLONE_NEWUSER. This also means any custom mounts below /proc also need to be mounted in
+ * the inner child, not the outer one. Determine this here. */
+ m->in_userns = path_startswith(m->destination, "/proc");
- s = resolve_source_path(dest, m->source);
- if (!s)
- return log_oom();
+ if (m->type == CUSTOM_MOUNT_BIND) {
+ if (m->source) {
+ char *s;
- free_and_replace(m->source, s);
- } else {
- /* No source specified? In that case, use a throw-away temporary directory in /var/tmp */
+ s = resolve_source_path(dest, m->source);
+ if (!s)
+ return log_oom();
- m->rm_rf_tmpdir = strdup("/var/tmp/nspawn-temp-XXXXXX");
- if (!m->rm_rf_tmpdir)
- return log_oom();
+ free_and_replace(m->source, s);
+ } else {
+ /* No source specified? In that case, use a throw-away temporary directory in /var/tmp */
- if (!mkdtemp(m->rm_rf_tmpdir)) {
- m->rm_rf_tmpdir = mfree(m->rm_rf_tmpdir);
- return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to acquire temporary directory: %m");
+ m->rm_rf_tmpdir = strdup("/var/tmp/nspawn-temp-XXXXXX");
+ if (!m->rm_rf_tmpdir)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ if (!mkdtemp(m->rm_rf_tmpdir)) {
+ m->rm_rf_tmpdir = mfree(m->rm_rf_tmpdir);
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to acquire temporary directory: %m");
+ }
+
+ m->source = strjoin(m->rm_rf_tmpdir, "/src");
+ if (!m->source)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ if (mkdir(m->source, 0755) < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to create %s: %m", m->source);
}
-
- m->source = strjoin(m->rm_rf_tmpdir, "/src");
- if (!m->source)
- return log_oom();
-
- if (mkdir(m->source, 0755) < 0)
- return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to create %s: %m", m->source);
}
if (m->type == CUSTOM_MOUNT_OVERLAY) {
@@ -223,6 +232,7 @@ int bind_mount_parse(CustomMount **l, size_t *n, const char *s, bool read_only)
m->destination = TAKE_PTR(destination);
m->read_only = read_only;
m->options = TAKE_PTR(opts);
+
return 0;
}
@@ -327,6 +337,29 @@ int overlay_mount_parse(CustomMount **l, size_t *n, const char *s, bool read_onl
return 0;
}
+int inaccessible_mount_parse(CustomMount **l, size_t *n, const char *s) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL;
+ CustomMount *m;
+
+ assert(l);
+ assert(n);
+ assert(s);
+
+ if (!path_is_absolute(s))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ path = strdup(s);
+ if (!path)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ m = custom_mount_add(l, n, CUSTOM_MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE);
+ if (!m)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ m->destination = TAKE_PTR(path);
+ return 0;
+}
+
int tmpfs_patch_options(
const char *options,
uid_t uid_shift,
@@ -494,9 +527,9 @@ int mount_all(const char *dest,
uid_t uid_shift,
const char *selinux_apifs_context) {
-#define PROC_INACCESSIBLE(path) \
- { NULL, (path), NULL, NULL, MS_BIND, \
- MOUNT_IN_USERNS|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO|MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE_REG }, /* Bind mount first ... */ \
+#define PROC_INACCESSIBLE_REG(path) \
+ { "/run/systemd/inaccessible/reg", (path), NULL, NULL, MS_BIND, \
+ MOUNT_IN_USERNS|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO }, /* Bind mount first ... */ \
{ NULL, (path), NULL, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_REMOUNT, \
MOUNT_IN_USERNS|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO } /* Then, make it r/o */
@@ -531,11 +564,11 @@ int mount_all(const char *dest,
/* Make these files inaccessible to container payloads: they potentially leak information about kernel
* internals or the host's execution environment to the container */
- PROC_INACCESSIBLE("/proc/kallsyms"),
- PROC_INACCESSIBLE("/proc/kcore"),
- PROC_INACCESSIBLE("/proc/keys"),
- PROC_INACCESSIBLE("/proc/sysrq-trigger"),
- PROC_INACCESSIBLE("/proc/timer_list"),
+ PROC_INACCESSIBLE_REG("/proc/kallsyms"),
+ PROC_INACCESSIBLE_REG("/proc/kcore"),
+ PROC_INACCESSIBLE_REG("/proc/keys"),
+ PROC_INACCESSIBLE_REG("/proc/sysrq-trigger"),
+ PROC_INACCESSIBLE_REG("/proc/timer_list"),
/* Make these directories read-only to container payloads: they show hardware information, and in some
* cases contain tunables the container really shouldn't have access to. */
@@ -573,7 +606,6 @@ int mount_all(const char *dest,
#endif
};
- _cleanup_(unlink_and_freep) char *inaccessible = NULL;
bool use_userns = (mount_settings & MOUNT_USE_USERNS);
bool netns = (mount_settings & MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_NETNS);
bool ro = (mount_settings & MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO);
@@ -584,7 +616,7 @@ int mount_all(const char *dest,
for (k = 0; k < ELEMENTSOF(mount_table); k++) {
_cleanup_free_ char *where = NULL, *options = NULL;
- const char *o, *what;
+ const char *o;
bool fatal = (mount_table[k].mount_settings & MOUNT_FATAL);
if (in_userns != (bool)(mount_table[k].mount_settings & MOUNT_IN_USERNS))
@@ -603,33 +635,14 @@ int mount_all(const char *dest,
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to resolve %s/%s: %m", dest, mount_table[k].where);
- if (mount_table[k].mount_settings & MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE_REG) {
-
- if (!inaccessible) {
- _cleanup_free_ char *np = NULL;
-
- r = tempfn_random_child(NULL, "inaccessible", &np);
- if (r < 0)
- return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to generate inaccessible file node path: %m");
-
- r = touch_file(np, false, USEC_INFINITY, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID, 0000);
- if (r < 0)
- return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create inaccessible file node '%s': %m", np);
-
- inaccessible = TAKE_PTR(np);
- }
-
- what = inaccessible;
- } else
- what = mount_table[k].what;
-
- r = path_is_mount_point(where, NULL, 0);
- if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT)
- return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to detect whether %s is a mount point: %m", where);
-
/* Skip this entry if it is not a remount. */
- if (what && r > 0)
- continue;
+ if (mount_table[k].what) {
+ r = path_is_mount_point(where, NULL, 0);
+ if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to detect whether %s is a mount point: %m", where);
+ if (r > 0)
+ continue;
+ }
r = mkdir_userns_p(dest, where, 0755, (use_userns && !in_userns) ? uid_shift : UID_INVALID);
if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST) {
@@ -654,7 +667,7 @@ int mount_all(const char *dest,
}
r = mount_verbose(fatal ? LOG_ERR : LOG_DEBUG,
- what,
+ mount_table[k].what,
where,
mount_table[k].type,
mount_table[k].flags,
@@ -667,7 +680,6 @@ int mount_all(const char *dest,
}
static int mount_bind(const char *dest, CustomMount *m) {
-
_cleanup_free_ char *where = NULL;
struct stat source_st, dest_st;
int r;
@@ -711,7 +723,6 @@ static int mount_bind(const char *dest, CustomMount *m) {
r = touch(where);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create mount point %s: %m", where);
-
}
r = mount_verbose(LOG_ERR, m->source, where, NULL, MS_BIND | MS_REC, m->options);
@@ -773,7 +784,6 @@ static char *joined_and_escaped_lower_dirs(char **lower) {
}
static int mount_overlay(const char *dest, CustomMount *m) {
-
_cleanup_free_ char *lower = NULL, *where = NULL, *escaped_source = NULL;
const char *options;
int r;
@@ -815,11 +825,59 @@ static int mount_overlay(const char *dest, CustomMount *m) {
return mount_verbose(LOG_ERR, "overlay", where, "overlay", m->read_only ? MS_RDONLY : 0, options);
}
+static int mount_inaccessible(const char *dest, CustomMount *m) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *where = NULL;
+ const char *source;
+ struct stat st;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(dest);
+ assert(m);
+
+ r = chase_symlinks_and_stat(m->destination, dest, CHASE_PREFIX_ROOT, &where, &st);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_full_errno(m->graceful ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_ERR, r, "Failed to resolve %s/%s: %m", dest, m->destination);
+ return m->graceful ? 0 : r;
+ }
+
+ assert_se(source = mode_to_inaccessible_node(st.st_mode));
+
+ r = mount_verbose(m->graceful ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_ERR, source, where, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return m->graceful ? 0 : r;
+
+ r = mount_verbose(m->graceful ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_ERR, NULL, where, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY|MS_REMOUNT, NULL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return m->graceful ? 0 : r;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int mount_arbitrary(const char *dest, CustomMount *m) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *where = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(dest);
+ assert(m);
+
+ r = chase_symlinks(m->destination, dest, CHASE_PREFIX_ROOT|CHASE_NONEXISTENT, &where);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to resolve %s/%s: %m", dest, m->destination);
+ if (r == 0) { /* Doesn't exist yet? */
+ r = mkdir_p_label(where, 0755);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Creating mount point for mount %s failed: %m", where);
+ }
+
+ return mount_verbose(LOG_ERR, m->source, where, m->type_argument, 0, m->options);
+}
+
int mount_custom(
const char *dest,
CustomMount *mounts, size_t n,
bool userns, uid_t uid_shift, uid_t uid_range,
- const char *selinux_apifs_context) {
+ const char *selinux_apifs_context,
+ bool in_userns) {
size_t i;
int r;
@@ -829,6 +887,9 @@ int mount_custom(
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
CustomMount *m = mounts + i;
+ if (m->in_userns != in_userns)
+ continue;
+
switch (m->type) {
case CUSTOM_MOUNT_BIND:
@@ -843,6 +904,14 @@ int mount_custom(
r = mount_overlay(dest, m);
break;
+ case CUSTOM_MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE:
+ r = mount_inaccessible(dest, m);
+ break;
+
+ case CUSTOM_MOUNT_ARBITRARY:
+ r = mount_arbitrary(dest, m);
+ break;
+
default:
assert_not_reached("Unknown custom mount type");
}
diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.h b/src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.h
index e060ca0e4d..ff6990c734 100644
--- a/src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.h
+++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.h
@@ -13,14 +13,15 @@ typedef enum MountSettingsMask {
MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO = 1 << 3, /* if set, /proc/sys, and /sys will be mounted read-only, otherwise read-write. */
MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_NETNS = 1 << 4, /* if set, /proc/sys/net will be mounted read-write.
Works only if MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO is also set. */
- MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE_REG = 1 << 5, /* if set, create an inaccessible regular file first and use as bind mount source */
- MOUNT_APPLY_TMPFS_TMP = 1 << 6, /* if set, /tmp will be mounted as tmpfs */
+ MOUNT_APPLY_TMPFS_TMP = 1 << 5, /* if set, /tmp will be mounted as tmpfs */
} MountSettingsMask;
typedef enum CustomMountType {
CUSTOM_MOUNT_BIND,
CUSTOM_MOUNT_TMPFS,
CUSTOM_MOUNT_OVERLAY,
+ CUSTOM_MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE,
+ CUSTOM_MOUNT_ARBITRARY,
_CUSTOM_MOUNT_TYPE_MAX,
_CUSTOM_MOUNT_TYPE_INVALID = -1
} CustomMountType;
@@ -34,6 +35,9 @@ typedef struct CustomMount {
char *work_dir;
char **lower;
char *rm_rf_tmpdir;
+ char *type_argument; /* only for CUSTOM_MOUNT_ARBITRARY */
+ bool graceful;
+ bool in_userns;
} CustomMount;
CustomMount* custom_mount_add(CustomMount **l, size_t *n, CustomMountType t);
@@ -43,11 +47,12 @@ int custom_mount_prepare_all(const char *dest, CustomMount *l, size_t n);
int bind_mount_parse(CustomMount **l, size_t *n, const char *s, bool read_only);
int tmpfs_mount_parse(CustomMount **l, size_t *n, const char *s);
int overlay_mount_parse(CustomMount **l, size_t *n, const char *s, bool read_only);
+int inaccessible_mount_parse(CustomMount **l, size_t *n, const char *s);
int mount_all(const char *dest, MountSettingsMask mount_settings, uid_t uid_shift, const char *selinux_apifs_context);
int mount_sysfs(const char *dest, MountSettingsMask mount_settings);
-int mount_custom(const char *dest, CustomMount *mounts, size_t n, bool userns, uid_t uid_shift, uid_t uid_range, const char *selinux_apifs_context);
+int mount_custom(const char *dest, CustomMount *mounts, size_t n, bool userns, uid_t uid_shift, uid_t uid_range, const char *selinux_apifs_context, bool in_userns);
int setup_volatile_mode(const char *directory, VolatileMode mode, bool userns, uid_t uid_shift, uid_t uid_range, const char *selinux_apifs_context);
diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-oci.c b/src/nspawn/nspawn-oci.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5a41de3810
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-oci.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2352 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
+
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "bus-util.h"
+#include "cap-list.h"
+#include "cpu-set-util.h"
+#include "env-util.h"
+#include "fs-util.h"
+#include "hostname-util.h"
+#include "json.h"
+#include "missing_sched.h"
+#include "nspawn-oci.h"
+#include "path-util.h"
+#include "rlimit-util.h"
+#include "seccomp-util.h"
+#include "stat-util.h"
+#include "stdio-util.h"
+#include "string-util.h"
+#include "strv.h"
+#include "user-util.h"
+
+/* TODO:
+ * OCI runtime tool implementation
+ * hooks
+ *
+ * Spec issues:
+ *
+ * How is RLIM_INFINITY supposed to be encoded?
+ * configured effective caps is bullshit, as execv() corrupts it anyway
+ * pipes bind mounted is *very* different from pipes newly created, comments regarding bind mount or not are bogus
+ * annotation values structured? or string?
+ * configurable file system namespace path, but then also root path? wtf?
+ * apply sysctl inside of the container? or outside?
+ * how is unlimited pids tasks limit to be encoded?
+ * what are the defaults for caps if not specified?
+ * what are the default uid/gid mappings if one is missing but the other set, or when user ns is on but no namespace configured
+ * the source field of "mounts" is really weird, as it cannot realistically be relative to the bundle, since we never know if that's what the fs wants
+ * spec contradicts itself on the mount "type" field, as the example uses "bind" as type, but it's not listed in /proc/filesystem, and is something made up by /bin/mount
+ * if type of mount is left out, what shall be assumed? "bind"?
+ * readonly mounts is entirely redundant?
+ * should escaping be applied when joining mount options with ","?
+ * devices cgroup support is bogus, "allow" and "deny" on the kernel level is about adding/removing entries, not about access
+ * spec needs to say that "rwm" devices cgroup combination can't be the empty string
+ * cgrouspv1 crap: kernel, kernelTCP, swapiness, disableOOMKiller, swap, devices, leafWeight
+ * general: it shouldn't leak lower level abstractions this obviously
+ * unmanagable cgroups stuff: realtimeRuntime/realtimePeriod
+ * needs to say what happense when some option is not specified, i.e. which defautls apply
+ * no architecture? no personality?
+ * seccomp example and logic is simply broken: there's no constant "SCMP_ACT_ERRNO".
+ * spec should say what to do with unknown props
+ * /bin/mount regarding NFS and FUSE required?
+ * what does terminal=false mean?
+ * sysctl inside or outside? whitelisting?
+ *
+ * Unsupported:
+ *
+ * apparmorProfile
+ * selinuxLabel + mountLabel
+ * hugepageLimits
+ * network
+ * rdma
+ * intelRdt
+ * swappiness, disableOOMKiller, kernel, kernelTCP, leafWeight (because it's dead, cgroupsv2 can't do it and hence systemd neither)
+ *
+ * Non-slice cgroup paths
+ * Propagation that is not slave + shared
+ * more than one uid/gid mapping, mappings with a container base != 0, or non-matching uid/gid mappings
+ * device cgroups access = false items that are not catchall
+ * device cgroups matches where minor is specified, but major isn't. similar where major is specified but char/block is not. also, any match that only has a type set that has less than "rwm" set. also, any entry that has none of rwm set.
