let's return ENOSYS in that case, to make things a bit less confusng.
Previously we'd just propagate ENOENT, which people might mistake as
applying to the object being modified rather than /proc/ just not being
there.
Let's return ENOSYS instead, i.e. an error clearly indicating that some
kernel API is not available. This hopefully should put people on a
better track.
Note that we only do the procfs check in the error path, which hopefully
means it's the less likely path.
We probably can add similar bits to more suitable codepaths dealing with
/proc/self/fd, but for now, let's pick to the ones noticed in #14745.
Fixes: #14745
Previously there was a weird asymmetry: initially we'd resolve the
specified prefix path when chasing symlinks together with the actual
path we were supposed to cover, except when we hit an absolute symlink
where we'd use the root as it was. Let's unify handling here: the prefix
path is never resolved, and always left as it is.
This in particular fixes issues with symlinks in the prefix path, as
that confused the check that made sure we never left the root directory.
Fixes: #14634
Replaces: #14635
f5947a5e92 dropped missing.h and
replaced with the more specific headers but did not add
missing_fcntl.h in places that use O_TMPFILE. This is needed for
some older versions of glibc.
strerror() is not thread safe. Let's avoid it where it is easy hence.
(Ideally we'd not use it at all anymore, but that's sometimes a bit
nasty, not in this case though, where it is very easy to avoid)
Follow-up for: 27c3112dcb
chase_symlinks() would return negative on error, and either a non-negative status
or a non-negative fd when CHASE_OPEN was given. This made the interface quite
complicated, because dependning on the flags used, we would get two different
"types" of return object. Coverity was always confused by this, and flagged
every use of chase_symlinks() without CHASE_OPEN as a resource leak (because it
would this that an fd is returned). This patch uses a saparate output parameter,
so there is no confusion.
(I think it is OK to have functions which return either an error or an fd. It's
only returning *either* an fd or a non-fd that is confusing.)
The default message for ENOSPC is very misleading: it says that the disk is
filled, but in fact the inotify watch limit is the problem.
So let's introduce and use a wrapper that simply calls inotify_add_watch(2) and
which fixes the error message up in case ENOSPC is returned.
fstat(2) is fine with O_PATH fds.
For changing owership of a file opened with O_PATH, there's fchownat(2).
Only changing permissions is problematic but we introduced fchmod_opath() for
that purpose.
Inspired by #12431 let's also rework chmod_and_chown() and make sure we
never add more rights to a file not owned by the right user.
Also, let's make chmod_and_chown() just a wrapper arond
fchmod_and_chown().
let's also change strategy: instead of chown()ing first and stating
after on failure and supressing errors, let's avoid the chown in the
firts place, in the interest on keeping things minimal.
Let's reduce the chance of failure: if we can't apply the chmod/chown
requested, check if it's applied anyway, and if so, supress the error.
This is even race-free since we operate on an O_PATH fd anyway.
When chase_symlinks is given a root path, it is assumed that all
processed symlinks are restricted under that path. It should not
be necessary to verify components of that prefix path since they
are not relevant to the symlinks.
This change skips unsafe UID transitions in this root prefix, i.e.
it now ignores when an unprivileged user's directory contains a
root-owned directory above the symlink root.
This has been irritating me for quite a while: let's prefix these enum
values with a common prefix, like we do for almost all other enums.
No change in behaviour, just some renaming.
This has the side effect to upgrade the log level at which the log is emitted
from debug to warning.
This might be better since after all we didn't apply a tmpfiles.d/ rule and
that actually might end up being problematic eventually.
We're always interested into finding unsafe transitions so let's make the
helper return true when it finds such transitions so we don't need to negate
its results.
No functional changes.
We previously returned -EPERM but it can be returned for various other reasons
too.
Let's use -ENOLINK instead as this value shouldn't be used currently. This
allows users of CHASE_SAFE to detect without any ambiguities when unsafe
transitions are encountered by chase_symlinks().
All current users of CHASE_SAFE that explicitly reacted on -EPERM have been
converted to react on -ENOLINK.
This splits out a bunch of functions from fileio.c that have to do with
temporary files. Simply to make the header files a bit shorter, and to
group things more nicely.
No code changes, just some rearranging of source files.
This flag can be used to make chase_symlinks() emit a warning when it
encounters an error.
Such flag can be useful for generating a comprehensive and detailed warning
since chase_symlinks() can generate a warning with a full context.
For now only warnings for unsafe transitions are produced.
I noticed while profiling journald that we invoke readlinkat() a ton on
open /proc/self/fd/<fd>, and that the returned paths are more often than
not longer than the 99 chars used before, when we look at archived
journal files. This means for these cases we generally need to execute
two rather than one syscalls.
Let's increase the buffer size a tiny bit, so that we reduce the number
of syscalls executed. This is really a low-hanging fruit of
optimization.
This is the counterpiece to the boot counting implemented in
systemd-boot: if a boot is detected as successful we mark drop the
counter again from the booted snippet or kernel image.
Apparently FAT on some recent kernels can't do RENAME_NOREPLACE, and of
course cannot do linkat()/unlinkat() either (as the hard link concept
does not exist on FAT). Add a fallback using an explicit beforehand
faccessat() check. This sucks, but what we can do if the safe operations
are not available?
Fixes: #10063
This flag mimics what "O_NOFOLLOW|O_PATH" does for open(2) that is
chase_symlinks() will not resolve the final pathname component if it's a
symlink and instead will return a file descriptor referring to the symlink
itself.
Note: if CHASE_SAFE is also passed, no safety checking is performed on the
transition done if the symlink would have been followed.
We often open the parent directory of a path. Let's add a common helper
for that, that shortens our code a bit and adds some extra safety
checks, for example it will fail if used on the root directory (which
doesn't really have a parent).
The helper is actually generalized from a function in btrfs-util.[ch]
which already existed for this purpose.