When proving NODATA DS lookups we need to insist on looking at the parent zone's NSEC RR, not the child zone's.
When proving any other NODATA lookups we need to insist on looking at the child zone's NSEC RR, not the parent's.
Properly handle RRs that begin with an asterisk label. These are the unexpanded forms of wildcard domains and appear in
NSEC RRs for example. We need to make sure we handle the signatures of these RRs properly, since they mostly are
considered normal RRs, except that the RRSIG labels counter is one off for them, as the asterisk label is always
excluded of the signature.
Given how fragile DNS servers are with some DNS types, and given that we really should avoid confusing them with
known-weird lookups, refuse doing lookups for known-obsolete RR types.
Move detection into a set of new functions, that check whether one specific server can do DNSSEC, whether a server and
a specific transaction can do DNSSEC, or whether a transaction and all its auxiliary transactions could do so.
Also, do these checks both before we acquire additional RRs for the validation (so that we can skip them if the server
doesn't do DNSSEC anyway), and after we acquired them all (to see if any of the lookups changed our opinion about the
servers).
THis also tightens the checks a bit: a server that lacks TCP support is considered incompatible with DNSSEC too.
This changes the DnsServer logic to count failed UDP and TCP failures separately. This is useful so that we don't end
up downgrading the feature level from one UDP level to a lower UDP level just because a TCP connection we did because
of a TC response failed.
This also adds accounting of truncated packets. If we detect incoming truncated packets, and count too many failed TCP
connections (which is the normal fall back if we get a trucnated UDP packet) we downgrade the feature level, given that
the responses at the current levels don't get through, and we somehow need to make sure they become smaller, which they
will do if we don't request DNSSEC or EDNS support.
This makes resolved work much better with crappy DNS servers that do not implement TCP and only limited UDP packet
sizes, but otherwise support DNSSEC RRs. They end up choking on the generally larger DNSSEC RRs and there's no way to
retrieve the full data.
If we already degraded the feature level below DO don't bother with sending requests for DS, DNSKEY, RRSIG, NSEC, NSEC3
or NSEC3PARAM RRs. After all, we cannot do DNSSEC validation then anyway, and we better not press a legacy server like
this with such modern concepts.
This also has the benefit that when we try to validate a response we received using DNSSEC, and we detect a limited
server support level while doing so, all further auxiliary DNSSEC queries will fail right-away.
Under the assumption that packet failures (i.e. FORMERR, SERVFAIL, NOTIMP) are caused by packet contents, not used
transport, we shouldn't switch between UDP and TCP when we get them, but only downgrade the higher levels down to UDP.
UDP ICMP errors are reported to us via recvmsg() when we read a reply. Handle this properly, and consider this a lost
packet, and retry the connection.
This also adds some additional logging for invalid incoming packets.
Previously, when we couldn't connect to a DNS server via TCP we'd abort the whole transaction using a
"connection-failure" state. This change removes that, and counts failed connections as "lost packet" events, so that
we switch back to the UDP protocol again.
If we failed to contact a DNS server via TCP, bump of the feature level to UDP again. This way we'll switch back
between UDP and TCP if we fail to contact a host.
Generally, we prefer UDP over TCP, which is why UDP is a higher feature level. But some servers only support UDP but
not TCP hence when reaching the lowest feature level of TCP and want to downgrade from there, pick UDP again. We this
keep downgrading until we reach TCP and then we cycle through UDP and TCP.
This implements RFC 5155, Section 8.8 and RFC 4035, Section 5.3.4:
When we receive a response with an RRset generated from a wildcard we
need to look for one NSEC/NSEC3 RR that proves that there's no explicit RR
around before we accept the wildcard RRset as response.
This patch does a couple of things: the validation calls will now
identify wildcard signatures for us, and let us know the RRSIG used (so
that the RRSIG's signer field let's us know what the wildcard was that
generate the entry). Moreover, when iterating trough the RRsets of a
response we now employ three phases instead of just two.
a) in the first phase we only look for DNSKEYs RRs
b) in the second phase we only look for NSEC RRs
c) in the third phase we look for all kinds of RRs
Phase a) is necessary, since DNSKEYs "unlock" more signatures for us,
hence we shouldn't assume a key is missing until all DNSKEY RRs have
been processed.
Phase b) is necessary since NSECs need to be validated before we can
validate wildcard RRs due to the logic explained above.
Phase c) validates everything else. This phase also handles RRsets that
cannot be fully validated and removes them or lets the transaction fail.
There's now nsec3_hashed_domain_format() and nsec3_hashed_domain_make().
The former takes a hash value and formats it as domain, the latter takes
a domain name, hashes it and then invokes nsec3_hashed_domain_format().
This way we can reuse more code, as the formatting logic can be unified
between this call and another place.
When validating a transaction we initially collect DNSKEY, DS, SOA RRs
in the "validated_keys" list, that we need for the proofs. This includes
DNSKEY and DS data from our trust anchor database. Quite possibly we
learn that some of these DNSKEY/DS RRs have been revoked between the
time we request and collect those additional RRs and we begin the
validation step. In this case we need to make sure that the respective
DS/DNSKEY RRs are removed again from our list. This patch adds that, and
strips known revoked trust anchor RRs from the validated list before we
begin the actual validation proof, and each time we add more DNSKEY
material to it while we are doing the proof.
Instead of first iterating through all DNSKEYs in the DnsAnswer in
dns_transaction_check_revoked_trust_anchors(), and
then doing that a second time in dns_trust_anchor_check_revoked(), do so
only once in the former, and pass the dnskey we found directly to the
latter.
There's not reason to wait for checking for revoked trust anchors until
after validation, after all revoked DNSKEYs only need to be self-signed,
but not have a full trust chain.
This way, we can be sure that all trust anchor lookups we do during
validation already honour that some keys might have been revoked.
The domain name for this NSEC3 RR was originally stored in a variable
called "suffix", which was then renamed to "zone" in
d1511b3338. Hence also rename the
RR variable accordingly.
Let's increase compatibility with many private domains by default, and
ship a default NTA list of wel-known private domains, where it is
unlikely they will be deployed as official TLD anytime soon.