+ *
+ */
+
+static int oci_unexpected(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Unexpected OCI element '%s' of type '%s'.", name, json_variant_type_to_string(json_variant_type(v)));
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int oci_unsupported(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Unsupported OCI element '%s' of type '%s'.", name, json_variant_type_to_string(json_variant_type(v)));
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static int oci_terminal(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ Settings *s = userdata;
+
+ /* If not specified, or set to true, we'll default to either an interactive or a read-only
+ * console. If specifiy as false, we'll forcibly move to "pipe" mode though. */
+ s->console_mode = json_variant_boolean(v) ? _CONSOLE_MODE_INVALID : CONSOLE_PIPE;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_console_dimension(const char *name, JsonVariant *variant, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ unsigned *u = userdata;
+ uintmax_t k;
+
+ assert(u);
+
+ k = json_variant_unsigned(variant);
+ if (k == 0) {
+ json_log(variant, flags, 0, "Console size field '%s' is too small.", strna(name));
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+ if (k > USHRT_MAX) { /* TIOCSWINSZ's struct winsize uses "unsigned short" for width and height */
+ json_log(variant, flags, 0, "Console size field '%s' is too large.", strna(name));
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+
+ *u = (unsigned) k;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_console_size(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "height", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_console_dimension, offsetof(Settings, console_height), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ { "width", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_console_dimension, offsetof(Settings, console_width), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ {}
+ };
+
+ return json_dispatch(v, table, oci_unexpected, flags, userdata);
+}
+
+static int oci_absolute_path(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ char **p = userdata;
+ const char *n;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(p);
+
+ n = json_variant_string(v);
+
+ if (!path_is_absolute(n)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Path in JSON field '%s' is not absolute: %s", strna(name), n);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = free_and_strdup(p, n);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_env(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ char ***l = userdata;
+ JsonVariant *e;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(l);
+
+ JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(e, v) {
+ const char *n;
+
+ if (!json_variant_is_string(e)) {
+ json_log(e, flags, 0, "Environment array contains non-string.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ assert_se(n = json_variant_string(e));
+
+ if (!env_assignment_is_valid(n)) {
+ json_log(e, flags, 0, "Environment assignment not valid: %s", n);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = strv_extend(l, n);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_args(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL;
+ char ***value = userdata;
+ JsonVariant *e;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(value);
+
+ JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(e, v) {
+ const char *n;
+
+ if (!json_variant_is_string(e)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Argument is not a string.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ assert_se(n = json_variant_string(e));
+
+ r = strv_extend(&l, n);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+ }
+
+ if (strv_isempty(l)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Argument list empty, refusing.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (isempty(l[0])) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Executable name is empty, refusing.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ strv_free_and_replace(*value, l);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_rlimit_type(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ const char *z;
+ int t, *type = userdata;
+
+ assert_se(type);
+
+ z = startswith(json_variant_string(v), "RLIMIT_");
+ if (!z) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "rlimit entry's name does not begin with 'RLIMIT_', refusing: %s", json_variant_string(v));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ t = rlimit_from_string(z);
+ if (t < 0) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "rlimit name unknown: %s", json_variant_string(v));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ *type = t;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_rlimit_value(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ rlim_t z, *value = userdata;
+
+ assert(value);
+
+ if (json_variant_is_negative(v))
+ z = RLIM_INFINITY;
+ else {
+ if (!json_variant_is_unsigned(v)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "rlimits limit not unsigned, refusing.");
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+
+ z = (rlim_t) json_variant_unsigned(v);
+
+ if ((uintmax_t) z != json_variant_unsigned(v)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "rlimits limit out of range, refusing.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *value = z;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_rlimits(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+
+ Settings *s = userdata;
+ JsonVariant *e;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(s);
+
+ JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(e, v) {
+
+ struct rlimit_data {
+ int type;
+ rlim_t soft;
+ rlim_t hard;
+ } data = {
+ .type = -1,
+ .soft = RLIM_INFINITY,
+ .hard = RLIM_INFINITY,
+ };
+
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "soft", JSON_VARIANT_NUMBER, oci_rlimit_value, offsetof(struct rlimit_data, soft), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ { "hard", JSON_VARIANT_NUMBER, oci_rlimit_value, offsetof(struct rlimit_data, hard), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ { "type", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, oci_rlimit_type, offsetof(struct rlimit_data, type), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ {}
+ };
+
+
+ r = json_dispatch(e, table, oci_unexpected, flags, &data);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ assert(data.type >= 0);
+ assert(data.type < _RLIMIT_MAX);
+
+ if (s->rlimit[data.type]) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "rlimits array contains duplicate entry, refusing.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ s->rlimit[data.type] = new(struct rlimit, 1);
+ if (!s->rlimit[data.type])
+ return log_oom();
+
+ *s->rlimit[data.type] = (struct rlimit) {
+ .rlim_cur = data.soft,
+ .rlim_max = data.hard,
+ };
+
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_capability_array(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ uint64_t *mask = userdata, m = 0;
+ JsonVariant *e;
+
+ JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(e, v) {
+ const char *n;
+ int cap;
+
+ if (!json_variant_is_string(e)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Entry in capabilities array is not a string.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ assert_se(n = json_variant_string(e));
+
+ cap = capability_from_name(n);
+ if (cap < 0) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Unknown capability: %s", n);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ m |= UINT64_C(1) << cap;
+ }
+
+ if (*mask == (uint64_t) -1)
+ *mask = m;
+ else
+ *mask |= m;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_capabilities(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "effective", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_capability_array, offsetof(CapabilityQuintet, effective) },
+ { "bounding", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_capability_array, offsetof(CapabilityQuintet, bounding) },
+ { "inheritable", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_capability_array, offsetof(CapabilityQuintet, inheritable) },
+ { "permitted", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_capability_array, offsetof(CapabilityQuintet, permitted) },
+ { "ambient", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_capability_array, offsetof(CapabilityQuintet, ambient) },
+ {}
+ };
+
+ Settings *s = userdata;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(s);
+
+ r = json_dispatch(v, table, oci_unexpected, flags, &s->full_capabilities);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (s->full_capabilities.bounding != (uint64_t) -1) {
+ s->capability = s->full_capabilities.bounding;
+ s->drop_capability = ~s->full_capabilities.bounding;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_oom_score_adj(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ Settings *s = userdata;
+ intmax_t k;
+
+ assert(s);
+
+ k = json_variant_integer(v);
+ if (k < OOM_SCORE_ADJ_MIN || k > OOM_SCORE_ADJ_MAX) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "oomScoreAdj value out of range: %ji", k);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ s->oom_score_adjust = (int) k;
+ s->oom_score_adjust_set = true;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_uid_gid(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ uid_t *uid = userdata, u;
+ uintmax_t k;
+
+ assert(uid);
+ assert_cc(sizeof(uid_t) == sizeof(gid_t));
+
+ k = json_variant_unsigned(v);
+ u = (uid_t) k;
+ if ((uintmax_t) u != k) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "UID/GID out of range: %ji", k);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!uid_is_valid(u)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "UID/GID is not valid: " UID_FMT, u);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ *uid = u;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_supplementary_gids(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ Settings *s = userdata;
+ JsonVariant *e;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(s);
+
+ JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(e, v) {
+ gid_t gid, *a;
+
+ if (!json_variant_is_unsigned(e)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Supplementary GID entry is not a UID.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = oci_uid_gid(name, e, flags, &gid);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ a = reallocarray(s->supplementary_gids, s->n_supplementary_gids + 1, sizeof(gid_t));
+ if (!a)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ s->supplementary_gids = a;
+ s->supplementary_gids[s->n_supplementary_gids++] = gid;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_user(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "uid", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_uid_gid, offsetof(Settings, uid), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ { "gid", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_uid_gid, offsetof(Settings, gid), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ { "additionalGids", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_supplementary_gids, 0, 0 },
+ {}
+ };
+
+ return json_dispatch(v, table, oci_unexpected, flags, userdata);
+}
+
+static int oci_process(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "terminal", JSON_VARIANT_BOOLEAN, oci_terminal, 0, 0 },
+ { "consoleSize", JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT, oci_console_size, 0, 0 },
+ { "cwd", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, oci_absolute_path, offsetof(Settings, working_directory), 0 },
+ { "env", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_env, offsetof(Settings, environment), 0 },
+ { "args", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_args, offsetof(Settings, parameters), 0 },
+ { "rlimits", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_rlimits, 0, 0 },
+ { "apparmorProfile", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, oci_unsupported, 0, JSON_PERMISSIVE },
+ { "capabilities", JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT, oci_capabilities, 0, 0 },
+ { "noNewPrivileges", JSON_VARIANT_BOOLEAN, json_dispatch_boolean, offsetof(Settings, no_new_privileges), 0 },
+ { "oomScoreAdj", JSON_VARIANT_INTEGER, oci_oom_score_adj, 0, 0 },
+ { "selinuxLabel", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, oci_unsupported, 0, JSON_PERMISSIVE },
+ { "user", JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT, oci_user, 0, 0 },
+ {}
+ };
+
+ return json_dispatch(v, table, oci_unexpected, flags, userdata);
+}
+
+static int oci_root(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "path", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, json_dispatch_string, offsetof(Settings, root) },
+ { "readonly", JSON_VARIANT_BOOLEAN, json_dispatch_boolean, offsetof(Settings, read_only) },
+ {}
+ };
+
+ return json_dispatch(v, table, oci_unexpected, flags, userdata);
+}
+
+static int oci_hostname(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ Settings *s = userdata;
+ const char *n;
+
+ assert(s);
+
+ assert_se(n = json_variant_string(v));
+
+ if (!hostname_is_valid(n, false)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Hostname string is not a valid hostname: %s", n);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (free_and_strdup(&s->hostname, n) < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool oci_exclude_mount(const char *path) {
+
+ /* Returns "true" for all mounts we insist to mount on our own, and hence ignore the OCI data. */
+
+ if (PATH_IN_SET(path,
+ "/dev",
+ "/dev/mqueue",
+ "/dev/pts",
+ "/dev/shm",
+ "/proc",
+ "/proc/acpi",
+ "/proc/apm",
+ "/proc/asound",
+ "/proc/bus",
+ "/proc/fs",
+ "/proc/irq",
+ "/proc/kallsyms",
+ "/proc/kcore",
+ "/proc/keys",
+ "/proc/scsi",
+ "/proc/sys",
+ "/proc/sys/net",
+ "/proc/sysrq-trigger",
+ "/proc/timer_list",
+ "/run",
+ "/sys",
+ "/sys",
+ "/sys/fs/selinux",
+ "/tmp"))
+ return true;
+
+ /* Similar, skip the whole /sys/fs/cgroups subtree */
+ if (path_startswith(path, "/sys/fs/cgroup"))
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static int oci_mounts(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ Settings *s = userdata;
+ JsonVariant *e;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(s);
+
+ JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(e, v) {
+
+ struct mount_data {
+ char *destination;
+ char *source;
+ char *type;
+ char **options;
+ } data = {};
+
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "destination", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, oci_absolute_path, offsetof(struct mount_data, destination), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ { "source", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, json_dispatch_string, offsetof(struct mount_data, source), 0 },
+ { "options", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, json_dispatch_strv, offsetof(struct mount_data, options), 0, },
+ { "type", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, json_dispatch_string, offsetof(struct mount_data, type), 0 },
+ {}
+ };
+
+ _cleanup_free_ char *joined_options = NULL;
+ CustomMount *m;
+
+ r = json_dispatch(e, table, oci_unexpected, flags, &data);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto fail_item;
+
+ if (!path_is_absolute(data.destination)) {
+ json_log(e, flags, 0, "Mount destination not an absolute path: %s", data.destination);
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto fail_item;
+ }
+
+ if (oci_exclude_mount(data.destination))
+ goto skip_item;
+
+ if (data.options) {
+ joined_options = strv_join(data.options, ",");
+ if (!joined_options) {
+ r = log_oom();
+ goto fail_item;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!data.type || streq(data.type, "bind")) {
+
+ if (!path_is_absolute(data.source)) {
+ char *joined;
+
+ joined = path_join(s->bundle, data.source);
+ if (!joined) {
+ r = log_oom();
+ goto fail_item;
+ }
+
+ free_and_replace(data.source, joined);
+ }
+
+ data.type = mfree(data.type);
+
+ m = custom_mount_add(&s->custom_mounts, &s->n_custom_mounts, CUSTOM_MOUNT_BIND);
+ } else
+ m = custom_mount_add(&s->custom_mounts, &s->n_custom_mounts, CUSTOM_MOUNT_ARBITRARY);
+ if (!m) {
+ r = log_oom();
+ goto fail_item;
+ }
+
+ m->destination = TAKE_PTR(data.destination);
+ m->source = TAKE_PTR(data.source);
+ m->options = TAKE_PTR(joined_options);
+ m->type_argument = TAKE_PTR(data.type);
+
+ strv_free(data.options);
+ continue;
+
+ fail_item:
+ free(data.destination);
+ free(data.source);
+ strv_free(data.options);
+ free(data.type);
+
+ return r;
+
+ skip_item:
+ free(data.destination);
+ free(data.source);
+ strv_free(data.options);
+ free(data.type);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_namespace_type(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ unsigned long *nsflags = userdata;
+ const char *n;
+
+ assert(nsflags);
+ assert_se(n = json_variant_string(v));
+
+ /* We don't use namespace_flags_from_string() here, as the OCI spec uses slightly different names than the
+ * kernel here. */
+ if (streq(n, "pid"))
+ *nsflags = CLONE_NEWPID;
+ else if (streq(n, "network"))
+ *nsflags = CLONE_NEWNET;
+ else if (streq(n, "mount"))
+ *nsflags = CLONE_NEWNS;
+ else if (streq(n, "ipc"))
+ *nsflags = CLONE_NEWIPC;
+ else if (streq(n, "uts"))
+ *nsflags = CLONE_NEWUTS;
+ else if (streq(n, "user"))
+ *nsflags = CLONE_NEWUSER;
+ else if (streq(n, "cgroup"))
+ *nsflags = CLONE_NEWCGROUP;
+ else {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Unknown cgroup type, refusing: %s", n);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_namespaces(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ Settings *s = userdata;
+ unsigned long n = 0;
+ JsonVariant *e;
+ int r;
+
+ assert_se(s);
+
+ JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(e, v) {
+
+ struct namespace_data {
+ unsigned long type;
+ char *path;
+ } data = {};
+
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "type", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, oci_namespace_type, offsetof(struct namespace_data, type), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ { "path", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, oci_absolute_path, offsetof(struct namespace_data, path), 0 },
+ {}
+ };
+
+ r = json_dispatch(e, table, oci_unexpected, flags, &data);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ free(data.path);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if (data.path) {
+ if (data.type != CLONE_NEWNET) {
+ json_log(e, flags, 0, "Specifying namespace path for non-network namespace is not supported.");
+ free(data.path);
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ if (s->network_namespace_path) {
+ json_log(e, flags, 0, "Network namespace path specified more than once, refusing.");
+ free(data.path);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ free(s->network_namespace_path);
+ s->network_namespace_path = data.path;
+ }
+
+ if (FLAGS_SET(n, data.type)) {
+ json_log(e, flags, 0, "Duplicat namespace specification, refusing.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ n |= data.type;
+ }
+
+ if (!FLAGS_SET(n, CLONE_NEWNS)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Containers without file system namespace aren't supported.");
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ s->private_network = FLAGS_SET(n, CLONE_NEWNET);
+ s->userns_mode = FLAGS_SET(n, CLONE_NEWUSER) ? USER_NAMESPACE_FIXED : USER_NAMESPACE_NO;
+ s->use_cgns = FLAGS_SET(n, CLONE_NEWCGROUP);
+
+ s->clone_ns_flags = n & (CLONE_NEWIPC|CLONE_NEWPID|CLONE_NEWUTS);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_uid_gid_range(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ uid_t *uid = userdata, u;
+ uintmax_t k;
+
+ assert(uid);
+ assert_cc(sizeof(uid_t) == sizeof(gid_t));
+
+ /* This is very much like oci_uid_gid(), except the checks are a bit different, as this is a UID range rather
+ * than a specific UID, and hence (uid_t) -1 has no special significance. OTOH a range of zero makes no
+ * sense. */
+
+ k = json_variant_unsigned(v);
+ u = (uid_t) k;
+ if ((uintmax_t) u != k) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "UID/GID out of range: %ji", k);
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+ if (u == 0) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "UID/GID range can't be zero.");
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+
+ *uid = u;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_uid_gid_mappings(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ struct mapping_data {
+ uid_t host_id;
+ uid_t container_id;
+ uid_t range;
+ } data = {
+ .host_id = UID_INVALID,
+ .container_id = UID_INVALID,
+ .range = 0,
+ };
+
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "containerID", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_uid_gid, offsetof(struct mapping_data, container_id), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ { "hostID", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_uid_gid, offsetof(struct mapping_data, host_id), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ { "size", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_uid_gid_range, offsetof(struct mapping_data, range), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ {}
+ };
+
+ Settings *s = userdata;
+ JsonVariant *e;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(s);
+
+ if (json_variant_elements(v) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (json_variant_elements(v) > 1) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "UID/GID mappings with more than one entry are not supported.");
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ assert_se(e = json_variant_by_index(v, 0));
+
+ r = json_dispatch(e, table, oci_unexpected, flags, &data);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (data.host_id + data.range < data.host_id ||
+ data.container_id + data.range < data.container_id) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "UID/GID range goes beyond UID/GID validity range, refusing.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (data.container_id != 0) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "UID/GID mappings with a non-zero container base are not supported.");
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ if (data.range < 0x10000)
+ json_log(v, flags|JSON_WARNING, 0, "UID/GID mapping with less than 65536 UID/GIDS set up, you are looking for trouble.");
+
+ if (s->uid_range != UID_INVALID &&
+ (s->uid_shift != data.host_id || s->uid_range != data.range)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Non-matching UID and GID mappings are not supported.");
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ s->uid_shift = data.host_id;
+ s->uid_range = data.range;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_device_type(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ mode_t *mode = userdata;
+ const char *t;
+
+ assert(mode);
+ assert_se(t = json_variant_string(v));
+
+ if (STR_IN_SET(t, "c", "u"))
+ *mode = (*mode & ~S_IFMT) | S_IFCHR;
+ else if (streq(t, "b"))
+ *mode = (*mode & ~S_IFMT) | S_IFBLK;
+ else if (streq(t, "p"))
+ *mode = (*mode & ~S_IFMT) | S_IFIFO;
+ else {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Unknown device type: %s", t);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_device_major(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ unsigned *u = userdata;
+ uintmax_t k;
+
+ assert_se(u);
+
+ k = json_variant_unsigned(v);
+ if (!DEVICE_MAJOR_VALID(k)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Device major %ji out of range.", k);
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+
+ *u = (unsigned) k;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_device_minor(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ unsigned *u = userdata;
+ uintmax_t k;
+
+ assert_se(u);
+
+ k = json_variant_unsigned(v);
+ if (!DEVICE_MINOR_VALID(k)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Device minor %ji out of range.", k);
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+
+ *u = (unsigned) k;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_device_file_mode(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ mode_t *mode = userdata, m;
+ uintmax_t k;
+
+ assert(mode);
+
+ k = json_variant_unsigned(v);
+ m = (mode_t) k;
+
+ if ((m & ~07777) != 0 || (uintmax_t) m != k) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "fileMode out of range, refusing.");
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+
+ *mode = m;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_devices(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ Settings *s = userdata;
+ JsonVariant *e;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(s);
+
+ JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(e, v) {
+
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "type", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, oci_device_type, offsetof(DeviceNode, mode), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ { "path", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, oci_absolute_path, offsetof(DeviceNode, path), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ { "major", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_device_major, offsetof(DeviceNode, major), 0 },
+ { "minor", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_device_minor, offsetof(DeviceNode, minor), 0 },
+ { "fileMode", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_device_file_mode, offsetof(DeviceNode, mode), 0 },
+ { "uid", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_uid_gid, offsetof(DeviceNode, uid), 0 },
+ { "gid", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_uid_gid, offsetof(DeviceNode, gid), 0 },
+ {}
+ };
+
+ DeviceNode *node, *nodes;
+
+ nodes = reallocarray(s->extra_nodes, s->n_extra_nodes + 1, sizeof(DeviceNode));
+ if (!nodes)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ s->extra_nodes = nodes;
+
+ node = nodes + s->n_extra_nodes;
+ *node = (DeviceNode) {
+ .uid = UID_INVALID,
+ .gid = GID_INVALID,
+ .major = (unsigned) -1,
+ .minor = (unsigned) -1,
+ .mode = 0644,
+ };
+
+ r = json_dispatch(e, table, oci_unexpected, flags, node);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto fail_element;
+
+ if (S_ISCHR(node->mode) || S_ISBLK(node->mode)) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL;
+
+ if (node->major == (unsigned) -1 || node->minor == (unsigned) -1) {
+ json_log(e, flags, 0, "Major/minor required when device node is device node");
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto fail_element;
+ }
+
+ /* Suppress a couple of implicit device nodes */
+ r = device_path_make_canonical(node->mode, makedev(node->major, node->minor), &path);
+ if (r < 0)
+ json_log(e, flags|JSON_DEBUG, 0, "Failed to resolve device node %u:%u, ignoring: %m", node->major, node->minor);
+ else {
+ if (PATH_IN_SET(path,
+ "/dev/null",
+ "/dev/zero",
+ "/dev/full",
+ "/dev/random",
+ "/dev/urandom",
+ "/dev/tty",
+ "/dev/net/tun",
+ "/dev/ptmx",
+ "/dev/pts/ptmx",
+ "/dev/console")) {
+
+ json_log(e, flags|JSON_DEBUG, 0, "Ignoring devices item for device '%s', as it is implicitly created anyway.", path);
+ free(node->path);
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ s->n_extra_nodes++;
+ continue;
+
+ fail_element:
+ free(node->path);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_cgroups_path(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *slice = NULL, *backwards = NULL;
+ Settings *s = userdata;
+ const char *p;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(s);
+
+ assert_se(p = json_variant_string(v));
+
+ r = cg_path_get_slice(p, &slice);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return json_log(v, flags, r, "Couldn't derive slice unit name from path '%s': %m", p);
+
+ r = cg_slice_to_path(slice, &backwards);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return json_log(v, flags, r, "Couldn't convert slice unit name '%s' back to path: %m", slice);
+
+ if (!path_equal(backwards, p)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Control group path '%s' does not refer to slice unit, refusing.", p);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ free_and_replace(s->slice, slice);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_cgroup_device_type(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ mode_t *mode = userdata;
+ const char *n;
+
+ assert_se(n = json_variant_string(v));
+
+ if (streq(n, "c"))
+ *mode = S_IFCHR;
+ else if (streq(n, "b"))
+ *mode = S_IFBLK;
+ else {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Control group device type unknown: %s", n);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+struct device_data {
+ bool allow;
+ bool r;
+ bool w;
+ bool m;
+ mode_t type;
+ unsigned major;
+ unsigned minor;
+};
+
+static int oci_cgroup_device_access(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ struct device_data *d = userdata;
+ bool r = false, w = false, m = false;
+ const char *s;
+ size_t i;
+
+ assert_se(s = json_variant_string(v));
+
+ for (i = 0; s[i]; i++) {
+ if (s[i] == 'r')
+ r = true;
+ else if (s[i] == 'w')
+ w = true;
+ else if (s[i] == 'm')
+ m = true;
+ else {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Unknown device access character '%c'.", s[i]);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ d->r = r;
+ d->w = w;
+ d->m = m;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_cgroup_devices(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+
+ _cleanup_free_ struct device_data *list = NULL;
+ Settings *s = userdata;
+ size_t n_list = 0, i;
+ bool noop = false;
+ JsonVariant *e;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(s);
+
+ JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(e, v) {
+
+ struct device_data data = {
+ .major = (unsigned) -1,
+ .minor = (unsigned) -1,
+ }, *a;
+
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "allow", JSON_VARIANT_BOOLEAN, json_dispatch_boolean, offsetof(struct device_data, allow), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ { "type", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, oci_cgroup_device_type, offsetof(struct device_data, type), 0 },
+ { "major", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_device_major, offsetof(struct device_data, major), 0 },
+ { "minor", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_device_minor, offsetof(struct device_data, minor), 0 },
+ { "access", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, oci_cgroup_device_access, 0, 0 },
+ {}
+ };
+
+ r = json_dispatch(e, table, oci_unexpected, flags, &data);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (!data.allow) {
+ /* The fact that OCI allows 'deny' entries makes really no sense, as 'allow' vs. 'deny' for the
+ * devices cgroup controller is really not about whitelisting and blacklisting but about adding
+ * and removing entries from the whitelist. Since we always start out with an empty whitelist
+ * we hence ignore the whole thing, as removing entries which don't exist make no sense. We'll
+ * log about this, since this is really borked in the spec, with one exception: the entry
+ * that's supposed to drop the kernel's default we ignore silently */
+
+ if (!data.r || !data.w || !data.m || data.type != 0 || data.major != (unsigned) -1 || data.minor != (unsigned) -1)
+ json_log(v, flags|JSON_WARNING, 0, "Devices cgroup whitelist with arbitrary 'allow' entries not supported, ignoring.");
+
+ /* We ignore the 'deny' entry as for us that's implied */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (!data.r && !data.w && !data.m) {
+ json_log(v, flags|LOG_WARNING, 0, "Device cgroup whitelist entry with no effect found, ignoring.");
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (data.minor != (unsigned) -1 && data.major == (unsigned) -1) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Device cgroup whitelist entries with minors but no majors not supported.");
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ if (data.major != (unsigned) -1 && data.type == 0) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Device cgroup whitelist entries with majors but no device node type not supported.");
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ if (data.type == 0) {
+ if (data.r && data.w && data.m) /* a catchall whitelist entry means we are looking at a noop */
+ noop = true;
+ else {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Device cgroup whitelist entries with no type not supported.");
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+ }
+
+ a = reallocarray(list, n_list + 1, sizeof(struct device_data));
+ if (!a)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ list = a;
+ list[n_list++] = data;
+ }
+
+ if (noop)
+ return 0;
+
+ r = settings_allocate_properties(s);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = sd_bus_message_open_container(s->properties, 'r', "sv");
+ if (r < 0)
+ return bus_log_create_error(r);
+
+ r = sd_bus_message_append(s->properties, "s", "DeviceAllow");
+ if (r < 0)
+ return bus_log_create_error(r);
+
+ r = sd_bus_message_open_container(s->properties, 'v', "a(ss)");
+ if (r < 0)
+ return bus_log_create_error(r);
+
+ r = sd_bus_message_open_container(s->properties, 'a', "(ss)");
+ if (r < 0)
+ return bus_log_create_error(r);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n_list; i++) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *pattern = NULL;
+ char access[4];
+ size_t n = 0;
+
+ if (list[i].minor == (unsigned) -1) {
+ const char *t;
+
+ if (list[i].type == S_IFBLK)
+ t = "block";
+ else {
+ assert(list[i].type == S_IFCHR);
+ t = "char";
+ }
+
+ if (list[i].major == (unsigned) -1) {
+ pattern = strjoin(t, "-*");
+ if (!pattern)
+ return log_oom();
+ } else {
+ if (asprintf(&pattern, "%s-%u", t, list[i].major) < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ assert(list[i].major != (unsigned) -1); /* If a minor is specified, then a major also needs to be specified */
+
+ r = device_path_make_major_minor(list[i].type, makedev(list[i].major, list[i].minor), &pattern);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+ }
+
+ if (list[i].r)
+ access[n++] = 'r';
+ if (list[i].w)
+ access[n++] = 'w';
+ if (list[i].m)
+ access[n++] = 'm';
+ access[n] = 0;
+
+ assert(n > 0);
+
+ r = sd_bus_message_append(s->properties, "(ss)", pattern, access);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return bus_log_create_error(r);
+ }
+
+ r = sd_bus_message_close_container(s->properties);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return bus_log_create_error(r);
+
+ r = sd_bus_message_close_container(s->properties);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return bus_log_create_error(r);
+
+ r = sd_bus_message_close_container(s->properties);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return bus_log_create_error(r);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_cgroup_memory_limit(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ uint64_t *m = userdata;
+ uintmax_t k;
+
+ assert(m);
+
+ if (json_variant_is_negative(v)) {
+ *m = UINT64_MAX;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!json_variant_is_unsigned(v)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Memory limit is not an unsigned integer");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ k = json_variant_unsigned(v);
+ if (k >= UINT64_MAX) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Memory limit too large: %ji", k);
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+
+ *m = (uint64_t) k;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_cgroup_memory(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+
