Let's use chase_symlinks() everywhere, and stop using GNU
canonicalize_file_name() everywhere. For most cases this should not change
behaviour, however increase exposure of our function to get better tested. Most
importantly in a few cases (most notably nspawn) it can take the correct root
directory into account when chasing symlinks.
Let's align all our BindMount tables, let's use the same column widths in all
of them, and let's make them not any wider than necessary.
This only changes whitespace, not contents of any of the tables.
This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling:
It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same,
hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero
initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields.
This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const"
and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter
when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a
root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to
allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor
function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a
BindMount structure.
While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with
ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is
implicited prefixed.
This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead,
which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done.
This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and
append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough
to be called directly.
Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in
prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that
doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra
bit in the BindMount structure.
This adds a variable that is always set to false to make sure that
protect paths inside sandbox are always enforced and not ignored. The only
case when it is set to true is on DynamicUser=no and RootDirectory=/chroot
is set. This allows users to use more our sandbox features inside RootDirectory=
The only exception is ProtectSystem=full|strict and when DynamicUser=yes
is implied. Currently RootDirectory= is not fully compatible with these
due to two reasons:
* /chroot/usr|etc has to be present on ProtectSystem=full
* /chroot// has to be a mount point on ProtectSystem=strict.
Instead of having two fields inside BindMount struct where one is stack
based and the other one is heap, use one field to store the full path
and updated it when we chase symlinks. This way we avoid dealing with
both at the same time.
This makes RootDirectory= work with ProtectHome= and ProtectKernelModules=yes
Fixes: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/4567
Lets go further and make /lib/modules/ inaccessible for services that do
not have business with modules, this is a minor improvment but it may
help on setups with custom modules and they are limited... in regard of
kernel auto-load feature.
This change introduce NameSpaceInfo struct which we may embed later
inside ExecContext but for now lets just reduce the argument number to
setup_namespace() and merge ProtectKernelModules feature.
ProtectSystem= with all its different modes and other options like
PrivateDevices= + ProtectKernelTunables= + ProtectHome= are orthogonal,
however currently it's a bit hard to parse that from the implementation
view. Simplify it by giving each mode its own table with all paths and
references to other Protect options.
With this change some entries are duplicated, but we do not care since
duplicate mounts are first sorted by the most restrictive mode then
cleaned.
Make ALSA entries, latency interface, mtrr, apm/acpi, suspend interface,
filesystems configuration and IRQ tuning readonly.
Most of these interfaces now days should be in /sys but they are still
available through /proc, so just protect them. This patch does not touch
/proc/net/...
Move out mount calculation on its own function. Actually the logic is
smart enough to later drop nop and duplicates mounts, this change
improves code readability.
---
src/core/namespace.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
Instead of having all these paths everywhere, put the ones that are
protected by ProtectKernelTunables= into their own table. This way it
is easy to add paths and track which ones are protected.
This adds logic to chase symlinks for all mount points that shall be created in
a namespace environment in userspace, instead of leaving this to the kernel.
This has the advantage that we can correctly handle absolute symlinks that
shall be taken relative to a specific root directory. Moreover, we can properly
handle mounts created on symlinked files or directories as we can merge their
mounts as necessary.
(This also drops the "done" flag in the namespace logic, which was never
actually working, but was supposed to permit a partial rollback of the
namespace logic, which however is only mildly useful as it wasn't clear in
which case it would or would not be able to roll back.)
Fixes: #3867
Let's create the new namespace only after we validated and processed all
parameters, right before we start with actually mounting things.
This way, the window where we can roll back is larger (not that it matters
IRL...)
Let's tighten our sandbox a bit more: with this change ProtectSystem= gains a
new setting "strict". If set, the entire directory tree of the system is
mounted read-only, but the API file systems /proc, /dev, /sys are excluded
(they may be managed with PrivateDevices= and ProtectKernelTunables=). Also,
/home and /root are excluded as those are left for ProtectHome= to manage.
In this mode, all "real" file systems (i.e. non-API file systems) are mounted
read-only, and specific directories may only be excluded via
ReadWriteDirectories=, thus implementing an effective whitelist instead of
blacklist of writable directories.
While we are at, also add /efi to the list of paths always affected by
ProtectSystem=. This is a follow-up for
b52a109ad3 which added /efi as alternative for
/boot. Our namespacing logic should respect that too.
Previously, if ReadWritePaths= was nested inside a ReadOnlyPaths=
specification, then we'd first recursively apply the ReadOnlyPaths= paths, and
make everything below read-only, only in order to then flip the read-only bit
again for the subdirs listed in ReadWritePaths= below it.
This is not only ugly (as for the dirs in question we first turn on the RO bit,
only to turn it off again immediately after), but also problematic in
containers, where a container manager might have marked a set of dirs read-only
and this code will undo this is ReadWritePaths= is set for any.
With this patch behaviour in this regard is altered: ReadOnlyPaths= will not be
applied to the children listed in ReadWritePaths= in the first place, so that
we do not need to turn off the RO bit for those after all.
