From RFC 6762, Section 10.2
"They (the rules about when to set the cache-flush bit) apply to
startup announcements as described in Section 8.3, "Announcing",
and to responses generated as a result of receiving query messages."
So, set the cache-flush bit for mDNS answers except for DNS-SD
service enumerattion PTRs described in RFC 6763, Section 4.1.
According to p5.3 of RFC6762 (Multicast DNS) one mDNS query message
can contain more than one question sections.
Generate answers for all found questions and put them to a reply
message.
Update detect_vm_xen_dom0 to propagate errors in case reading
/proc/xen/capabilites fails. This does not fix any bugs, it just makes
it consistent with other functions called by detect_vm.
If the user modifies configuration, e.g. /etc/fstab, they might forget to tell
systemd about the changes. Let's do a reload for them.
Note that doing a reload should be safe, because emergency and rescue modes are
"single threaded" and nothing should be doing changes at the point where we are
exiting from the sushell. Also, daemon-reload can be implicitly called at
various moments, so we can ignore the case where the user did some incompatible
changes on disk and is counting on systemd never reloading and picking them up.
C.f. #7565.
This is actually slightly safer because it allows gcc to make sure that all code
paths either call return or are noreturn. But the real motivation is just to
follow the usual style and make it a bit shorter.
The tainting logic existed for a long time, but was hidden inside the
bus interfaces. Let's give it a small bit more coverage, by logging its
value early at boot during initialization.
When no entries matches with entry_oneshot, entry_default and
default_pattern, then log message shows a wrong entry.
Moreover, if none of entry_oneshot, entry_default and default_pattern
are set, then the index `i` is uninitialized.
This fixes such problem.
This moves the invocation a bit later, but that shoudln't matter. By
moving it we gain two things: first of all, its closer to other code
where it belongs, secondly its naturally conditioned properly, as we no
longer will rewrite the container ID file on every reexecution again,
and not in test mode either.
No real functional changes, just some rearranging to shorten the overly
long main() function a bit.
This gets rid of the arm_reboot_watchdog variable, as it can be directly
derived from shutdown_verb, and we need it only one time. By dropping it
we can reduce the number of arguments we need to pass around.
```
$ ./src/test/test-systemd-tmpfiles.py valgrind --leak-check=full --error-exitcode=1 ./build/systemd-tmpfiles
...
Running valgrind --leak-check=full --error-exitcode=1 ./build/systemd-tmpfiles on 'w /unresolved/argument - - - - "%Y"'
...
[<stdin>:1] Failed to substitute specifiers in argument: Invalid slot
...
==22602== 5 bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 1 of 2
==22602== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==22602== by 0x4ECA7D4: malloc_multiply (alloc-util.h:74)
==22602== by 0x4ECA909: specifier_printf (specifier.c:59)
==22602== by 0x113490: specifier_expansion_from_arg (tmpfiles.c:1923)
==22602== by 0x1144E7: parse_line (tmpfiles.c:2159)
==22602== by 0x11551C: read_config_file (tmpfiles.c:2425)
==22602== by 0x115AB0: main (tmpfiles.c:2529)
```
The file /proc/xen/capabilities is only available if xenfs is mounted.
With a classic xenlinux based kernel that file is available
unconditionally. But with a modern pvops based kernel, xenfs must be
mounted before the "capabilities" may appear. xenfs is mounted very late
via .services files provided by the Xen toolstack. Other units may be
scheduled before xenfs is mounted, which will confuse the detection of
VIRTUALIZATION_XEN.
In all Xen enabled kernels, and if that kernel is actually running on
the Xen hypervisor, the "/proc/xen" directory is the reliable indicator
that this instance runs in a "Xen guest".
Adjust the code to check for /proc/xen instead of
/proc/xen/capabilities.
Fixes commit 3f61278b5 ("basic: Bugfix Detect XEN Dom0 as no virtualization")
Setting the secure_boot flag, avoids getting the printout
"EFI stub: UEFI Secure Boot is enabled." when booting
a Linux kernel with linuxx64.efi.stub and EFI SecureBoot enabled.
This is mainly a cosmetic fixup, as the "quiet" kernel parameter does
not silence pr_efi printouts in the linux kernel (this only works using
the efi stub from the linux source tree)
We currently look for "nobody" and "nfsnobody" when testing groups, both
of which do not exist on Ubuntu, our main testing environment. Let's
extend the tests slightly to also use "nogroup" if it exists.
The "nobody" user might possibly be seen by the journal or coredumping
code if unmapped userns-using processes are somehow visible to them.
Let's make sure we don't do the ACL magic for this user either, since
this is a special system user that might be backed by different real
users in different contexts.
We already synthesize records for both "root" and "nobody" in
nss-systemd. Let's do the same in our own NSS wrappers that are supposed
to bypass NSS if possible. Previously this was done for "root" only, but
let's clean this up, and do the same for "nobody" too, so that we
synthesize records the same way everywhere, regardless whether in NSS or
internally.
Instead of contacting PID 1 for dynamic UID/GID lookups for all
UIDs/GIDs that do not qualify as "system" do the more precise check
instead: check if they actually qualify for the "dynamic" range.