+ struct memory_data {
+ uint64_t limit;
+ uint64_t reservation;
+ uint64_t swap;
+ } data = {
+ .limit = UINT64_MAX,
+ .reservation = UINT64_MAX,
+ .swap = UINT64_MAX,
+ };
+
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "limit", JSON_VARIANT_NUMBER, oci_cgroup_memory_limit, offsetof(struct memory_data, limit), 0 },
+ { "reservation", JSON_VARIANT_NUMBER, oci_cgroup_memory_limit, offsetof(struct memory_data, reservation), 0 },
+ { "swap", JSON_VARIANT_NUMBER, oci_cgroup_memory_limit, offsetof(struct memory_data, swap), 0 },
+ { "kernel", JSON_VARIANT_NUMBER, oci_unsupported, 0, JSON_PERMISSIVE },
+ { "kernelTCP", JSON_VARIANT_NUMBER, oci_unsupported, 0, JSON_PERMISSIVE },
+ { "swapiness", JSON_VARIANT_NUMBER, oci_unsupported, 0, JSON_PERMISSIVE },
+ { "disableOOMKiller", JSON_VARIANT_NUMBER, oci_unsupported, 0, JSON_PERMISSIVE },
+ {}
+ };
+
+ Settings *s = userdata;
+ int r;
+
+ r = json_dispatch(v, table, oci_unexpected, flags, &data);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (data.swap != UINT64_MAX) {
+ if (data.limit == UINT64_MAX)
+ json_log(v, flags|LOG_WARNING, 0, "swap limit without memory limit is not supported, ignoring.");
+ else if (data.swap < data.limit)
+ json_log(v, flags|LOG_WARNING, 0, "swap limit is below memory limit, ignoring.");
+ else {
+ r = settings_allocate_properties(s);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = sd_bus_message_append(s->properties, "(sv)", "MemorySwapMax", "t", data.swap - data.limit);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return bus_log_create_error(r);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (data.limit != UINT64_MAX) {
+ r = settings_allocate_properties(s);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = sd_bus_message_append(s->properties, "(sv)", "MemoryMax", "t", data.limit);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return bus_log_create_error(r);
+ }
+
+ if (data.reservation != UINT64_MAX) {
+ r = settings_allocate_properties(s);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = sd_bus_message_append(s->properties, "(sv)", "MemoryLow", "t", data.reservation);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return bus_log_create_error(r);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+struct cpu_data {
+ uint64_t shares;
+ uint64_t quota;
+ uint64_t period;
+ cpu_set_t *cpuset;
+ unsigned ncpus;
+};
+
+static int oci_cgroup_cpu_shares(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ uint64_t *u = userdata;
+ uintmax_t k;
+
+ assert(u);
+
+ k = json_variant_unsigned(v);
+ if (k < CGROUP_CPU_SHARES_MIN || k > CGROUP_CPU_SHARES_MAX) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "shares value out of range.");
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+
+ *u = (uint64_t) k;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_cgroup_cpu_quota(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ uint64_t *u = userdata;
+ uintmax_t k;
+
+ assert(u);
+
+ k = json_variant_unsigned(v);
+ if (k <= 0 || k >= UINT64_MAX) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "period/quota value out of range.");
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+
+ *u = (uint64_t) k;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_cgroup_cpu_cpus(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ struct cpu_data *data = userdata;
+ cpu_set_t *set;
+ const char *n;
+ int ncpus;
+
+ assert(data);
+
+ assert_se(n = json_variant_string(v));
+
+ ncpus = parse_cpu_set(n, &set);
+ if (ncpus < 0)
+ return json_log(v, flags, ncpus, "Failed to parse CPU set specification: %s", n);
+
+ CPU_FREE(data->cpuset);
+ data->cpuset = set;
+ data->ncpus = ncpus;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_cgroup_cpu(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "shares", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_cgroup_cpu_shares, offsetof(struct cpu_data, shares), 0 },
+ { "quota", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_cgroup_cpu_quota, offsetof(struct cpu_data, quota), 0 },
+ { "period", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_cgroup_cpu_quota, offsetof(struct cpu_data, period), 0 },
+ { "realtimeRuntime", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_unsupported, 0, 0 },
+ { "realtimePeriod", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_unsupported, 0, 0 },
+ { "cpus", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, oci_cgroup_cpu_cpus, 0, 0 },
+ { "mems", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, oci_unsupported, 0, 0 },
+ {}
+ };
+
+ struct cpu_data data = {
+ .shares = UINT64_MAX,
+ .quota = UINT64_MAX,
+ .period = UINT64_MAX,
+ };
+
+ Settings *s = userdata;
+ int r;
+
+ r = json_dispatch(v, table, oci_unexpected, flags, &data);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ CPU_FREE(data.cpuset);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ CPU_FREE(s->cpuset);
+ s->cpuset = data.cpuset;
+ s->cpuset_ncpus = data.ncpus;
+
+ if (data.shares != UINT64_MAX) {
+ r = settings_allocate_properties(s);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = sd_bus_message_append(s->properties, "(sv)", "CPUShares", "t", data.shares);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return bus_log_create_error(r);
+ }
+
+ if (data.quota != UINT64_MAX && data.period != UINT64_MAX) {
+ r = settings_allocate_properties(s);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = sd_bus_message_append(s->properties, "(sv)", "CPUQuotaPerSecUSec", "t", (uint64_t) (data.quota * USEC_PER_SEC / data.period));
+ if (r < 0)
+ return bus_log_create_error(r);
+
+ } else if ((data.quota != UINT64_MAX) != (data.period != UINT64_MAX)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "CPU quota and period not used together.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_cgroup_block_io_weight(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ Settings *s = userdata;
+ uintmax_t k;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(s);
+
+ k = json_variant_unsigned(v);
+ if (k < CGROUP_BLKIO_WEIGHT_MIN || k > CGROUP_BLKIO_WEIGHT_MAX) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Block I/O weight out of range.");
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+
+ r = settings_allocate_properties(s);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = sd_bus_message_append(s->properties, "(sv)", "BlockIOWeight", "t", (uint64_t) k);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return bus_log_create_error(r);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_cgroup_block_io_weight_device(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ Settings *s = userdata;
+ JsonVariant *e;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(s);
+
+ JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(e, v) {
+ struct device_data {
+ unsigned major;
+ unsigned minor;
+ uintmax_t weight;
+ } data = {
+ .major = (unsigned) -1,
+ .minor = (unsigned) -1,
+ .weight = UINTMAX_MAX,
+ };
+
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "major", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_device_major, offsetof(struct device_data, major), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ { "minor", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_device_minor, offsetof(struct device_data, minor), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ { "weight", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, json_dispatch_unsigned, offsetof(struct device_data, weight), 0 },
+ { "leafWeight", JSON_VARIANT_INTEGER, oci_unsupported, 0, JSON_PERMISSIVE },
+ {}
+ };
+
+ _cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL;
+
+ r = json_dispatch(e, table, oci_unexpected, flags, &data);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (data.weight == UINTMAX_MAX)
+ continue;
+
+ if (data.weight < CGROUP_BLKIO_WEIGHT_MIN || data.weight > CGROUP_BLKIO_WEIGHT_MAX) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Block I/O device weight out of range.");
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+
+ r = device_path_make_major_minor(S_IFBLK, makedev(data.major, data.minor), &path);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return json_log(v, flags, r, "Failed to build device path: %m");
+
+ r = settings_allocate_properties(s);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = sd_bus_message_append(s->properties, "(sv)", "BlockIODeviceWeight", "a(st)", 1, path, (uint64_t) data.weight);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return bus_log_create_error(r);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_cgroup_block_io_throttle(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ Settings *s = userdata;
+ const char *pname;
+ JsonVariant *e;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(s);
+
+ pname = streq(name, "throttleReadBpsDevice") ? "IOReadBandwidthMax" :
+ streq(name, "throttleWriteBpsDevice") ? "IOWriteBandwidthMax" :
+ streq(name, "throttleReadIOPSDevice") ? "IOReadIOPSMax" :
+ "IOWriteIOPSMax";
+
+ JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(e, v) {
+ struct device_data {
+ unsigned major;
+ unsigned minor;
+ uintmax_t rate;
+ } data = {
+ .major = (unsigned) -1,
+ .minor = (unsigned) -1,
+ };
+
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "major", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_device_major, offsetof(struct device_data, major), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ { "minor", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_device_minor, offsetof(struct device_data, minor), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ { "rate", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, json_dispatch_unsigned, offsetof(struct device_data, rate), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ {}
+ };
+
+ _cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL;
+
+ r = json_dispatch(e, table, oci_unexpected, flags, &data);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (data.rate >= UINT64_MAX) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Block I/O device rate out of range.");
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+
+ r = device_path_make_major_minor(S_IFBLK, makedev(data.major, data.minor), &path);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return json_log(v, flags, r, "Failed to build device path: %m");
+
+ r = settings_allocate_properties(s);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = sd_bus_message_append(s->properties, "(sv)", pname, "a(st)", 1, path, (uint64_t) data.rate);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return bus_log_create_error(r);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_cgroup_block_io(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "weight", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_cgroup_block_io_weight, 0, 0 },
+ { "leafWeight", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_unsupported, 0, JSON_PERMISSIVE },
+ { "weightDevice", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_cgroup_block_io_weight_device, 0, 0 },
+ { "throttleReadBpsDevice", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_cgroup_block_io_throttle, 0, 0 },
+ { "throttleWriteBpsDevice", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_cgroup_block_io_throttle, 0, 0 },
+ { "throttleReadIOPSDevice", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_cgroup_block_io_throttle, 0, 0 },
+ { "throttleWriteIOPSDevice", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_cgroup_block_io_throttle, 0, 0 },
+ {}
+ };
+
+ return json_dispatch(v, table, oci_unexpected, flags, userdata);
+}
+
+static int oci_cgroup_pids(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "limit", JSON_VARIANT_NUMBER, json_dispatch_variant, 0, JSON_MANDATORY },
+ {}
+ };
+
+ _cleanup_(json_variant_unrefp) JsonVariant *k = NULL;
+ Settings *s = userdata;
+ uint64_t m;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(s);
+
+ r = json_dispatch(v, table, oci_unexpected, flags, &k);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (json_variant_is_negative(k))
+ m = UINT64_MAX;
+ else {
+ if (!json_variant_is_unsigned(k)) {
+ json_log(k, flags, 0, "pids limit not unsigned integer, refusing.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ m = (uint64_t) json_variant_unsigned(k);
+
+ if ((uintmax_t) m != json_variant_unsigned(k)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "pids limit out of range, refusing.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ r = settings_allocate_properties(s);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = sd_bus_message_append(s->properties, "(sv)", "TasksMax", "t", m);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return bus_log_create_error(r);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_resources(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "devices", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_cgroup_devices, 0, 0 },
+ { "memory", JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT, oci_cgroup_memory, 0, 0 },
+ { "cpu", JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT, oci_cgroup_cpu, 0, 0 },
+ { "blockIO", JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT, oci_cgroup_block_io, 0, 0 },
+ { "hugepageLimits", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_unsupported, 0, 0 },
+ { "network", JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT, oci_unsupported, 0, 0 },
+ { "pids", JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT, oci_cgroup_pids, 0, 0 },
+ { "rdma", JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT, oci_unsupported, 0, 0 },
+ {}
+ };
+
+ return json_dispatch(v, table, oci_unexpected, flags, userdata);
+}
+
+static bool sysctl_key_valid(const char *s) {
+ bool dot = true;
+
+ /* Note that we are a bit stricter here than in systemd-sysctl, as that inherited semantics from the old sysctl
+ * tool, which were really weird (as it swaps / and . in both ways) */
+
+ if (isempty(s))
+ return false;
+
+ for (; *s; s++) {
+
+ if (*s <= ' ' || *s >= 127)
+ return false;
+ if (*s == '/')
+ return false;
+ if (*s == '.') {
+
+ if (dot) /* Don't allow two dots next to each other (or at the beginning) */
+ return false;
+
+ dot = true;
+ } else
+ dot = false;
+ }
+
+ if (dot) /* don't allow a dot at the end */
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static int oci_sysctl(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ Settings *s = userdata;
+ JsonVariant *k, *w;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(s);
+
+ JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT_FOREACH(k, w, v) {
+ const char *n, *m;
+
+ if (!json_variant_is_string(w)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "sysctl parameter is not a string, refusing.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ assert_se(n = json_variant_string(k));
+ assert_se(m = json_variant_string(w));
+
+ if (sysctl_key_valid(n)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "sysctl key invalid, refusing: %s", n);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = strv_extend_strv(&s->sysctl, STRV_MAKE(n, m), false);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_seccomp_action_from_string(const char *name, uint32_t *ret) {
+
+ static const struct {
+ const char *name;
+ uint32_t action;
+ } table[] = {
+ { "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW", SCMP_ACT_ALLOW },
+ { "SCMP_ACT_ERRNO", SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM) }, /* the OCI spec doesn't document the error, but it appears EPERM is supposed to be used */
+ { "SCMP_ACT_KILL", SCMP_ACT_KILL },
+#ifdef SCMP_ACT_LOG
+ { "SCMP_ACT_LOG", SCMP_ACT_LOG },
+#endif
+ { "SCMP_ACT_TRAP", SCMP_ACT_TRAP },
+
+ /* We don't support SCMP_ACT_TRACE because that requires a tracer, and that doesn't really make sense
+ * here */
+ };
+
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(table); i++)
+ if (streq_ptr(name, table[i].name)) {
+ *ret = table[i].action;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int oci_seccomp_arch_from_string(const char *name, uint32_t *ret) {
+
+ static const struct {
+ const char *name;
+ uint32_t arch;
+ } table[] = {
+ { "SCMP_ARCH_AARCH64", SCMP_ARCH_AARCH64 },
+ { "SCMP_ARCH_ARM", SCMP_ARCH_ARM },
+ { "SCMP_ARCH_MIPS", SCMP_ARCH_MIPS },
+ { "SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64", SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64 },
+ { "SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64N32", SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64N32 },
+ { "SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL", SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL },
+ { "SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64", SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64 },
+ { "SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32", SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32 },
+ { "SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE", SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE },
+#ifdef SCMP_ARCH_PARISC
+ { "SCMP_ARCH_PARISC", SCMP_ARCH_PARISC },
+#endif
+#ifdef SCMP_ARCH_PARISC64
+ { "SCMP_ARCH_PARISC64", SCMP_ARCH_PARISC64 },
+#endif
+ { "SCMP_ARCH_PPC", SCMP_ARCH_PPC },
+ { "SCMP_ARCH_PPC64", SCMP_ARCH_PPC64 },
+ { "SCMP_ARCH_PPC64LE", SCMP_ARCH_PPC64LE },
+ { "SCMP_ARCH_S390", SCMP_ARCH_S390 },
+ { "SCMP_ARCH_S390X", SCMP_ARCH_S390X },
+ { "SCMP_ARCH_X32", SCMP_ARCH_X32 },
+ { "SCMP_ARCH_X86", SCMP_ARCH_X86 },
+ { "SCMP_ARCH_X86_64", SCMP_ARCH_X86_64 },
+ };
+
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(table); i++)
+ if (streq_ptr(table[i].name, name)) {
+ *ret = table[i].arch;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int oci_seccomp_compare_from_string(const char *name, enum scmp_compare *ret) {
+
+ static const struct {
+ const char *name;
+ enum scmp_compare op;