This means that ReadWritePaths=/ReadOnlyPaths= may only be used to turn on the
RO bit, but never to turn it off again. Or to say this differently: if some
dirs are marked read-only via some external tool, then ReadWritePaths= will not
undo it.
This is not only the safer option, but also more in-line with what the man page
currently claims:
"Entries (files or directories) listed in ReadWritePaths= are
accessible from within the namespace with the same access rights as
from outside."
To implement this change bind_remount_recursive() gained a new "blacklist"
string list parameter, which when passed may contain subdirs that shall be
excluded from the read-only mounting.
A number of functions are updated to add more debug logging to make this more
digestable.
We generally try to avoid strerror(), due to its threads-unsafety, let's do
this here, too.
Also, let's be tiny bit more explanatory with the log messages, and let's
shorten a few things.
This patch renames Read{Write,Only}Directories= and InaccessibleDirectories=
to Read{Write,Only}Paths= and InaccessiblePaths=, previous names are kept
as aliases but they are not advertised in the documentation.
Renamed variables:
`read_write_dirs` --> `read_write_paths`
`read_only_dirs` --> `read_only_paths`
`inaccessible_dirs` --> `inaccessible_paths`
Despite the name, `Read{Write,Only}Directories=` already allows for
regular file paths to be masked. This commit adds the same behavior
to `InaccessibleDirectories=` and makes it explicit in the doc.
This patch introduces `/run/systemd/inaccessible/{reg,dir,chr,blk,fifo,sock}`
{dile,device}nodes and mounts on the appropriate one the paths specified
in `InacessibleDirectories=`.
Based on Luca's patch from https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/3327
Private /dev will not be managed by udev or others, so we can make it
noexec and readonly after we have made all device nodes. As /dev/shm
needs to be writable, we can't use bind_remount_recursive().
There are more than enough calls doing string manipulations to deserve
its own files, hence do something about it.
This patch also sorts the #include blocks of all files that needed to be
updated, according to the sorting suggestions from CODING_STYLE. Since
pretty much every file needs our string manipulation functions this
effectively means that most files have sorted #include blocks now.
Also touches a few unrelated include files.
Also, make it slightly more powerful, by accepting a flags argument, and
make it safe for handling if more than one cmsg attribute happens to be
attached.
The previous coccinelle semantic patch that improved usage of
log_error_errno()'s return value, only looked for log_error_errno()
invocations with a single parameter after the error parameter. Update
the patch to handle arbitrary numbers of additional arguments.
Turns this:
r = -errno;
log_error_errno(errno, "foo");
into this:
r = log_error_errno(errno, "foo");
and this:
r = log_error_errno(errno, "foo");
return r;
into this:
return log_error_errno(errno, "foo");
When a service is chrooted with the option RootDirectory=/opt/..., then
the options PrivateDevices, PrivateTmp, ProtectHome, ProtectSystem must
mount the directories under $RootDirectory/{dev,tmp,home,usr,boot}.
The test-ns tool can test setup_namespace() with and without chroot:
$ sudo TEST_NS_PROJECTS=/home/lennart/projects ./test-ns
$ sudo TEST_NS_CHROOT=/home/alban/debian-tree TEST_NS_PROJECTS=/home/alban/debian-tree/home/alban/Documents ./test-ns
Previously all bind mount mounts were applied in the order specified,
followed by all tmpfs mounts in the order specified. This is
problematic, if bind mounts shall be placed within tmpfs mounts.
This patch hence reworks the custom mount point logic, and alwas applies
them in strict prefix-first order. This means the order of mounts
specified on the command line becomes irrelevant, the right operation
will always be executed.
While we are at it this commit also adds native support for overlayfs
mounts, as supported by recent kernels.
The comparison function we use for qsorting paths is overly indifferent.
Consider these 3 paths for sorting:
/foo
/bar
/foo/foo
qsort() may compare:
"/foo" with "/bar" => 0, indifference
"/bar" with "/foo/foo" => 0, indifference
and assume transitively that "/foo" and "/foo/foo" are also indifferent.
But this is wrong, we want "/foo" sorted before "/foo/foo".
The comparison function must be transitive.
Use path_compare(), which behaves properly.
Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1184016
/dev/pts/ptmx is as important as /dev/pts, so error out if that
fails. Others seem less important, since the namespace is usable
without them, so ignore failures.
CID #123755, #123754.
This patch removes includes that are not used. The removals were found with
include-what-you-use which checks if any of the symbols from a header is
in use.
After all it is now much more like strjoin() than strappend(). At the
same time, add support for NULL sentinels, even if they are normally not
necessary.
If the format string contains %m, clearly errno must have a meaningful
value, so we might as well use log_*_errno to have ERRNO= logged.
