This reverts commit b45c068dd8.
I think the idea was generally sound, but didn't take into account the
limitations of show-environment and how it is used. People expect to be able to
eval systemctl show-environment output in bash, and no escaping syntax is
defined for environment *names* (we only do escaping for *values*). We could
skip such problematic variables in 'systemctl show-environment', and only allow
them to be inherited directly. But this would be confusing and ugly.
The original motivation for this change was that various import operations
would fail. a4ccce22d9 changed systemctl to filter
invalid variables in import-environment.
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-session/-/issues/71 does a similar change
in GNOME. So those problematic variables should not cause failures, but just
be silently ignored.
Finally, the environment block is becoming a dumping ground. In my gnome
session 'systemctl show-environment --user' includes stuff like PWD, FPATH
(from zsh), SHLVL=0 (no idea what that is). This is not directly related to
variable names (since all those are allowed under the stricter rules too), but
I think we should start pushing people away from running import-environment and
towards importing only select variables.
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/17188#issuecomment-708676511
This adds tests to make sure that basic/env-util considers environment
variables containing \r characters invalid, and that it removes such
variables during environment cleanup in strv_env_clean*().
test-env-util has not verified this behaviour before.
As \r characters can be used to hide information, disallowing them
helps with systemd's security barrier role, even when the \r
character comes as part of a DOS style (\r\n) line ending.
Prompted-by: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/17378
The idea is that we have strvs like list of server names or addresses, where
the majority of strings is rather short, but some are long and there can
potentially be many strings. So formattting them either all on one line or all
in separate lines leads to output that is either hard to read or uses way too
many rows. We want to wrap them, but relying on the pager to do the wrapping is
not nice. Normal text has a lot of redundancy, so when the pager wraps a line
in the middle of a word the read can understand what is going on without any
trouble. But for a high-density zero-redundancy text like an IP address it is
much nicer to wrap between words. This also makes c&p easier.
This adds a variant of TABLE_STRV which is wrapped on output (with line breaks
inserted between different strv entries).
The change table_print() is quite ugly. A second pass is added to re-calculate
column widths. Since column size is now "soft", i.e. it can adjust based on
available columns, we need to two passes:
- first we figure out how much space we want
- in the second pass we figure out what the actual wrapped columns
widths will be.
To avoid unnessary work, the second pass is only done when we actually have
wrappable fields.
A test is added in test-format-table.
The test was failing because it couldn't start the service:
path-modified.service: state = failed; result = exit-code
path-modified.path: state = waiting; result = success
path-modified.service: state = failed; result = exit-code
path-modified.path: state = waiting; result = success
path-modified.service: state = failed; result = exit-code
path-modified.path: state = waiting; result = success
path-modified.service: state = failed; result = exit-code
path-modified.path: state = waiting; result = success
path-modified.service: state = failed; result = exit-code
path-modified.path: state = waiting; result = success
path-modified.service: state = failed; result = exit-code
Failed to connect to system bus: No such file or directory
-.slice: Failed to enable/disable controllers on cgroup /system.slice/kojid.service, ignoring: Permission denied
path-modified.service: Failed to create cgroup /system.slice/kojid.service/path-modified.service: Permission denied
path-modified.service: Failed to attach to cgroup /system.slice/kojid.service/path-modified.service: No such file or directory
path-modified.service: Failed at step CGROUP spawning /bin/true: No such file or directory
path-modified.service: Main process exited, code=exited, status=219/CGROUP
path-modified.service: Failed with result 'exit-code'.
Test timeout when testing path-modified.path
In fact any of the services that we try to start may fail, especially
considering that we're doing some rogue cgroup operations. See
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/16603#issuecomment-679133641.
Just to make it easier to grok what happens when test-path fails.
Change printf→log_info so that output is interleaved and not split in two
independent parts in log files.
This creates a private mount namespace for test-mountpint-util, with all
propagation from the host turned off. This gives us the guarantee that
/proc/self/mountinfo remains fixed and constant while we operate,
removing potential races against other unrelated stuff running on the
system that changes the mount table.