+ } table[] = {
+ { "SCMP_CMP_NE", SCMP_CMP_NE },
+ { "SCMP_CMP_LT", SCMP_CMP_LT },
+ { "SCMP_CMP_LE", SCMP_CMP_LE },
+ { "SCMP_CMP_EQ", SCMP_CMP_EQ },
+ { "SCMP_CMP_GE", SCMP_CMP_GE },
+ { "SCMP_CMP_GT", SCMP_CMP_GT },
+ { "SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ", SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ },
+ };
+
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(table); i++)
+ if (streq_ptr(table[i].name, name)) {
+ *ret = table[i].op;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int oci_seccomp_archs(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ scmp_filter_ctx *sc = userdata;
+ JsonVariant *e;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(sc);
+
+ JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(e, v) {
+ uint32_t a;
+
+ if (!json_variant_is_string(e)) {
+ json_log(e, flags, 0, "Architecture entry is not a string");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = oci_seccomp_arch_from_string(json_variant_string(e), &a);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return json_log(e, flags, r, "Unknown architecture: %s", json_variant_string(e));
+
+ r = seccomp_arch_add(sc, a);
+ if (r == -EEXIST)
+ continue;
+ if (r < 0)
+ return json_log(e, flags, r, "Failed to add architecture to seccomp filter: %m");
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+struct syscall_rule {
+ char **names;
+ uint32_t action;
+ struct scmp_arg_cmp *arguments;
+ size_t n_arguments;
+};
+
+static void syscall_rule_free(struct syscall_rule *rule) {
+ assert(rule);
+
+ strv_free(rule->names);
+ free(rule->arguments);
+};
+
+static int oci_seccomp_action(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ uint32_t *action = userdata;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(action);
+
+ r = oci_seccomp_action_from_string(json_variant_string(v), action);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return json_log(v, flags, r, "Unknown system call action '%s': %m", json_variant_string(v));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_seccomp_op(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ enum scmp_compare *op = userdata;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(op);
+
+ r = oci_seccomp_compare_from_string(json_variant_string(v), op);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return json_log(v, flags, r, "Unknown seccomp operator '%s': %m", json_variant_string(v));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_seccomp_args(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ struct syscall_rule *rule = userdata;
+ JsonVariant *e;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(rule);
+
+ JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(e, v) {
+ static const struct JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "index", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, json_dispatch_uint32, offsetof(struct scmp_arg_cmp, arg), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ { "value", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, json_dispatch_uint64, offsetof(struct scmp_arg_cmp, datum_a), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ { "valueTwo", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, json_dispatch_uint64, offsetof(struct scmp_arg_cmp, datum_b), 0 },
+ { "op", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, oci_seccomp_op, offsetof(struct scmp_arg_cmp, op), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ {},
+ };
+
+ struct scmp_arg_cmp *a, *p;
+ int expected;
+
+ a = reallocarray(rule->arguments, rule->n_arguments + 1, sizeof(struct syscall_rule));
+ if (!a)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ rule->arguments = a;
+ p = rule->arguments + rule->n_arguments;
+
+ *p = (struct scmp_arg_cmp) {
+ .arg = 0,
+ .datum_a = 0,
+ .datum_b = 0,
+ .op = 0,
+ };
+
+ r = json_dispatch(e, table, oci_unexpected, flags, p);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ expected = p->op == SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ ? 4 : 3;
+ if (r != expected)
+ json_log(e, flags|JSON_WARNING, 0, "Wrong number of system call arguments for JSON data data, ignoring.");
+
+ /* Note that we are a bit sloppy here and do not insist that SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ gets two datum values,
+ * and the other only one. That's because buildah for example by default calls things with
+ * SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ but only one argument. We use 0 when the value is not specified. */
+
+ rule->n_arguments++;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_seccomp_syscalls(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ scmp_filter_ctx *sc = userdata;
+ JsonVariant *e;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(sc);
+
+ JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(e, v) {
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "names", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, json_dispatch_strv, offsetof(struct syscall_rule, names), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ { "action", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, oci_seccomp_action, offsetof(struct syscall_rule, action), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ { "args", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_seccomp_args, 0, 0 },
+ };
+ struct syscall_rule rule = {
+ .action = (uint32_t) -1,
+ };
+ char **i;
+
+ r = json_dispatch(e, table, oci_unexpected, flags, &rule);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto fail_rule;
+
+ if (strv_isempty(rule.names)) {
+ json_log(e, flags, 0, "System call name list is empty.");
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto fail_rule;
+ }
+
+ STRV_FOREACH(i, rule.names) {
+ int nr;
+
+ nr = seccomp_syscall_resolve_name(*i);
+ if (nr == __NR_SCMP_ERROR) {
+ log_debug("Unknown syscall %s, skipping.", *i);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ r = seccomp_rule_add_array(sc, rule.action, nr, rule.n_arguments, rule.arguments);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto fail_rule;
+ }
+
+ syscall_rule_free(&rule);
+ continue;
+
+ fail_rule:
+ syscall_rule_free(&rule);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_seccomp(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "defaultAction", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, NULL, 0, JSON_MANDATORY },
+ { "architectures", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_seccomp_archs, 0, 0 },
+ { "syscalls", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_seccomp_syscalls, 0, 0 },
+ {}
+ };
+
+ _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx sc = NULL;
+ Settings *s = userdata;
+ JsonVariant *def;
+ uint32_t d;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(s);
+
+ def = json_variant_by_key(v, "defaultAction");
+ if (!def) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "defaultAction element missing.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!json_variant_is_string(def)) {
+ json_log(def, flags, 0, "defaultAction is not a string.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = oci_seccomp_action_from_string(json_variant_string(def), &d);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return json_log(def, flags, r, "Unknown default action: %s", json_variant_string(def));
+
+ sc = seccomp_init(d);
+ if (!sc) {
+ log_error("Couldn't allocate seccomp object.");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ r = json_dispatch(v, table, oci_unexpected, flags, sc);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ seccomp_release(s->seccomp);
+ s->seccomp = TAKE_PTR(sc);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_rootfs_propagation(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ const char *s;
+
+ s = json_variant_string(v);
+
+ if (streq(s, "shared"))
+ return 0;
+
+ json_log(v, flags|JSON_DEBUG, 0, "Ignoring rootfsPropagation setting '%s'.", s);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_masked_paths(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ Settings *s = userdata;
+ JsonVariant *e;
+
+ assert(s);
+
+ JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(e, v) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *destination = NULL;
+ CustomMount *m;
+ const char *p;
+
+ if (!json_variant_is_string(e)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Path is not a string, refusing.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ assert_se(p = json_variant_string(e));
+
+ if (!path_is_absolute(p)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Path is not not absolute, refusing: %s", p);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (oci_exclude_mount(p))
+ continue;
+
+ destination = strdup(p);
+ if (!destination)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ m = custom_mount_add(&s->custom_mounts, &s->n_custom_mounts, CUSTOM_MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE);
+ if (!m)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ m->destination = TAKE_PTR(destination);
+
+ /* The spec doesn't say this, but apparently pre-existing implementations are lenient towards
+ * non-existing paths to mask. Let's hence be too. */
+ m->graceful = true;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_readonly_paths(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ Settings *s = userdata;
+ JsonVariant *e;
+
+ assert(s);
+
+ JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(e, v) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *source = NULL, *destination = NULL;
+ CustomMount *m;
+ const char *p;
+
+ if (!json_variant_is_string(e)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Path is not a string, refusing.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ assert_se(p = json_variant_string(e));
+
+ if (!path_is_absolute(p)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Path is not not absolute, refusing: %s", p);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (oci_exclude_mount(p))
+ continue;
+
+ source = strjoin("+", p);
+ if (!source)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ destination = strdup(p);
+ if (!destination)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ m = custom_mount_add(&s->custom_mounts, &s->n_custom_mounts, CUSTOM_MOUNT_BIND);
+ if (!m)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ m->source = TAKE_PTR(source);
+ m->destination = TAKE_PTR(destination);
+ m->read_only = true;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_linux(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "namespaces", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_namespaces, 0, 0 },
+ { "uidMappings", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_uid_gid_mappings, 0, 0 },
+ { "gidMappings", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_uid_gid_mappings, 0, 0 },
+ { "devices", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_devices, 0, 0 },
+ { "cgroupsPath", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, oci_cgroups_path, 0, 0 },
+ { "resources", JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT, oci_resources, 0, 0 },
+ { "intelRdt", JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT, oci_unsupported, 0, JSON_PERMISSIVE },
+ { "sysctl", JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT, oci_sysctl, 0, 0 },
+ { "seccomp", JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT, oci_seccomp, 0, 0 },
+ { "rootfsPropagation", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, oci_rootfs_propagation, 0, 0 },
+ { "maskedPaths", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_masked_paths, 0, 0 },
+ { "readonlyPaths", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_readonly_paths, 0, 0 },
+ { "mountLabel", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, oci_unsupported, 0, JSON_PERMISSIVE },
+ {}
+ };
+
+ return json_dispatch(v, table, oci_unexpected, flags, userdata);
+}
+
+static int oci_hook_timeout(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ usec_t *u = userdata;
+ uintmax_t k;
+
+ k = json_variant_unsigned(v);
+ if (k == 0) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Hook timeout cannot be zero.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (k > (UINT64_MAX-1/USEC_PER_SEC)) {
+ json_log(v, flags, 0, "Hook timeout too large.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ *u = k * USEC_PER_SEC;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_hooks_array(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ Settings *s = userdata;
+ JsonVariant *e;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(s);
+
+ JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(e, v) {
+
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "path", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, oci_absolute_path, offsetof(OciHook, path), JSON_MANDATORY },
+ { "args", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_args, offsetof(OciHook, args), 0 },
+ { "env", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_env, offsetof(OciHook, env), 0 },
+ { "timeout", JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, oci_hook_timeout, offsetof(OciHook, timeout), 0 },
+ {}
+ };
+
+ OciHook *a, **array, *new_item;
+ size_t *n_array;
+
+ if (streq(name, "prestart")) {
+ array = &s->oci_hooks_prestart;
+ n_array = &s->n_oci_hooks_prestart;
+ } else if (streq(name, "poststart")) {
+ array = &s->oci_hooks_poststart;
+ n_array = &s->n_oci_hooks_poststart;
+ } else {
+ assert(streq(name, "poststop"));
+ array = &s->oci_hooks_poststop;
+ n_array = &s->n_oci_hooks_poststop;
+ }
+
+ a = reallocarray(*array, *n_array + 1, sizeof(OciHook));
+ if (!a)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ *array = a;
+ new_item = a + *n_array;
+
+ *new_item = (OciHook) {
+ .timeout = USEC_INFINITY,
+ };
+
+ r = json_dispatch(e, table, oci_unexpected, flags, userdata);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ free(new_item->path);
+ strv_free(new_item->args);
+ strv_free(new_item->env);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ (*n_array) ++;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int oci_hooks(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "prestart", JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT, oci_hooks_array, 0, 0 },
+ { "poststart", JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT, oci_hooks_array, 0, 0 },
+ { "poststop", JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT, oci_hooks_array, 0, 0 },
+ {}
+ };
+
+ return json_dispatch(v, table, oci_unexpected, flags, userdata);
+}
+
+static int oci_annotations(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags flags, void *userdata) {
+ JsonVariant *k, *w;
+
+ JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT_FOREACH(k, w, v) {
+ const char *n;
+
+ assert_se(n = json_variant_string(k));
+
+ if (isempty(n)) {
+ json_log(k, flags, 0, "Annotation with empty key, refusing.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!json_variant_is_string(w)) {
+ json_log(w, flags, 0, "Annotation has non-string value, refusing.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ json_log(k, flags|JSON_DEBUG, 0, "Ignoring annotation '%s' with value '%s'.", n, json_variant_string(w));
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int oci_load(FILE *f, const char *bundle, Settings **ret) {
+
+ static const JsonDispatch table[] = {
+ { "ociVersion", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, NULL, 0, JSON_MANDATORY },
+ { "process", JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT, oci_process, 0, 0 },
+ { "root", JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT, oci_root, 0, 0 },
+ { "hostname", JSON_VARIANT_STRING, oci_hostname, 0, 0 },
+ { "mounts", JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY, oci_mounts, 0, 0 },
+ { "linux", JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT, oci_linux, 0, 0 },
+ { "hooks", JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT, oci_hooks, 0, 0 },
+ { "annotations", JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT, oci_annotations, 0, 0 },
+ {}
+ };
+
+ _cleanup_(json_variant_unrefp) JsonVariant *oci = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(settings_freep) Settings *s = NULL;
+ unsigned line = 0, column = 0;
+ JsonVariant *v;
+ const char *path;
+ int r;
+
+ assert_se(bundle);
+
+ path = strjoina(bundle, "/config.json");
+
+ r = json_parse_file(f, path, &oci, &line, &column);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (line != 0 && column != 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse '%s' at %u:%u: %m", path, line, column);
+ else
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse '%s': %m", path);
+ }
+
+ v = json_variant_by_key(oci, "ociVersion");
+ if (!v) {
+ log_error("JSON file '%s' is not an OCI bundle configuration file. Refusing.", path);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (!streq_ptr(json_variant_string(v), "1.0.0")) {
+ log_error("OCI bundle version not supported: %s", strna(json_variant_string(v)));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ // {
+ // _cleanup_free_ char *formatted = NULL;
+ // assert_se(json_variant_format(oci, JSON_FORMAT_PRETTY|JSON_FORMAT_COLOR, &formatted) >= 0);
+ // fputs(formatted, stdout);
+ // }
+
+ s = settings_new();
+ if (!s)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ s->start_mode = START_PID1;
+ s->resolv_conf = RESOLV_CONF_OFF;
+ s->link_journal = LINK_NO;
+ s->timezone = TIMEZONE_OFF;
+
+ s->bundle = strdup(bundle);
+ if (!s->bundle)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ r = json_dispatch(oci, table, oci_unexpected, 0, s);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (s->properties) {
+ r = sd_bus_message_seal(s->properties, 0, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Cannot seal properties bus message: %m");
+ }
+
+ *ret = TAKE_PTR(s);