Using:
find . -name '*.[ch]' | xargs sed -r -i -e \
's/log_(debug|info|notice|warning|error|emergency)\((".*%m.*")/log_\1_errno(errno, \2/'
Plus some whitespace, linewrap, and indent adjustments.
fix:
CID 1237553 (#1 of 6): Unchecked return value from library
(CHECKED_RETURN
CID 1237553 (#3 of 6): Unchecked return value from library
(CHECKED_RETURN)
CID 1237553 (#4 of 6): Unchecked return value from library
(CHECKED_RETURN)
CID 1237553 (#5 of 6): Unchecked return value from library
(CHECKED_RETURN
CID 1237553 (#6 of 6): Unchecked return value from library
(CHECKED_RETURN)
kdbus has seen a larger update than expected lately, most notably with
kdbusfs, a file system to expose the kdbus control files:
* Each time a file system of this type is mounted, a new kdbus
domain is created.
* The layout inside each mount point is the same as before, except
that domains are not hierarchically nested anymore.
* Domains are therefore also unnamed now.
* Unmounting a kdbusfs will automatically also detroy the
associated domain.
* Hence, the action of creating a kdbus domain is now as
privileged as mounting a filesystem.
* This way, we can get around creating dev nodes for everything,
which is last but not least something that is not limited by
20-bit minor numbers.
The kdbus specific bits in nspawn have all been dropped now, as nspawn
can rely on the container OS to set up its own kdbus domain, simply by
mounting a new instance.
A new set of mounts has been added to mount things *after* the kernel
modules have been loaded. For now, only kdbus is in this set, which is
invoked with mount_setup_late().
If a path to a previously created custom kdbus endpoint is passed in,
bind-mount a new devtmpfs that contains a 'bus' node, which in turn in
bind-mounted with the custom endpoint. This tmpfs then mounted over the
kdbus subtree that refers to the current bus.
This way, we can fake the bus node in order to lock down services with
a kdbus custom endpoint policy.
Instead of blindly creating another bind mount for read-only mounts,
check if there's already one we can use, and if so, use it. Also,
recursively mark all submounts read-only too. Also, ignore autofs mounts
when remounting read-only unless they are already triggered.
This would otherwise unconditionally trigger any /boot autofs mount,
which we probably should avoid.
ProtectSystem= will now only cover /usr and (optionally) /etc, both of
which cannot be autofs anyway.
ProtectHome will continue to cover /run/user and /home. The former
cannot be autofs either. /home could be, however is frequently enough
used (unlikey /boot) so that it isn't too problematic to simply trigger
it unconditionally via ProtectHome=.
Also, rename ProtectedHome= to ProtectHome=, to simplify things a bit.
With this in place we now have two neat options ProtectSystem= and
ProtectHome= for protecting the OS itself (and optionally its
configuration), and for protecting the user's data.
Now that we moved the actual syslog socket to
/run/systemd/journal/dev-log we can actually make /dev/log a symlink to
it, when PrivateDevices= is used, thus making syslog available to
services using PrivateDevices=.
ReadOnlySystem= uses fs namespaces to mount /usr and /boot read-only for
a service.
ProtectedHome= uses fs namespaces to mount /home and /run/user
inaccessible or read-only for a service.
This patch also enables these settings for all our long-running services.
Together they should be good building block for a minimal service
sandbox, removing the ability for services to modify the operating
system or access the user's private data.
Similar to PrivateNetwork=, PrivateTmp= introduce PrivateDevices= that
sets up a private /dev with only the API pseudo-devices like /dev/null,
/dev/zero, /dev/random, but not any physical devices in them.
This way it is easy to only exclude directories from the current boot
from automatic clean up in /var/tmp.
Also, pick a longer name for the directories so that are globs in
tmp.conf can be simpler yet equally accurate.
This extends 62678ded 'efi: never call qsort on potentially
NULL arrays' to all other places where qsort is used and it
is not obvious that the count is non-zero.
Currently, PrivateTmp=yes means that the service cannot see the /tmp
shared by rest of the system and is isolated from other services using
PrivateTmp, but users can access and modify /tmp as seen by the
service.
Move the private /tmp and /var/tmp directories into a 0077-mode
directory. This way unpriviledged users on the system cannot see (or
modify) /tmp as seen by the service.
All Execs within the service, will get mounted the same
/tmp and /var/tmp directories, if service is configured with
PrivateTmp=yes. Temporary directories are cleaned up by service
itself in addition to systemd-tmpfiles. Directory which is mounted
as inaccessible is created at runtime in /run/systemd.
- don't use pivot_root() anymore, just reuse root hierarchy
- first create all mounts, then mark them read-only so that we get the
right behaviour when people want writable mounts inside of
read-only mounts
- don't pass invalid combinations of MS_ constants to the kernel
We finally got the OK from all contributors with non-trivial commits to
relicense systemd from GPL2+ to LGPL2.1+.
Some udev bits continue to be GPL2+ for now, but we are looking into
relicensing them too, to allow free copy/paste of all code within
systemd.
The bits that used to be MIT continue to be MIT.
The big benefit of the relicensing is that closed source code may now
link against libsystemd-login.so and friends.