Plain implies a ... "plain" output.
Also do not say "No jobs" with --no-legend. We skip
reporting the number of jobs with --no-legend if there
are any, and 0 is also a number, and should be skipped.
There is no reason to provide our own attach_flags_mask. We can simply
rely on kdbus.attach_flags_mask= which is read by the kernel *and* kmod.
If it's set, we assume the user wants to override our setting, so we
simply skip setting it.
The kernel module system is not namespaced, so no container should ever
modify global options. Make sure we set the kdbus attach_flags_mask only
on a real boot as PID1.
If the received NTP message from server didn't fit to our buffer, either
it is doing something nasty or we don't know the protocol. Consider the
packet as invalid.
(David: add parantheses around conditional)
While it's a lovely scenario, it's probably not really useful. Fix our
GetConnectionUnixUser() to return the actual 'euid' which we asked for,
not the possible uninitialized 'uid'.
This reverts commit 68e68ca810. We *need*
root access to create cgroups. The only exception is if it is run from
within a cgroup with "Delegate=yes". However, this is not always true and
we really shouldn't rely on this.
If your terminal runs from within a systemd --user instance, you're fine.
Everyone else is not (like running from ssh, VTs, and so on..).
If we set SD_BUS_CREDS_AUGMENT, we *need* the PID from the kernel so we
can lookup further information from /proc. However, we *must* set
SD_BUS_CREDS_PIDS in "mask", otherwise, our creds-collector will never
actually copy the pid into "sd_bus_creds". Fix this, so
SD_BUS_CREDS_AUGMENT works even if SD_BUS_CREDS_PID is not specified by
the caller.
Whenever a process performs an action on an object, the kernel uses the
EUID of the process to do permission checks and to apply on any newly
created objects. The UID of a process is only used if someone *ELSE* acts
on the process. That is, the UID of a process defines who owns the
process, the EUID defines what privileges are used by this process when
performing an action.
Process limits, on the other hand, are always applied to the real UID, not
the effective UID. This is, because a process has a user object linked,
which always corresponds to its UID. A process never has a user object
linked for its EUID. Thus, accounting (and limits) is always done on the
real UID.
This commit fixes all sd-bus users to use the EUID when performing
privilege checks and alike. Furthermore, it fixes unix-creds to be parsed
as EUID, not UID (as the kernel always takes the EUID on UDS). Anyone
using UID (eg., to do user-accounting) has to fall back to the EUID as UDS
does not transmit the UID.
Make sure we tell the kernel to fake all UIDs/GIDs. Otherwise, the remote
side has no chance of querying our effective UID (which is usually what
they're interested in).
We need to implicitly allow HELLO from users with the same uid as the bus.
Fix the bus-uid tracking to use the original uid, not the uid after
privilege-dropping.
If the caller does not run in a session/seat or has no tracked user, hide
the /org/freedesktop/login1/.../self links in introspection data.
Otherwise, "busctl tree org.freedesktop.login1" tries to query those nodes
even though it cant.
If we test the policy against multiple destination names, we really should
not print warnings if one of the names results in DENY. Instead, pass the
whole array of names to the policy and let it deal with it.
We cannot use "User=" in unit-files if we want to retain privileges. So
make bus-proxy.c explicitly drop privileges. However, only do that if
we're root, as there is no need to drop it on the user-bus.
This implements a shared policy cache with read-write locks. We no longer
parse the XML policy in each thread.
This will allow us to easily implement ReloadConfig().
Some time ago 95-keymap.rules was replaced by
60-keyboard.hwdb. Original comments for MSI laptops (that were in
95-keymap.rules) were removed, but I think they are important for
understanding what's going on.
https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=88412
Set thread-names to "p$PIDu$UID" and suffix with '*' if truncated. This
helps debugging bus-proxy issues if we want to figure out which
connections are currently open.
Instead of using Accept=true and running one proxy for each connection, we
now run one proxy-daemon with a thread per connection. This will enable us
to share resources like policies in the future.
When we call 'systemd-random-seed load' with a read-only /var/lib/systemd,
the cleanup code (which rewrites the random-seed file) will fail and exit.
Arguably, if the filesystem is read-only and the random-seed file exists
then this will be possibly be quite bad for entroy on subsequent reboots
but it should still not make the unit fail.
Move all the proxy code into a "struct Proxy" object that can be used
from multiple binaries.
We now dropped SMACK as we have to refactor it to work properly. We can
introduce it later on.