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-oci.h b/src/nspawn/nspawn-oci.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d23a2f3dae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-oci.h
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
+#pragma once
+
+#include "nspawn-settings.h"
+
+int oci_load(FILE *f, const char *path, Settings **ret);
diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-register.c b/src/nspawn/nspawn-register.c
index 4ca5f7998d..8e2c329665 100644
--- a/src/nspawn/nspawn-register.c
+++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-register.c
@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ int register_machine(
unsigned n_mounts,
int kill_signal,
char **properties,
+ sd_bus_message *properties_message,
bool keep_unit,
const char *service) {
@@ -185,6 +186,12 @@ int register_machine(
if (r < 0)
return r;
+ if (properties_message) {
+ r = sd_bus_message_copy(m, properties_message, true);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return bus_log_create_error(r);
+ }
+
r = bus_append_unit_property_assignment_many(m, UNIT_SERVICE, properties);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -235,7 +242,8 @@ int allocate_scope(
CustomMount *mounts,
unsigned n_mounts,
int kill_signal,
- char **properties) {
+ char **properties,
+ sd_bus_message *properties_message) {
_cleanup_(sd_bus_message_unrefp) sd_bus_message *m = NULL, *reply = NULL;
_cleanup_(sd_bus_error_free) sd_bus_error error = SD_BUS_ERROR_NULL;
@@ -289,6 +297,12 @@ int allocate_scope(
if (r < 0)
return r;
+ if (properties_message) {
+ r = sd_bus_message_copy(m, properties_message, true);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return bus_log_create_error(r);
+ }
+
r = append_machine_properties(
m,
mounts,
diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-register.h b/src/nspawn/nspawn-register.h
index 05f5776f23..65a3ae85a7 100644
--- a/src/nspawn/nspawn-register.h
+++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-register.h
@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@
#include "nspawn-mount.h"
-int register_machine(sd_bus *bus, const char *machine_name, pid_t pid, const char *directory, sd_id128_t uuid, int local_ifindex, const char *slice, CustomMount *mounts, unsigned n_mounts, int kill_signal, char **properties, bool keep_unit, const char *service);
+int register_machine(sd_bus *bus, const char *machine_name, pid_t pid, const char *directory, sd_id128_t uuid, int local_ifindex, const char *slice, CustomMount *mounts, unsigned n_mounts, int kill_signal, char **properties, sd_bus_message *properties_message, bool keep_unit, const char *service);
int terminate_machine(sd_bus *bus, const char *machine_name);
-int allocate_scope(sd_bus *bus, const char *machine_name, pid_t pid, const char *slice, CustomMount *mounts, unsigned n_mounts, int kill_signal, char **properties);
+int allocate_scope(sd_bus *bus, const char *machine_name, pid_t pid, const char *slice, CustomMount *mounts, unsigned n_mounts, int kill_signal, char **properties, sd_bus_message *properties_message);
int terminate_scope(sd_bus *bus, const char *machine_name);
diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.c b/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.c
index 505e8cac40..ab69f24c54 100644
--- a/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.c
+++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.c
@@ -17,6 +17,50 @@
#include "user-util.h"
#include "util.h"
+Settings *settings_new(void) {
+ Settings *s;
+
+ s = new(Settings, 1);
+ if (!s)
+ return NULL;
+
+ *s = (Settings) {
+ .start_mode = _START_MODE_INVALID,
+ .personality = PERSONALITY_INVALID,
+
+ .resolv_conf = _RESOLV_CONF_MODE_INVALID,
+ .link_journal = _LINK_JOURNAL_INVALID,
+ .timezone = _TIMEZONE_MODE_INVALID,
+
+ .userns_mode = _USER_NAMESPACE_MODE_INVALID,
+ .userns_chown = -1,
+ .uid_shift = UID_INVALID,
+ .uid_range = UID_INVALID,
+
+ .no_new_privileges = -1,
+
+ .read_only = -1,
+ .volatile_mode = _VOLATILE_MODE_INVALID,
+
+ .private_network = -1,
+ .network_veth = -1,
+
+ .full_capabilities = CAPABILITY_QUINTET_NULL,
+
+ .uid = UID_INVALID,
+ .gid = GID_INVALID,
+
+ .console_mode = _CONSOLE_MODE_INVALID,
+ .console_width = (unsigned) -1,
+ .console_height = (unsigned) -1,
+
+ .clone_ns_flags = (unsigned long) -1,
+ .use_cgns = -1,
+ };
+
+ return s;
+}
+
int settings_load(FILE *f, const char *path, Settings **ret) {
_cleanup_(settings_freep) Settings *s = NULL;
int r;
@@ -24,27 +68,10 @@ int settings_load(FILE *f, const char *path, Settings **ret) {
assert(path);
assert(ret);
- s = new0(Settings, 1);
+ s = settings_new();
if (!s)
return -ENOMEM;
- s->start_mode = _START_MODE_INVALID;
- s->personality = PERSONALITY_INVALID;
- s->userns_mode = _USER_NAMESPACE_MODE_INVALID;
- s->resolv_conf = _RESOLV_CONF_MODE_INVALID;
- s->link_journal = _LINK_JOURNAL_INVALID;
- s->timezone = _TIMEZONE_MODE_INVALID;
- s->uid_shift = UID_INVALID;
- s->uid_range = UID_INVALID;
- s->no_new_privileges = -1;
-
- s->read_only = -1;
- s->volatile_mode = _VOLATILE_MODE_INVALID;
- s->userns_chown = -1;
-
- s->private_network = -1;
- s->network_veth = -1;
-
r = config_parse(NULL, path, f,
"Exec\0"
"Network\0"
@@ -66,12 +93,33 @@ int settings_load(FILE *f, const char *path, Settings **ret) {
s->userns_mode = USER_NAMESPACE_NO;
*ret = TAKE_PTR(s);
-
return 0;
}
-Settings* settings_free(Settings *s) {
+static void free_oci_hooks(OciHook *h, size_t n) {
+ size_t i;
+ assert(h || n == 0);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ free(h[i].path);
+ strv_free(h[i].args);
+ strv_free(h[i].env);
+ }
+
+ free(h);
+}
+
+void device_node_free_many(DeviceNode *node, size_t n) {
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+ free(node[i].path);
+
+ free(node);
+}
+
+Settings* settings_free(Settings *s) {
if (!s)
return NULL;
@@ -96,6 +144,28 @@ Settings* settings_free(Settings *s) {
expose_port_free_all(s->expose_ports);
custom_mount_free_all(s->custom_mounts, s->n_custom_mounts);
+
+ free(s->bundle);
+ free(s->root);
+
+ free_oci_hooks(s->oci_hooks_prestart, s->n_oci_hooks_prestart);
+ free_oci_hooks(s->oci_hooks_poststart, s->n_oci_hooks_poststart);
+ free_oci_hooks(s->oci_hooks_poststop, s->n_oci_hooks_poststop);
+
+ free(s->slice);
+ sd_bus_message_unref(s->properties);
+
+ free(s->supplementary_gids);
+ device_node_free_many(s->extra_nodes, s->n_extra_nodes);
+ free(s->extra_nodes);
+ free(s->network_namespace_path);
+
+ strv_free(s->sysctl);
+
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
+ seccomp_release(s->seccomp);
+#endif
+
return mfree(s);
}
@@ -122,6 +192,26 @@ bool settings_network_veth(Settings *s) {
s->network_zone;
}
+int settings_allocate_properties(Settings *s) {
+ _cleanup_(sd_bus_unrefp) sd_bus *bus = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(s);
+
+ if (s->properties)
+ return 0;
+
+ r = sd_bus_default_system(&bus);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = sd_bus_message_new(bus, &s->properties, SD_BUS_MESSAGE_METHOD_CALL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
DEFINE_CONFIG_PARSE_ENUM(config_parse_volatile_mode, volatile_mode, VolatileMode, "Failed to parse volatile mode");
int config_parse_expose_port(
@@ -315,6 +405,34 @@ int config_parse_tmpfs(
return 0;
}
+int config_parse_inaccessible(
+ const char *unit,
+ const char *filename,
+ unsigned line,
+ const char *section,
+ unsigned section_line,
+ const char *lvalue,
+ int ltype,
+ const char *rvalue,
+ void *data,
+ void *userdata) {
+
+ Settings *settings = data;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(filename);
+ assert(lvalue);
+ assert(rvalue);
+
+ r = inaccessible_mount_parse(&settings->custom_mounts, &settings->n_custom_mounts, rvalue);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_syntax(unit, LOG_ERR, filename, line, r, "Invalid inaccessible file system specification %s: %m", rvalue);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
int config_parse_overlay(
const char *unit,
const char *filename,
diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.h b/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.h
index a63aa32e90..cc802f77af 100644
--- a/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.h
+++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.h
@@ -4,8 +4,14 @@
#include
#include
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
+#include
+#endif
+
+#include "sd-bus.h"
#include "sd-id128.h"
+#include "capability-util.h"
#include "conf-parser.h"
#include "macro.h"
#include "missing_resource.h"
@@ -60,6 +66,15 @@ typedef enum TimezoneMode {
_TIMEZONE_MODE_INVALID = -1
} TimezoneMode;
+typedef enum ConsoleMode {
+ CONSOLE_INTERACTIVE,
+ CONSOLE_READ_ONLY,
+ CONSOLE_PASSIVE,
+ CONSOLE_PIPE,
+ _CONSOLE_MODE_MAX,
+ _CONSOLE_MODE_INVALID = -1,
+} ConsoleMode;
+
typedef enum SettingsMask {
SETTING_START_MODE = UINT64_C(1) << 0,
SETTING_ENVIRONMENT = UINT64_C(1) << 1,
@@ -86,9 +101,14 @@ typedef enum SettingsMask {
SETTING_LINK_JOURNAL = UINT64_C(1) << 22,
SETTING_TIMEZONE = UINT64_C(1) << 23,
SETTING_EPHEMERAL = UINT64_C(1) << 24,
- SETTING_RLIMIT_FIRST = UINT64_C(1) << 25, /* we define one bit per resource limit here */
- SETTING_RLIMIT_LAST = UINT64_C(1) << (25 + _RLIMIT_MAX - 1),
- _SETTINGS_MASK_ALL = (UINT64_C(1) << (25 + _RLIMIT_MAX)) -1,
+ SETTING_SLICE = UINT64_C(1) << 25,
+ SETTING_DIRECTORY = UINT64_C(1) << 26,
+ SETTING_USE_CGNS = UINT64_C(1) << 27,
+ SETTING_CLONE_NS_FLAGS = UINT64_C(1) << 28,
+ SETTING_CONSOLE_MODE = UINT64_C(1) << 29,
+ SETTING_RLIMIT_FIRST = UINT64_C(1) << 30, /* we define one bit per resource limit here */
+ SETTING_RLIMIT_LAST = UINT64_C(1) << (30 + _RLIMIT_MAX - 1),
+ _SETTINGS_MASK_ALL = (UINT64_C(1) << (30 + _RLIMIT_MAX)) -1,
_SETTING_FORCE_ENUM_WIDTH = UINT64_MAX
} SettingsMask;
@@ -101,6 +121,22 @@ assert_cc(sizeof(SettingsMask) == 8);
assert_cc(sizeof(SETTING_RLIMIT_FIRST) == 8);
assert_cc(sizeof(SETTING_RLIMIT_LAST) == 8);
+typedef struct DeviceNode {
+ char *path;
+ unsigned major;
+ unsigned minor;
+ mode_t mode;
+ uid_t uid;
+ gid_t gid;
+} DeviceNode;
+
+typedef struct OciHook {
+ char *path;
+ char **args;
+ char **env;
+ usec_t timeout;
+} OciHook;
+
typedef struct Settings {
/* [Run] */
StartMode start_mode;
@@ -150,13 +186,39 @@ typedef struct Settings {
char **network_ipvlan;
char **network_veth_extra;
ExposePort *expose_ports;
+
+ /* Additional fields, that are specific to OCI runtime case */
+ char *bundle;
+ char *root;
+ OciHook *oci_hooks_prestart, *oci_hooks_poststart, *oci_hooks_poststop;
+ size_t n_oci_hooks_prestart, n_oci_hooks_poststart, n_oci_hooks_poststop;
+ char *slice;
+ sd_bus_message *properties;
+ CapabilityQuintet full_capabilities;
+ uid_t uid;
+ gid_t gid;
+ gid_t *supplementary_gids;
+ size_t n_supplementary_gids;
+ unsigned console_width, console_height;
+ ConsoleMode console_mode;
+ DeviceNode *extra_nodes;
+ size_t n_extra_nodes;
+ unsigned long clone_ns_flags;
+ char *network_namespace_path;
+ int use_cgns;
+ char **sysctl;
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
+ scmp_filter_ctx seccomp;
+#endif
} Settings;
+Settings *settings_new(void);
int settings_load(FILE *f, const char *path, Settings **ret);
Settings* settings_free(Settings *s);
bool settings_network_veth(Settings *s);
bool settings_private_network(Settings *s);
+int settings_allocate_properties(Settings *s);
DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(Settings*, settings_free);
@@ -170,6 +232,7 @@ CONFIG_PARSER_PROTOTYPE(config_parse_pivot_root);
CONFIG_PARSER_PROTOTYPE(config_parse_bind);
CONFIG_PARSER_PROTOTYPE(config_parse_tmpfs);
CONFIG_PARSER_PROTOTYPE(config_parse_overlay);
+CONFIG_PARSER_PROTOTYPE(config_parse_inaccessible);
CONFIG_PARSER_PROTOTYPE(config_parse_veth_extra);
CONFIG_PARSER_PROTOTYPE(config_parse_network_zone);
CONFIG_PARSER_PROTOTYPE(config_parse_boot);
@@ -190,3 +253,5 @@ const char *timezone_mode_to_string(TimezoneMode a) _const_;
TimezoneMode timezone_mode_from_string(const char *s) _pure_;
int parse_link_journal(const char *s, LinkJournal *ret_mode, bool *ret_try);
+
+void device_node_free_many(DeviceNode *node, size_t n);
diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-setuid.c b/src/nspawn/nspawn-setuid.c
index f207bcec04..0b26f1a042 100644
--- a/src/nspawn/nspawn-setuid.c
+++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-setuid.c
@@ -59,14 +59,41 @@ static int spawn_getent(const char *database, const char *key, pid_t *rpid) {
return pipe_fds[0];
}
+int change_uid_gid_raw(
+ uid_t uid,
+ gid_t gid,
+ const gid_t *supplementary_gids,
+ size_t n_supplementary_gids) {
+
+ if (!uid_is_valid(uid))
+ uid = 0;
+ if (!gid_is_valid(gid))
+ gid = 0;
+
+ (void) fchown(STDIN_FILENO, uid, gid);
+ (void) fchown(STDOUT_FILENO, uid, gid);
+ (void) fchown(STDERR_FILENO, uid, gid);
+
+ if (setgroups(n_supplementary_gids, supplementary_gids) < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to set auxiliary groups: %m");
+
+ if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "setresgid() failed: %m");
+
+ if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "setresuid() failed: %m");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
int change_uid_gid(const char *user, char **_home) {
char *x, *u, *g, *h;
const char *word, *state;
- _cleanup_free_ uid_t *uids = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ gid_t *gids = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *home = NULL, *line = NULL;
_cleanup_fclose_ FILE *f = NULL;
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
- unsigned n_uids = 0;
+ unsigned n_gids = 0;
size_t sz = 0, l;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
@@ -189,10 +216,10 @@ int change_uid_gid(const char *user, char **_home) {
memcpy(c, word, l);
c[l] = 0;
- if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(uids, sz, n_uids+1))
+ if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(gids, sz, n_gids+1))
return log_oom();
- r = parse_uid(c, &uids[n_uids++]);
+ r = parse_gid(c, &gids[n_gids++]);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse group data from getent: %m");
}
@@ -205,18 +232,9 @@ int change_uid_gid(const char *user, char **_home) {
if (r < 0 && !IN_SET(r, -EEXIST, -ENOTDIR))
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to make home directory: %m");
- (void) fchown(STDIN_FILENO, uid, gid);
- (void) fchown(STDOUT_FILENO, uid, gid);
- (void) fchown(STDERR_FILENO, uid, gid);
-
- if (setgroups(n_uids, uids) < 0)
- return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to set auxiliary groups: %m");
-
- if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) < 0)
- return log_error_errno(errno, "setresgid() failed: %m");
-
- if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0)
- return log_error_errno(errno, "setresuid() failed: %m");
+ r = change_uid_gid_raw(uid, gid, gids, n_gids);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
if (_home)
*_home = TAKE_PTR(home);
diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-setuid.h b/src/nspawn/nspawn-setuid.h
index 0ae47cb6b3..9a2b05ebbb 100644
--- a/src/nspawn/nspawn-setuid.h
+++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-setuid.h
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
#pragma once
-int change_uid_gid(const char *user, char **ret);
+int change_uid_gid_raw(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, const gid_t *supplementary_gids, size_t n_supplementary_gids);
+int change_uid_gid(const char *user, char **ret_home);
diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn.c b/src/nspawn/nspawn.c
index 05203057b6..b2cf419484 100644
--- a/src/nspawn/nspawn.c
+++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn.c
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
#include "nspawn-expose-ports.h"
#include "nspawn-mount.h"
#include "nspawn-network.h"
+#include "nspawn-oci.h"
#include "nspawn-patch-uid.h"
#include "nspawn-register.h"
#include "nspawn-seccomp.h"
@@ -86,6 +87,9 @@
#include "raw-clone.h"
#include "rlimit-util.h"
#include "rm-rf.h"
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
+#include "seccomp-util.h"
+#endif
#include "selinux-util.h"
#include "signal-util.h"
#include "socket-util.h"
@@ -94,6 +98,7 @@
#include "string-table.h"
#include "string-util.h"
#include "strv.h"
+#include "sysctl-util.h"
#include "terminal-util.h"
#include "tmpfile-util.h"
#include "umask-util.h"
@@ -124,12 +129,16 @@ static char *arg_chdir = NULL;
static char *arg_pivot_root_new = NULL;
static char *arg_pivot_root_old = NULL;
static char *arg_user = NULL;
+static uid_t arg_uid = UID_INVALID;
+static gid_t arg_gid = GID_INVALID;
+static gid_t* arg_supplementary_gids = NULL;
+static size_t arg_n_supplementary_gids = 0;
static sd_id128_t arg_uuid = {};
static char *arg_machine = NULL; /* The name used by the host to refer to this */
static char *arg_hostname = NULL; /* The name the payload sees by default */
static const char *arg_selinux_context = NULL;
static const char *arg_selinux_apifs_context = NULL;
-static const char *arg_slice = NULL;
+static char *arg_slice = NULL;
static bool arg_private_network = false;
static bool arg_read_only = false;
static StartMode arg_start_mode = START_PID1;
@@ -163,6 +172,7 @@ static uint64_t arg_caps_retain =
(1ULL << CAP_SYS_PTRACE) |
(1ULL << CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) |
(1ULL << CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
+static CapabilityQuintet arg_full_capabilities = CAPABILITY_QUINTET_NULL;
static CustomMount *arg_custom_mounts = NULL;
static size_t arg_n_custom_mounts = 0;
static char **arg_setenv = NULL;
@@ -179,9 +189,11 @@ static char *arg_network_zone = NULL;
static char *arg_network_namespace_path = NULL;
static unsigned long arg_personality = PERSONALITY_INVALID;
static char *arg_image = NULL;
+static char *arg_oci_bundle = NULL;
static VolatileMode arg_volatile_mode = VOLATILE_NO;
static ExposePort *arg_expose_ports = NULL;
