Quoting the manual page of stime(2): "Starting with glibc 2.31, this function
is no longer available to newly linked applications and is no longer declared
in <time.h>."
If we encounter an RR that has no matching signature, then we don't know
whether it was expanded from a wildcard or not. We need to accept that
and not make the NSEC test fail, just skip over the RR.
The three answer sections can only carry up to UINT16_MAX entries, hence
put a hard upper limit on how far DnsAnswer can grow. The three count
fields in the DNS packet header are 16 bit only, hence the limit.
If code actually tries to add more than 64K RRs it will get ENOSPC with
this new checking.
And similar to DnsQuestion.
The current overflow checking is broken in the corner case of the strings'
combined length being exactly SIZE_MAX: After the loop, l would be SIZE_MAX,
but we're not testing whether the l+1 expression overflows.
Fix it by simply pre-accounting for the final '\0': initialize l to 1 instead
of 0.
The loops over (x, then all varargs, until a NULL is found) can be written much
simpler with an ordinary for loop. Just initialize the loop variable to x, test
that, and in the increment part, fetch the next va_arg(). That removes a level
of indentation, and avoids doing a separate strlen()/stpcpy() call for x.
While touching this code anyway, change (size_t)-1 to the more readable
SIZE_MAX.
This beefs up the READ_FULL_FILE_CONNECT_SOCKET logic of
read_full_file_full() a bit: when used a sender socket name may be
specified. If specified as NULL behaviour is as before: the client
socket name is picked by the kernel. But if specified as non-NULL the
client can pick a socket name to use when connecting. This is useful to
communicate a minimal amount of metainformation from client to server,
outside of the transport payload.
Specifically, these beefs up the service credential logic to pass an
abstract AF_UNIX socket name as client socket name when connecting via
READ_FULL_FILE_CONNECT_SOCKET, that includes the requesting unit name
and the eventual credential name. This allows servers implementing the
trivial credential socket logic to distinguish clients: via a simple
getpeername() it can be determined which unit is requesting a
credential, and which credential specifically.
Example: with this patch in place, in a unit file "waldo.service" a
configuration line like the following:
LoadCredential=foo:/run/quux/creds.sock
will result in a connection to the AF_UNIX socket /run/quux/creds.sock,
originating from an abstract namespace AF_UNIX socket:
@$RANDOM/unit/waldo.service/foo
(The $RANDOM is replaced by some randomized string. This is included in
the socket name order to avoid namespace squatting issues: the abstract
socket namespace is open to unprivileged users after all, and care needs
to be taken not to use guessable names)
The services listening on the /run/quux/creds.sock socket may thus
easily retrieve the name of the unit the credential is requested for
plus the credential name, via a simpler getpeername(), discarding the
random preifx and the /unit/ string.
This logic uses "/" as separator between the fields, since both unit
names and credential names appear in the file system, and thus are
designed to use "/" as outer separators. Given that it's a good safe
choice to use as separators here, too avoid any conflicts.
This is a minimal patch only: the new logic is used only for the unit
file credential logic. For other places where we use
READ_FULL_FILE_CONNECT_SOCKET it is probably a good idea to use this
scheme too, but this should be done carefully in later patches, since
the socket names become API that way, and we should determine the right
amount of info to pass over.
When selinux is enabled, the call of
manager_rtnl_enumerate_nexthop() fails.
This fix is to facilitate selinux hook handling for enumerating
nexthop.
In manager_rtnl_enumerate_nexthop() there is a check
if "Not supported" is returned by the send_netlink() call.
This check expects that -EOPNOTSUPP is returned,
the selinux hook seems to return -EINVAL instead.
This happens in kernel older than 5.3
(more specificallytorvalds/linux@65ee00a) as it does not support
nexthop handling through netlink.
And if SELinux is enforced in the order kernel, callingRTM_GETNEXTHOP
returns -EINVAL.
Thus adding a call in the manager_rtnl_enumerate_nexthop for the
extra return -EINVAL.
* Existing valid rule files written with KEY="value" are not affected
* Now, KEY=e"value\n" becomes valid. Where `\n` is a newline character
* Escape sequences supported by src/basic/escape.h:cunescape() is
supported
With these patches applied, networkd is successfully able to get an
address from a DHCP server on an IPoIB interface.
1)
Makes networkd pass the actual interface type to the dhcp client,
instead of hardcoding it to Ethernet.
2)
Fixes some issues in handling the larger (20 Byte) IB MAC addresses in
the dhcp code.
3)
Add a new field to networkds Link struct, which holds the interface
broadcast address.
3.1)
Modify the DHCP code to also expect the broadcast address as parameter.
On an Ethernet-Interface the Broadcast address never changes and is always
all 6 bytes set to 0xFF.
On an IB one however it is not neccesarily always the same, thus
fetching the actual address from the interface is neccesary.
4)
Only the last 8 bytes of an IB MAC are stable, so when using an IB MAC to
generate a client ID, only pass those 8 bytes.
This passes the legacy ethernet address to functions in a lot of places,
which all will need migrated to handle arbitrary size hardware addresses
eventually.
Hardware addresses come in various shapes and sizes, these new functions
and accomapying data structures account for that instead of hard-coding
a hardware address to the 6 bytes of an ethernet MAC.
Yu Watanabe