If the format string contains %m, clearly errno must have a meaningful
value, so we might as well use log_*_errno to have ERRNO= logged.
Using:
find . -name '*.[ch]' | xargs sed -r -i -e \
's/log_(debug|info|notice|warning|error|emergency)\((".*%m.*")/log_\1_errno(errno, \2/'
Plus some whitespace, linewrap, and indent adjustments.
Turns out we can just do kmod_setup() earlier, before we do mount_setup(),
so there's no need for mount_setup_late() anymore. Instead, put kdbusfs in
mount_table[].
kdbus has seen a larger update than expected lately, most notably with
kdbusfs, a file system to expose the kdbus control files:
* Each time a file system of this type is mounted, a new kdbus
domain is created.
* The layout inside each mount point is the same as before, except
that domains are not hierarchically nested anymore.
* Domains are therefore also unnamed now.
* Unmounting a kdbusfs will automatically also detroy the
associated domain.
* Hence, the action of creating a kdbus domain is now as
privileged as mounting a filesystem.
* This way, we can get around creating dev nodes for everything,
which is last but not least something that is not limited by
20-bit minor numbers.
The kdbus specific bits in nspawn have all been dropped now, as nspawn
can rely on the container OS to set up its own kdbus domain, simply by
mounting a new instance.
A new set of mounts has been added to mount things *after* the kernel
modules have been loaded. For now, only kdbus is in this set, which is
invoked with mount_setup_late().
This is also the only place where FTW_ACTIONRETVAL is used, so
this makes systemd compile without SELinux or SMACK support
when the standard library doesn't support this extension.
It is redundant to store 'hash' and 'compare' function pointers in
struct Hashmap separately. The functions always comprise a pair.
Store a single pointer to struct hash_ops instead.
systemd keeps hundreds of hashmaps, so this saves a little bit of
memory.
Given that glibc searches for /dev/shm by just looking for any tmpfs we
should be more careful with providing tmpfs instances arbitrary code
might end up writing to.
Similar to PrivateNetwork=, PrivateTmp= introduce PrivateDevices= that
sets up a private /dev with only the API pseudo-devices like /dev/null,
/dev/zero, /dev/random, but not any physical devices in them.
Since on most systems with xattr systemd will compile with Smack
support enabled, we still attempt to mount various fs's with
Smack-only options.
Before mounting any of these Smack-related filesystems with
Smack specific mount options, check if Smack is functionally
active on the running kernel.
If Smack is really enabled in the kernel, all these Smack mounts
are now *fatal*, as they should be.
We no longer mount smackfs if systemd was compiled without
Smack support. This makes it easier to make smackfs mount
failures a critical error when Smack is enabled.
We no longer mount these filesystems with their Smack specific
options inside containers. There these filesystems will be
mounted with there non-mount smack options for now.
Once systemd itself is running in a security domain for SMACK,
it will fail to start countless tasks due to missing privileges
for mounted and created directory structures. For /run and shm
specifically, we grant all tasks access.
These 2 mounts are allowed to fail, which will happen if the
system is not running a SMACK enabled kernel or security=none is
passed to the kernel.
xattrs on cgroup fs were added back in v3.6-rc3-3-g03b1cde. But we
support kernels >= 2.6.39, and we should also support kernels compiled
w/o xattr support, even if systemd is compiled with xattr support.
Fall back to mounting without xattr support.
Tested-by: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
All attributes are stored as text, since root_directory is already
text, and it seems easier to have all of them in text format.
Attributes are written in the trusted. namespace, because the kernel
currently does not allow user. attributes on cgroups. This is a PITA,
and CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to *read* the attributes. Alas.
A second pipe is opened for the child to signal the parent that the
cgroup hierarchy has been set up.
Instead of outputting "5h 55s 50ms 3us" we'll now output "5h
55.050003s". Also, while outputting the accuracy is configurable.
Basically we now try use "dot notation" for all time values > 1min. For
>= 1s we use 's' as unit, otherwise for >= 1ms we use 'ms' as unit, and
finally 'us'.
This should give reasonably values in most cases.
All Execs within the service, will get mounted the same
/tmp and /var/tmp directories, if service is configured with
PrivateTmp=yes. Temporary directories are cleaned up by service
itself in addition to systemd-tmpfiles. Directory which is mounted
as inaccessible is created at runtime in /run/systemd.
Previously we were testing whether /sys/fs/cgroup/systemd/ was a mount
point. This might be problematic however, when the cgroup trees are bind
mounted into a container from the host (which should be absolutely
valid), which might create the impression that the container was running
systemd, but only the host actually is.
Replace this by a check for the existance of the directory
/run/systemd/system/, which should work unconditionally, since /run can
never be a bind mount but *must* be a tmpfs on systemd systems, which is
flushed at boots. This means that data in /run always reflects
information about the current boot, and only of the local container,
which makes it the perfect choice for a check like this.
(As side effect this is nice to Ubuntu people who now use logind with
the systemd cgroup hierarchy, where the old sd_booted() check misdetects
systemd, even though they still run legacy Upstart.)
SMACK is the Simple Mandatory Access Control Kernel, a minimal
approach to Access Control implemented as a kernel LSM.
The kernel exposes the smackfs filesystem API through which access
rules can be loaded. At boot time, we want to load the access rules
as early as possible to ensure all early boot steps are checked by Smack.
This patch mounts smackfs at the new location at /sys/fs/smackfs for
kernels 3.8 and above. The /smack mountpoint is not supported.
After mounting smackfs, rules are loaded from the usual location.
For more information about Smack see:
http://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/security/Smack.txt
Add efivarfs to the mount_table in mount-setup.c, so the EFI variable
filesystem will be mounted when systemd executed.
The EFI variable filesystem will merge in v3.7 or v3.8 linux kernel.
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Mantas Mikulėnas <grawity@gmail.com>
Cc: Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Cc: Jeremy Kerr <jeremy.kerr@canonical.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
In order to make containers work nicely out of the box it is highly
desirable to have the mount propagation mode for the root fs is set as
"shared" by default so that containers receive system mounts by default.
(See mount --make-shared for more information).
As it is unlikely that the kernel will change the default to "shared"
for this, do this early at boot-up from PID 1. Setups which prefer the
default of "private" should undo this change via invoking "mount
--make-private /" or a similar command after boot.
In the long run /etc/fstab should take the propagation mode as a mount
option like any other, so that this may be used to change the default
mode. However, if fstab is not around or doesn't list / we still should
default to shared as propagation mode, hence this change now.
Adds messages for formally silent errors: new "Failed on cmdline argument %s: %s".
Removes some specific error messages for -ENOMEM in mount-setup.c. A few specific
ones have been left in other binaries.