static char **arg_property = NULL;
+static sd_bus_message *arg_property_message = NULL;
static UserNamespaceMode arg_userns_mode = USER_NAMESPACE_NO;
static uid_t arg_uid_shift = UID_INVALID, arg_uid_range = 0x10000U;
static bool arg_userns_chown = false;
@@ -199,6 +211,9 @@ static void *arg_root_hash = NULL;
static size_t arg_root_hash_size = 0;
static char **arg_syscall_whitelist = NULL;
static char **arg_syscall_blacklist = NULL;
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
+static scmp_filter_ctx arg_seccomp = NULL;
+#endif
static struct rlimit *arg_rlimit[_RLIMIT_MAX] = {};
static bool arg_no_new_privileges = false;
static int arg_oom_score_adjust = 0;
@@ -207,6 +222,11 @@ static cpu_set_t *arg_cpuset = NULL;
static unsigned arg_cpuset_ncpus = 0;
static ResolvConfMode arg_resolv_conf = RESOLV_CONF_AUTO;
static TimezoneMode arg_timezone = TIMEZONE_AUTO;
+static unsigned arg_console_width = (unsigned) -1, arg_console_height = (unsigned) -1;
+static DeviceNode* arg_extra_nodes = NULL;
+static size_t arg_n_extra_nodes = 0;
+static char **arg_sysctl = NULL;
+static ConsoleMode arg_console_mode = _CONSOLE_MODE_INVALID;
static int help(void) {
_cleanup_free_ char *link = NULL;
@@ -229,6 +249,7 @@ static int help(void) {
" -x --ephemeral Run container with snapshot of root directory, and\n"
" remove it after exit\n"
" -i --image=PATH File system device or disk image for the container\n"
+ " --oci-bundle=PATH OCI bundle directory\n"
" --root-hash=HASH Specify verity root hash\n"
" -a --as-pid2 Maintain a stub init as PID1, invoke binary as PID2\n"
" -b --boot Boot up full system (i.e. invoke init)\n"
@@ -297,6 +318,8 @@ static int help(void) {
" the container\n"
" --bind-ro=PATH[:PATH[:OPTIONS]\n"
" Similar, but creates a read-only bind mount\n"
+ " --inaccessible=PATH Over-mount file node with inaccessible node to mask\n"
+ " it\n"
" --tmpfs=PATH:[OPTIONS] Mount an empty tmpfs to the specified directory\n"
" --overlay=PATH[:PATH...]:PATH\n"
" Create an overlay mount from the host to \n"
@@ -310,6 +333,9 @@ static int help(void) {
" --volatile[=MODE] Run the system in volatile mode\n"
" --settings=BOOLEAN Load additional settings from .nspawn file\n"
" --notify-ready=BOOLEAN Receive notifications from the child init process\n"
+ " --console=MODE Select how stdin/stdout/stderr and /dev/console are\n"
+ " set up for the container.\n"
+ " -P --pipe Equivalent to --console=pipe\n"
"\nSee the %s for details.\n"
, program_invocation_short_name
, link
@@ -401,7 +427,9 @@ static void parse_share_ns_env(const char *name, unsigned long ns_flag) {
return;
if (r < 0)
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s from environment, defaulting to false.", name);
+
arg_clone_ns_flags = (arg_clone_ns_flags & ~ns_flag) | (r > 0 ? 0 : ns_flag);
+ arg_settings_mask |= SETTING_CLONE_NS_FLAGS;
}
static void parse_mount_settings_env(void) {
@@ -446,9 +474,20 @@ static void parse_environment(void) {
/* SYSTEMD_NSPAWN_USE_CGNS=0 can be used to disable CLONE_NEWCGROUP use,
* even if it is supported. If not supported, it has no effect. */
- r = getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_NSPAWN_USE_CGNS");
- if (r == 0 || !cg_ns_supported())
+ if (!cg_ns_supported())
arg_use_cgns = false;
+ else {
+ r = getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_NSPAWN_USE_CGNS");
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (r != -ENXIO)
+ log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_NSPAWN_USE_CGNS, ignoring: %m");
+
+ arg_use_cgns = true;
+ } else {
+ arg_use_cgns = r > 0;
+ arg_settings_mask |= SETTING_USE_CGNS;
+ }
+ }
e = getenv("SYSTEMD_NSPAWN_CONTAINER_SERVICE");
if (e)
@@ -471,6 +510,7 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
ARG_TMPFS,
ARG_OVERLAY,
ARG_OVERLAY_RO,
+ ARG_INACCESSIBLE,
ARG_SHARE_SYSTEM,
ARG_REGISTER,
ARG_KEEP_UNIT,
@@ -501,6 +541,9 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
ARG_CPU_AFFINITY,
ARG_RESOLV_CONF,
ARG_TIMEZONE,
+ ARG_CONSOLE,
+ ARG_PIPE,
+ ARG_OCI_BUNDLE,
};
static const struct option options[] = {
@@ -524,6 +567,7 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
{ "tmpfs", required_argument, NULL, ARG_TMPFS },
{ "overlay", required_argument, NULL, ARG_OVERLAY },
{ "overlay-ro", required_argument, NULL, ARG_OVERLAY_RO },
+ { "inaccessible", required_argument, NULL, ARG_INACCESSIBLE },
{ "machine", required_argument, NULL, 'M' },
{ "hostname", required_argument, NULL, ARG_HOSTNAME },
{ "slice", required_argument, NULL, 'S' },
@@ -561,6 +605,9 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
{ "cpu-affinity", required_argument, NULL, ARG_CPU_AFFINITY },
{ "resolv-conf", required_argument, NULL, ARG_RESOLV_CONF },
{ "timezone", required_argument, NULL, ARG_TIMEZONE },
+ { "console", required_argument, NULL, ARG_CONSOLE },
+ { "pipe", no_argument, NULL, ARG_PIPE },
+ { "oci-bundle", required_argument, NULL, ARG_OCI_BUNDLE },
{}
};
@@ -572,7 +619,7 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
assert(argc >= 0);
assert(argv);
- while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "+hD:u:abL:M:jS:Z:qi:xp:nUE:", options, NULL)) >= 0)
+ while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "+hD:u:abL:M:jS:Z:qi:xp:nUE:P", options, NULL)) >= 0)
switch (c) {
case 'h':
@@ -585,18 +632,31 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
r = parse_path_argument_and_warn(optarg, false, &arg_directory);
if (r < 0)
return r;
+
+ arg_settings_mask |= SETTING_DIRECTORY;
break;
case ARG_TEMPLATE:
r = parse_path_argument_and_warn(optarg, false, &arg_template);
if (r < 0)
return r;
+
+ arg_settings_mask |= SETTING_DIRECTORY;
break;
case 'i':
r = parse_path_argument_and_warn(optarg, false, &arg_image);
if (r < 0)
return r;
+
+ arg_settings_mask |= SETTING_DIRECTORY;
+ break;
+
+ case ARG_OCI_BUNDLE:
+ r = parse_path_argument_and_warn(optarg, false, &arg_oci_bundle);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
break;
case 'x':
@@ -704,6 +764,7 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
if (r < 0)
return r;
+ arg_settings_mask |= SETTING_NETWORK;
break;
case 'b':
@@ -737,7 +798,11 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
break;
case 'S':
- arg_slice = optarg;
+ r = free_and_strdup(&arg_slice, optarg);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ arg_settings_mask |= SETTING_SLICE;
break;
case 'M':
@@ -792,7 +857,6 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
r = extract_first_word(&p, &t, ",", 0);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse capability %s.", t);
-
if (r == 0)
break;
@@ -870,6 +934,14 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
arg_settings_mask |= SETTING_CUSTOM_MOUNTS;
break;
+ case ARG_INACCESSIBLE:
+ r = inaccessible_mount_parse(&arg_custom_mounts, &arg_n_custom_mounts, optarg);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse --inaccessible= argument %s: %m", optarg);
+
+ arg_settings_mask |= SETTING_CUSTOM_MOUNTS;
+ break;
+
case 'E': {
char **n;
@@ -1252,6 +1324,34 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
arg_settings_mask |= SETTING_TIMEZONE;
break;
+ case ARG_CONSOLE:
+ if (streq(optarg, "interactive"))
+ arg_console_mode = CONSOLE_INTERACTIVE;
+ else if (streq(optarg, "read-only"))
+ arg_console_mode = CONSOLE_READ_ONLY;
+ else if (streq(optarg, "passive"))
+ arg_console_mode = CONSOLE_PASSIVE;
+ else if (streq(optarg, "pipe"))
+ arg_console_mode = CONSOLE_PIPE;
+ else if (streq(optarg, "help"))
+ puts("interactive\n"
+ "read-only\n"
+ "passive\n"
+ "pipe");
+ else {
+ log_error("Unknown console mode: %s", optarg);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ arg_settings_mask |= SETTING_CONSOLE_MODE;
+ break;
+
+ case 'P':
+ case ARG_PIPE:
+ arg_console_mode = CONSOLE_PIPE;
+ arg_settings_mask |= SETTING_CONSOLE_MODE;
+ break;
+
case '?':
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1275,7 +1375,10 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
* --directory=". */
arg_directory = TAKE_PTR(arg_template);
- arg_caps_retain = (arg_caps_retain | plus | (arg_private_network ? 1ULL << CAP_NET_ADMIN : 0)) & ~minus;
+ arg_caps_retain = (arg_caps_retain | plus | (arg_private_network ? UINT64_C(1) << CAP_NET_ADMIN : 0)) & ~minus;
+
+ /* Make sure to parse environment before we reset the settings mask below */
+ parse_environment();
/* Load all settings from .nspawn files */
if (mask_no_settings)
@@ -1337,7 +1440,8 @@ static int verify_arguments(void) {
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "--private-users= is not supported, kernel compiled without user namespace support.");
if (arg_userns_chown && arg_read_only)
- return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "--read-only and --private-users-chown may not be combined.");
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+ "--read-only and --private-users-chown may not be combined.");
/* We don't support --private-users-chown together with any of the volatile modes since we couldn't
* change the read-only part of the tree (i.e. /usr) anyway, or because it would trigger a massive
@@ -1345,17 +1449,18 @@ static int verify_arguments(void) {
if (arg_userns_chown && arg_volatile_mode != VOLATILE_NO)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "--volatile= and --private-users-chown may not be combined.");
- /* If --network-namespace-path is given with any other network-related option,
- * we need to error out, to avoid conflicts between different network options. */
+ /* If --network-namespace-path is given with any other network-related option, we need to error out,
+ * to avoid conflicts between different network options. */
if (arg_network_namespace_path &&
(arg_network_interfaces || arg_network_macvlan ||
arg_network_ipvlan || arg_network_veth_extra ||
arg_network_bridge || arg_network_zone ||
arg_network_veth || arg_private_network))
- return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "--network-namespace-path cannot be combined with other network options.");
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "--network-namespace-path= cannot be combined with other network options.");
if (arg_network_bridge && arg_network_zone)
- return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "--network-bridge= and --network-zone= may not be combined.");
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+ "--network-bridge= and --network-zone= may not be combined.");
if (arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO && (arg_mount_settings & MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_NETNS) && !arg_private_network)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid namespacing settings. Mounting sysfs with --private-users requires --private-network.");
@@ -1729,9 +1834,9 @@ static int copy_devnodes(const char *dest) {
"tty\0"
"net/tun\0";
+ _cleanup_umask_ mode_t u;
const char *d;
int r = 0;
- _cleanup_umask_ mode_t u;
assert(dest);
@@ -1811,6 +1916,32 @@ static int copy_devnodes(const char *dest) {
return r;
}
+static int make_extra_nodes(const char *dest) {
+ _cleanup_umask_ mode_t u;
+ size_t i;
+ int r;
+
+ u = umask(0000);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < arg_n_extra_nodes; i++) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL;
+ DeviceNode *n = arg_extra_nodes + i;
+
+ path = prefix_root(dest, n->path);
+ if (!path)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ if (mknod(path, n->mode, S_ISCHR(n->mode) || S_ISBLK(n->mode) ? makedev(n->major, n->minor) : 0) < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to create device node '%s': %m", path);
+
+ r = chmod_and_chown(path, n->mode, n->uid, n->gid);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to adjust device node ownership of '%s': %m", path);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int setup_pts(const char *dest) {
_cleanup_free_ char *options = NULL;
const char *p;
@@ -1867,10 +1998,12 @@ static int setup_dev_console(const char *dest, const char *console) {
int r;
assert(dest);
- assert(console);
u = umask(0000);
+ if (!console)
+ return 0;
+
r = chmod_and_chown(console, 0600, arg_uid_shift, arg_uid_shift);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to correct access mode for TTY: %m");
@@ -2108,8 +2241,40 @@ static int setup_journal(const char *directory) {
return 0;
}
-static int drop_capabilities(void) {
- return capability_bounding_set_drop(arg_caps_retain, false);
+static int drop_capabilities(uid_t uid) {
+ CapabilityQuintet q;
+
+ /* Let's initialize all five capability sets to something valid. If the quintet was configured via
+ * OCI use that, but fill in missing bits. If it wasn't then derive the quintet in full from
+ * arg_caps_retain. */
+
+ if (capability_quintet_is_set(&arg_full_capabilities)) {
+ q = arg_full_capabilities;
+
+ if (q.bounding == (uint64_t) -1)
+ q.bounding = uid == 0 ? arg_caps_retain : 0;
+
+ if (q.effective == (uint64_t) -1)
+ q.effective = uid == 0 ? q.bounding : 0;
+
+ if (q.inheritable == (uint64_t) -1)
+ q.inheritable = uid == 0 ? q.bounding : 0;
+
+ if (q.permitted == (uint64_t) -1)
+ q.permitted = uid == 0 ? q.bounding : 0;
+
+ if (q.ambient == (uint64_t) -1 && ambient_capabilities_supported())
+ q.ambient = 0;
+ } else
+ q = (CapabilityQuintet) {
+ .bounding = arg_caps_retain,
+ .effective = uid == 0 ? arg_caps_retain : 0,
+ .inheritable = uid == 0 ? arg_caps_retain : 0,
+ .permitted = uid == 0 ? arg_caps_retain : 0,
+ .ambient = ambient_capabilities_supported() ? 0 : (uint64_t) -1,
+ };
+
+ return capability_quintet_enforce(&q);
}
static int reset_audit_loginuid(void) {
@@ -2496,6 +2661,77 @@ static int determine_uid_shift(const char *directory) {
return 0;
}
+static unsigned long effective_clone_ns_flags(void) {
+ unsigned long flags = arg_clone_ns_flags;
+
+ if (arg_private_network)
+ flags |= CLONE_NEWNET;
+ if (arg_use_cgns)
+ flags |= CLONE_NEWCGROUP;
+ if (arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO)
+ flags |= CLONE_NEWUSER;
+
+ return flags;
+}
+
+static int patch_sysctl(void) {
+
+ /* This table is inspired by runc's sysctl() function */
+ static const struct {
+ const char *key;
+ bool prefix;
+ unsigned long clone_flags;
+ } safe_sysctl[] = {
+ { "kernel.hostname", false, CLONE_NEWUTS },
+ { "kernel.domainname", false, CLONE_NEWUTS },
+ { "kernel.msgmax", false, CLONE_NEWIPC },
+ { "kernel.msgmnb", false, CLONE_NEWIPC },
+ { "kernel.msgmni", false, CLONE_NEWIPC },
+ { "kernel.sem", false, CLONE_NEWIPC },
+ { "kernel.shmall", false, CLONE_NEWIPC },
+ { "kernel.shmmax", false, CLONE_NEWIPC },
+ { "kernel.shmmni", false, CLONE_NEWIPC },
+ { "fs.mqueue.", true, CLONE_NEWIPC },
+ { "net.", true, CLONE_NEWNET },
+ };
+
+ unsigned long flags;
+ char **k, **v;
+ int r;
+
+ flags = effective_clone_ns_flags();
+
+ STRV_FOREACH_PAIR(k, v, arg_sysctl) {
+ bool good = false;
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(safe_sysctl); i++) {
+
+ if (!FLAGS_SET(flags, safe_sysctl[i].clone_flags))
+ continue;
+
+ if (safe_sysctl[i].prefix)
+ good = startswith(*k, safe_sysctl[i].key);
+ else
+ good = streq(*k, safe_sysctl[i].key);
+
+ if (good)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!good) {
+ log_error("Refusing to write to sysctl '%s', as it is not safe in the selected namespaces.", *k);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ r = sysctl_write(*k, *v);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write sysctl '%s': %m", *k);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int inner_child(
Barrier *barrier,
const char *directory,
@@ -2522,7 +2758,7 @@ static int inner_child(
};
const char *exec_target;
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **env_use = NULL;
- int r;
+ int r, which_failed;
/* This is the "inner" child process, i.e. the one forked off by the "outer" child process, which is the one
* the container manager itself forked off. At the time of clone() it gained its own CLONE_NEWNS, CLONE_NEWPID,
@@ -2539,6 +2775,8 @@ static int inner_child(
assert(directory);
assert(kmsg_socket >= 0);
+ log_debug("Inner child is initializing.");
+
if (arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO) {
/* Tell the parent, that it now can write the UID map. */
(void) barrier_place(barrier); /* #1 */
@@ -2608,6 +2846,18 @@ static int inner_child(
return r;
kmsg_socket = safe_close(kmsg_socket);
+ r = mount_custom(
+ "/",
+ arg_custom_mounts,
+ arg_n_custom_mounts,
+ false,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ arg_selinux_apifs_context,
+ true);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
if (setsid() < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "setsid() failed: %m");
@@ -2621,6 +2871,10 @@ static int inner_child(
rtnl_socket = safe_close(rtnl_socket);
}
+ r = patch_sysctl();
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
if (arg_oom_score_adjust_set) {
r = set_oom_score_adjust(arg_oom_score_adjust);
if (r < 0)
@@ -2631,10 +2885,6 @@ static int inner_child(
if (sched_setaffinity(0, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(arg_cpuset_ncpus), arg_cpuset) < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to set CPU affinity: %m");
- r = drop_capabilities();
- if (r < 0)
- return log_error_errno(r, "drop_capabilities() failed: %m");
-
(void) setup_hostname();
if (arg_personality != PERSONALITY_INVALID) {
@@ -2647,16 +2897,51 @@ static int inner_child(
return log_error_errno(r, "personality() failed: %m");
}
+ r = setrlimit_closest_all((const struct rlimit *const*) arg_rlimit, &which_failed);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to apply resource limit RLIMIT_%s: %m", rlimit_to_string(which_failed));
+
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
+ if (arg_seccomp) {
+
+ if (is_seccomp_available()) {
+
+ r = seccomp_load(arg_seccomp);
+ if (IN_SET(r, -EPERM, -EACCES))
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to install seccomp filter: %m");