Prompted-by: #17050
(I doubt this actually fixes 17050, this is mostly to make sure that we
aren't possibly affected by such races in our test)
There was some confusion about what POSIX says about variable names:
names shall not contain the character '='. For values to be portable
across systems conforming to POSIX.1-2008, the value shall be composed
of characters from the portable character set (except NUL and as
indicated below).
i.e. it allows almost all ASCII in variable names (without NUL and DEL and
'='). OTOH, it says that *utilities* use a smaller set of characters:
Environment variable names used by the utilities in the Shell and
Utilities volume of POSIX.1-2008 consist solely of uppercase letters,
digits, and the <underscore> ( '_' ) from the characters defined in
Portable Character Set and do not begin with a digit.
When enforcing variable names in environment blocks, we need to use this
first definition, so that we can propagate all valid variables.
I think having non-printable characters in variable names is too much, so
I took out the whitespace stuff from the first definition.
OTOH, when we use *shell syntax*, for example doing variable expansion,
it seems enough to support expansion of variables that the shell would allow.
Fixes#14878,
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1754395,
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1879216.
Also, even if login.defs are not present, don't start allocating at 1, but at
SYSTEM_UID_MIN.
Fixes#9769.
The test is adjusted. Actually, it was busted before, because sysusers would
never use SYSTEM_GID_MIN, so if SYSTEM_GID_MIN was different than
SYSTEM_UID_MIN, the tests would fail. On all "normal" systems the two are
equal, so we didn't notice. Since sysusers now always uses the minimum of the
two, we only need to substitute one value.
We don't (and shouldn't I think) look at them when determining the type of the
user, but they should be used during user/group allocation. (For example, an
admin may specify SYS_UID_MIN==200 to allow statically numbered users that are
shared with other systems in the range 1–199.)
It makes little sense to make the boundary between systemd and user guids
configurable. Nevertheless, a completely fixed compile-time define is not
enough in two scenarios:
- the systemd_uid_max boundary has moved over time. The default used to be
500 for a long time. Systems which are upgraded over time might have users
in the wrong range, but changing existing systems is complicated and
expensive (offline disks, backups, remote systems, read-only media, etc.)
- systems are used in a heterogenous enviornment, where some vendors pick
one value and others another.
So let's make this boundary overridable using /etc/login.defs.
Fixes#3855, #10184.
Fixes#17035. We use "," as the separator between arguments in fstab and crypttab
options field, but the kernel started using "," within arguments. Users will need
to escape those nested commas.
We had a special test case that the second semicolon would be interpreted
as an executable name. We would then try to find the executable and rely
on ";" not being found to cause ENOEXEC to be returned. I think that's just
crazy. Let's treat the second semicolon as a separator and ignore the
whole thing as we would whitespace.
test-execute is quite long and even with the test name it takes a moment
to find the relevant spot when something fails. Let's make things easier
by printing the exact location.
Define explicit action "kill" for SystemCallErrorNumber=.
In addition to errno code, allow specifying "kill" as action for
SystemCallFilter=.
---
v7: seccomp_parse_errno_or_action() returns -EINVAL if !HAVE_SECCOMP
v6: use streq_ptr(), let errno_to_name() handle bad values, kill processes,
init syscall_errno
v5: actually use seccomp_errno_or_action_to_string(), don't fail bus unit
parsing without seccomp
v4: fix build without seccomp
v3: drop log action
v2: action -> number
On centos7 ci:
--- test-libcrypt-util begin ---
Found container virtualization none.
/* test_hash_password */
ew3bU1.hoKk4o: yes
$1$gc5rWpTB$wK1aul1PyBn9AX1z93stk1: no
$2b$12$BlqcGkB/7BFvNMXKGxDea.5/8D6FTny.cbNcHW/tqcrcyo6ZJd8u2: no
$5$lGhDrcrao9zb5oIK$05KlOVG3ocknx/ThreqXE/gk.XzFFBMTksc4t2CPDUD: no
$6$c7wB/3GiRk0VHf7e$zXJ7hN0aLZapE.iO4mn/oHu6.prsXTUG/5k1AxpgR85ELolyAcaIGRgzfwJs3isTChMDBjnthZyaMCfCNxo9I.: no
$y$j9T$$9cKOWsAm4m97WiYk61lPPibZpy3oaGPIbsL4koRe/XD: no