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to install seccomp filter: %m");
+ }
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ r = setup_seccomp(arg_caps_retain, arg_syscall_whitelist, arg_syscall_blacklist);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+
#if HAVE_SELINUX
if (arg_selinux_context)
if (setexeccon(arg_selinux_context) < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "setexeccon(\"%s\") failed: %m", arg_selinux_context);
#endif
- r = change_uid_gid(arg_user, &home);
+ /* Make sure we keep the caps across the uid/gid dropping, so that we can retain some selected caps
+ * if we need to later on. */
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 1) < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to set PR_SET_KEEPCAPS: %m");
+
+ if (uid_is_valid(arg_uid) || gid_is_valid(arg_gid))
+ r = change_uid_gid_raw(arg_uid, arg_gid, arg_supplementary_gids, arg_n_supplementary_gids);
+ else
+ r = change_uid_gid(arg_user, &home);
if (r < 0)
return r;
+ r = drop_capabilities(getuid());
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Dropping capabilities failed: %m");
+
if (arg_no_new_privileges)
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to disable new privileges: %m");
@@ -2668,10 +2953,14 @@ static int inner_child(
if (envp[n_env])
n_env++;
- if ((asprintf((char**)(envp + n_env++), "HOME=%s", home ? home: "/root") < 0) ||
- (asprintf((char**)(envp + n_env++), "USER=%s", arg_user ? arg_user : "root") < 0) ||
- (asprintf((char**)(envp + n_env++), "LOGNAME=%s", arg_user ? arg_user : "root") < 0))
- return log_oom();
+ if (home || !uid_is_valid(arg_uid) || arg_uid == 0)
+ if (asprintf((char**)(envp + n_env++), "HOME=%s", home ?: "/root") < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ if (arg_user || !uid_is_valid(arg_uid) || arg_uid == 0)
+ if (asprintf((char**)(envp + n_env++), "USER=%s", arg_user ?: "root") < 0 ||
+ asprintf((char**)(envp + n_env++), "LOGNAME=%s", arg_user ? arg_user : "root") < 0)
+ return log_oom();
assert(!sd_id128_is_null(arg_uuid));
@@ -2711,6 +3000,8 @@ static int inner_child(
return r;
}
+ log_debug("Inner child completed, invoking payload.");
+
/* Now, explicitly close the log, so that we then can close all remaining fds. Closing the log explicitly first
* has the benefit that the logging subsystem knows about it, and is thus ready to be reopened should we need
* it again. Note that the other fds closed here are at least the locking and barrier fds. */
@@ -2803,7 +3094,6 @@ static int outer_child(
const char *directory,
const char *console,
DissectedImage *dissected_image,
- bool interactive,
bool secondary,
int pid_socket,
int uuid_socket,
@@ -2816,9 +3106,9 @@ static int outer_child(
int netns_fd) {
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
- int r, which_failed;
pid_t pid;
ssize_t l;
+ int r;
/* This is the "outer" child process, i.e the one forked off by the container manager itself. It already has
* its own CLONE_NEWNS namespace (which was created by the clone()). It still lives in the host's CLONE_NEWPID,
@@ -2827,18 +3117,21 @@ static int outer_child(
assert(barrier);
assert(directory);
- assert(console);
assert(pid_socket >= 0);
assert(uuid_socket >= 0);
assert(notify_socket >= 0);
assert(kmsg_socket >= 0);
+ log_debug("Outer child is initializing.");
+
if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL) < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "PR_SET_PDEATHSIG failed: %m");
- if (interactive) {
+ if (arg_console_mode != CONSOLE_PIPE) {
int terminal;
+ assert(console);
+
terminal = open_terminal(console, O_RDWR);
if (terminal < 0)
return log_error_errno(terminal, "Failed to open console: %m");
@@ -2992,7 +3285,12 @@ static int outer_child(
if (r < 0)
return r;
- dev_setup(directory, arg_uid_shift, arg_uid_shift);
+ r = make_extra_nodes(directory);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ (void) dev_setup(directory, arg_uid_shift, arg_uid_shift);
+ (void) make_inaccessible_nodes(directory, arg_uid_shift, arg_uid_shift);
r = setup_pts(directory);
if (r < 0)
@@ -3010,10 +3308,6 @@ static int outer_child(
if (r < 0)
return r;
- r = setup_seccomp(arg_caps_retain, arg_syscall_whitelist, arg_syscall_blacklist);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
-
r = setup_timezone(directory);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -3037,7 +3331,8 @@ static int outer_child(
arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO,
arg_uid_shift,
arg_uid_range,
- arg_selinux_apifs_context);
+ arg_selinux_apifs_context,
+ false);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -3062,10 +3357,6 @@ static int outer_child(
if (fd < 0)
return fd;
- r = setrlimit_closest_all((const struct rlimit *const*) arg_rlimit, &which_failed);
- if (r < 0)
- return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to apply resource limit RLIMIT_%s: %m", rlimit_to_string(which_failed));
-
pid = raw_clone(SIGCHLD|CLONE_NEWNS|
arg_clone_ns_flags |
(arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO ? CLONE_NEWUSER : 0));
@@ -3318,6 +3609,15 @@ static int merge_settings(Settings *settings, const char *path) {
if ((arg_settings_mask & SETTING_EPHEMERAL) == 0)
arg_ephemeral = settings->ephemeral;
+ if ((arg_settings_mask & SETTING_DIRECTORY) == 0 &&
+ settings->root) {
+
+ if (!arg_settings_trusted)
+ log_warning("Ignoring root directory setting, file %s is not trusted.", path);
+ else
+ free_and_replace(arg_directory, settings->root);
+ }
+
if ((arg_settings_mask & SETTING_PIVOT_ROOT) == 0 &&
settings->pivot_root_new) {
free_and_replace(arg_pivot_root_new, settings->pivot_root_new);
@@ -3332,16 +3632,36 @@ static int merge_settings(Settings *settings, const char *path) {
settings->environment)
strv_free_and_replace(arg_setenv, settings->environment);
- if ((arg_settings_mask & SETTING_USER) == 0 &&
- settings->user)
- free_and_replace(arg_user, settings->user);
+ if ((arg_settings_mask & SETTING_USER) == 0) {
+
+ if (settings->user)
+ free_and_replace(arg_user, settings->user);
+
+ if (uid_is_valid(settings->uid))
+ arg_uid = settings->uid;
+ if (gid_is_valid(settings->gid))
+ arg_gid = settings->gid;
+ if (settings->n_supplementary_gids > 0) {
+ free_and_replace(arg_supplementary_gids, settings->supplementary_gids);
+ arg_n_supplementary_gids = settings->n_supplementary_gids;
+ }
+ }
if ((arg_settings_mask & SETTING_CAPABILITY) == 0) {
- uint64_t plus;
+ uint64_t plus, minus;
+
+ /* Note that we copy both the simple plus/minus caps here, and the full quintet from the
+ * Settings structure */
plus = settings->capability;
- if (settings_private_network(settings))
- plus |= (1ULL << CAP_NET_ADMIN);
+ minus = settings->drop_capability;
+
+ if ((arg_settings_mask & SETTING_NETWORK) == 0) {
+ if (settings_private_network(settings))
+ plus |= UINT64_C(1) << CAP_NET_ADMIN;
+ else
+ minus |= UINT64_C(1) << CAP_NET_ADMIN;
+ }
if (!arg_settings_trusted && plus != 0) {
if (settings->capability != 0)
@@ -3349,7 +3669,15 @@ static int merge_settings(Settings *settings, const char *path) {
} else
arg_caps_retain |= plus;
- arg_caps_retain &= ~settings->drop_capability;
+ arg_caps_retain &= ~minus;
+
+ /* Copy the full capabilities over too */
+ if (capability_quintet_is_set(&settings->full_capabilities)) {
+ if (!arg_settings_trusted)
+ log_warning("Ignoring capabilitiy settings, file %s is not trusted.", path);
+ else
+ arg_full_capabilities = settings->full_capabilities;
+ }
}
if ((arg_settings_mask & SETTING_KILL_SIGNAL) == 0 &&
@@ -3398,7 +3726,8 @@ static int merge_settings(Settings *settings, const char *path) {
settings->network_interfaces ||
settings->network_macvlan ||
settings->network_ipvlan ||
- settings->network_veth_extra)) {
+ settings->network_veth_extra ||
+ settings->network_namespace_path)) {
if (!arg_settings_trusted)
log_warning("Ignoring network settings, file %s is not trusted.", path);
@@ -3413,6 +3742,8 @@ static int merge_settings(Settings *settings, const char *path) {
free_and_replace(arg_network_bridge, settings->network_bridge);
free_and_replace(arg_network_zone, settings->network_zone);
+
+ free_and_replace(arg_network_namespace_path, settings->network_namespace_path);
}
}
@@ -3445,12 +3776,21 @@ static int merge_settings(Settings *settings, const char *path) {
if ((arg_settings_mask & SETTING_SYSCALL_FILTER) == 0) {
- if (!arg_settings_trusted && !strv_isempty(arg_syscall_whitelist))
+ if (!arg_settings_trusted && !strv_isempty(settings->syscall_whitelist))
log_warning("Ignoring SystemCallFilter= settings, file %s is not trusted.", path);
else {
strv_free_and_replace(arg_syscall_whitelist, settings->syscall_whitelist);
strv_free_and_replace(arg_syscall_blacklist, settings->syscall_blacklist);
}
+
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
+ if (!arg_settings_trusted && settings->seccomp)
+ log_warning("Ignoring SECCOMP filter, file %s is not trusted.", path);
+ else {
+ seccomp_release(arg_seccomp);
+ arg_seccomp = TAKE_PTR(settings->seccomp);
+ }
+#endif
}
for (rl = 0; rl < _RLIMIT_MAX; rl ++) {
@@ -3519,6 +3859,55 @@ static int merge_settings(Settings *settings, const char *path) {
settings->timezone != _TIMEZONE_MODE_INVALID)
arg_timezone = settings->timezone;
+ if ((arg_settings_mask & SETTING_SLICE) == 0 &&
+ settings->slice) {
+
+ if (!arg_settings_trusted)
+ log_warning("Ignoring slice setting, file '%s' is not trusted.", path);
+ else
+ free_and_replace(arg_slice, settings->slice);
+ }
+
+ if ((arg_settings_mask & SETTING_USE_CGNS) == 0 &&
+ settings->use_cgns >= 0) {
+
+ if (!arg_settings_trusted)
+ log_warning("Ignoring cgroup namespace setting, file '%s' is not trusted.", path);
+ else
+ arg_use_cgns = settings->use_cgns;
+ }
+
+ if ((arg_settings_mask & SETTING_CLONE_NS_FLAGS) == 0 &&
+ settings->clone_ns_flags != (unsigned long) -1) {
+
+ if (!arg_settings_trusted)
+ log_warning("Ignoring namespace setting, file '%s' is not trusted.", path);
+ else
+ arg_clone_ns_flags = settings->clone_ns_flags;
+ }
+
+ if ((arg_settings_mask & SETTING_CONSOLE_MODE) == 0 &&
+ settings->console_mode >= 0) {
+
+ if (!arg_settings_trusted)
+ log_warning("Ignoring console mode setting, file '%s' is not trusted.", path);
+ else
+ arg_console_mode = settings->console_mode;
+ }
+
+ /* The following properties can only be set through the OCI settings logic, not from the command line, hence we
+ * don't consult arg_settings_mask for them. */
+
+ sd_bus_message_unref(arg_property_message);
+ arg_property_message = TAKE_PTR(settings->properties);
+
+ arg_console_width = settings->console_width;
+ arg_console_height = settings->console_height;
+
+ device_node_free_many(arg_extra_nodes, arg_n_extra_nodes);
+ arg_extra_nodes = TAKE_PTR(settings->extra_nodes);
+ arg_n_extra_nodes = settings->n_extra_nodes;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -3529,6 +3918,9 @@ static int load_settings(void) {
const char *fn, *i;
int r;
+ if (arg_oci_bundle)
+ return 0;
+
/* If all settings are masked, there's no point in looking for
* the settings file */
if ((arg_settings_mask & _SETTINGS_MASK_ALL) == _SETTINGS_MASK_ALL)
@@ -3596,10 +3988,27 @@ static int load_settings(void) {
return merge_settings(settings, p);
}
+static int load_oci_bundle(void) {
+ _cleanup_(settings_freep) Settings *settings = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!arg_oci_bundle)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* By default let's trust OCI bundles */
+ if (arg_settings_trusted < 0)
+ arg_settings_trusted = true;
+
+ r = oci_load(NULL, arg_oci_bundle, &settings);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ return merge_settings(settings, arg_oci_bundle);
+}
+
static int run(int master,
const char* console,
DissectedImage *dissected_image,
- bool interactive,
bool secondary,
FDSet *fds,
char veth_name[IFNAMSIZ], bool *veth_created,
@@ -3630,7 +4039,6 @@ static int run(int master,
_cleanup_(sd_netlink_unrefp) sd_netlink *rtnl = NULL;
_cleanup_(sd_bus_flush_close_unrefp) sd_bus *bus = NULL;
ContainerStatus container_status = 0;
- char last_char = 0;
int ifi = 0, r;
ssize_t l;
sigset_t mask_chld;
@@ -3732,7 +4140,6 @@ static int run(int master,
arg_directory,
console,
dissected_image,
- interactive,
secondary,
pid_socket_pair[1],
uuid_socket_pair[1],
@@ -3944,6 +4351,7 @@ static int run(int master,
arg_custom_mounts, arg_n_custom_mounts,
arg_kill_signal,
arg_property,
+ arg_property_message,
arg_keep_unit,
arg_container_service_name);
if (r < 0)
@@ -3957,7 +4365,8 @@ static int run(int master,
arg_slice,
arg_custom_mounts, arg_n_custom_mounts,
arg_kill_signal,
- arg_property);
+ arg_property,
+ arg_property_message);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -4046,22 +4455,32 @@ static int run(int master,
rtnl_socket_pair[0] = safe_close(rtnl_socket_pair[0]);
- r = pty_forward_new(event, master,
- PTY_FORWARD_IGNORE_VHANGUP | (interactive ? 0 : PTY_FORWARD_READ_ONLY),
- &forward);
- if (r < 0)
- return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create PTY forwarder: %m");
+ if (IN_SET(arg_console_mode, CONSOLE_INTERACTIVE, CONSOLE_READ_ONLY)) {
+ assert(master >= 0);
+
+ r = pty_forward_new(event, master,
+ PTY_FORWARD_IGNORE_VHANGUP | (arg_console_mode == CONSOLE_READ_ONLY ? PTY_FORWARD_READ_ONLY : 0),
+ &forward);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create PTY forwarder: %m");
+
+ if (arg_console_width != (unsigned) -1 || arg_console_height != (unsigned) -1)
+ (void) pty_forward_set_width_height(forward, arg_console_width, arg_console_height);
+ }
r = sd_event_loop(event);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to run event loop: %m");
- pty_forward_get_last_char(forward, &last_char);
+ if (forward) {
+ char last_char = 0;
- forward = pty_forward_free(forward);
+ (void) pty_forward_get_last_char(forward, &last_char);
+ forward = pty_forward_free(forward);
- if (!arg_quiet && last_char != '\n')
- putc('\n', stdout);
+ if (!arg_quiet && last_char != '\n')
+ putc('\n', stdout);
+ }
/* Kill if it is not dead yet anyway */
if (bus) {
@@ -4185,7 +4604,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
pid_t pid = 0;
union in_addr_union exposed = {};
_cleanup_(release_lock_file) LockFile tree_global_lock = LOCK_FILE_INIT, tree_local_lock = LOCK_FILE_INIT;
- bool interactive, veth_created = false, remove_tmprootdir = false;
+ bool veth_created = false, remove_tmprootdir = false;
char tmprootdir[] = "/tmp/nspawn-root-XXXXXX";
_cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *loop = NULL;
_cleanup_(decrypted_image_unrefp) DecryptedImage *decrypted_image = NULL;
@@ -4210,6 +4629,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
+ r = load_oci_bundle();
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+
r = determine_names();
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
@@ -4218,8 +4641,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
- parse_environment();
-
r = cg_unified_flush();
if (r < 0) {
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine whether the unified cgroups hierarchy is used: %m");
@@ -4485,31 +4906,37 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
- interactive =
- isatty(STDIN_FILENO) > 0 &&
- isatty(STDOUT_FILENO) > 0;
+ if (arg_console_mode < 0)
+ arg_console_mode =
+ isatty(STDIN_FILENO) > 0 &&
+ isatty(STDOUT_FILENO) > 0 ? CONSOLE_INTERACTIVE : CONSOLE_READ_ONLY;
- master = posix_openpt(O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NONBLOCK);
- if (master < 0) {
- r = log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to acquire pseudo tty: %m");
- goto finish;
- }
+ if (arg_console_mode == CONSOLE_PIPE) /* if we pass STDERR on to the container, don't add our own logs into it too */
+ arg_quiet = true;
- r = ptsname_malloc(master, &console);
- if (r < 0) {
- r = log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine tty name: %m");
- goto finish;
- }
-
- if (arg_selinux_apifs_context) {
- r = mac_selinux_apply(console, arg_selinux_apifs_context);
- if (r < 0)
+ if (arg_console_mode != CONSOLE_PIPE) {
+ master = posix_openpt(O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NONBLOCK);
+ if (master < 0) {
+ r = log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to acquire pseudo tty: %m");
goto finish;
- }
+ }
- if (unlockpt(master) < 0) {
- r = log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to unlock tty: %m");
- goto finish;
+ r = ptsname_malloc(master, &console);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ r = log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine tty name: %m");
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ if (arg_selinux_apifs_context) {
+ r = mac_selinux_apply(console, arg_selinux_apifs_context);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ if (unlockpt(master) < 0) {
+ r = log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to unlock tty: %m");
+ goto finish;
+ }
}
if (!arg_quiet)
@@ -4527,7 +4954,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
r = run(master,
console,
dissected_image,
- interactive, secondary,
+ secondary,
fds,
veth_name, &veth_created,
&exposed,
@@ -4592,6 +5019,7 @@ finish:
free(arg_machine);
free(arg_hostname);
free(arg_user);
+ free(arg_supplementary_gids);
free(arg_pivot_root_new);
free(arg_pivot_root_old);
free(arg_chdir);
@@ -4605,13 +5033,21 @@ finish:
free(arg_network_zone);
free(arg_network_namespace_path);
strv_free(arg_property);
+ sd_bus_message_unref(arg_property_message);
custom_mount_free_all(arg_custom_mounts, arg_n_custom_mounts);
expose_port_free_all(arg_expose_ports);
free(arg_root_hash);
rlimit_free_all(arg_rlimit);
strv_free(arg_syscall_whitelist);
strv_free(arg_syscall_blacklist);
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
+ seccomp_release(arg_seccomp);
+#endif
arg_cpuset = cpu_set_mfree(arg_cpuset);
+ free(arg_oci_bundle);
+ device_node_free_many(arg_extra_nodes, arg_n_extra_nodes);
+ strv_free(arg_sysctl);
+ free(arg_slice);
return r < 0 ? EXIT_FAILURE : ret;
}