/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "af-list.h" #include "alloc-util.h" #include "env-util.h" #include "errno-list.h" #include "macro.h" #include "nsflags.h" #include "nulstr-util.h" #include "process-util.h" #include "seccomp-util.h" #include "set.h" #include "string-util.h" #include "strv.h" /* This array will be modified at runtime as seccomp_restrict_archs is called. */ uint32_t seccomp_local_archs[] = { /* Note: always list the native arch we are compiled as last, so that users can deny-list seccomp(), but our own calls to it still succeed */ #if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) SCMP_ARCH_X86, SCMP_ARCH_X86_64, SCMP_ARCH_X32, /* native */ #elif defined(__x86_64__) && !defined(__ILP32__) SCMP_ARCH_X86, SCMP_ARCH_X32, SCMP_ARCH_X86_64, /* native */ #elif defined(__i386__) SCMP_ARCH_X86, #elif defined(__aarch64__) SCMP_ARCH_ARM, SCMP_ARCH_AARCH64, /* native */ #elif defined(__arm__) SCMP_ARCH_ARM, #elif defined(__mips__) && __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN && _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI32 SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL, SCMP_ARCH_MIPS, /* native */ #elif defined(__mips__) && __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN && _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI32 SCMP_ARCH_MIPS, SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL, /* native */ #elif defined(__mips__) && __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN && _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI64 SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL, SCMP_ARCH_MIPS, SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32, SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64N32, SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64, SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64, /* native */ #elif defined(__mips__) && __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN && _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI64 SCMP_ARCH_MIPS, SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL, SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64N32, SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32, SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64, SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64, /* native */ #elif defined(__mips__) && __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN && _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_NABI32 SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL, SCMP_ARCH_MIPS, SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64, SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64, SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32, SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64N32, /* native */ #elif defined(__mips__) && __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN && _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_NABI32 SCMP_ARCH_MIPS, SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL, SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64, SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64, SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64N32, SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32, /* native */ #elif defined(__powerpc64__) && __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN SCMP_ARCH_PPC, SCMP_ARCH_PPC64LE, SCMP_ARCH_PPC64, /* native */ #elif defined(__powerpc64__) && __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN SCMP_ARCH_PPC, SCMP_ARCH_PPC64, SCMP_ARCH_PPC64LE, /* native */ #elif defined(__powerpc__) SCMP_ARCH_PPC, #elif defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 64 && defined(SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64) SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64, #elif defined(__s390x__) SCMP_ARCH_S390, SCMP_ARCH_S390X, /* native */ #elif defined(__s390__) SCMP_ARCH_S390, #endif SECCOMP_LOCAL_ARCH_END }; const char* seccomp_arch_to_string(uint32_t c) { /* Maintain order used in . * * Names used here should be the same as those used for ConditionArchitecture=, * except for "subarchitectures" like x32. */ switch(c) { case SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE: return "native"; case SCMP_ARCH_X86: return "x86"; case SCMP_ARCH_X86_64: return "x86-64"; case SCMP_ARCH_X32: return "x32"; case SCMP_ARCH_ARM: return "arm"; case SCMP_ARCH_AARCH64: return "arm64"; case SCMP_ARCH_MIPS: return "mips"; case SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64: return "mips64"; case SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64N32: return "mips64-n32"; case SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL: return "mips-le"; case SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64: return "mips64-le"; case SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32: return "mips64-le-n32"; case SCMP_ARCH_PPC: return "ppc"; case SCMP_ARCH_PPC64: return "ppc64"; case SCMP_ARCH_PPC64LE: return "ppc64-le"; #ifdef SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64 case SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64: return "riscv64"; #endif case SCMP_ARCH_S390: return "s390"; case SCMP_ARCH_S390X: return "s390x"; default: return NULL; } } int seccomp_arch_from_string(const char *n, uint32_t *ret) { if (!n) return -EINVAL; assert(ret); if (streq(n, "native")) *ret = SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE; else if (streq(n, "x86")) *ret = SCMP_ARCH_X86; else if (streq(n, "x86-64")) *ret = SCMP_ARCH_X86_64; else if (streq(n, "x32")) *ret = SCMP_ARCH_X32; else if (streq(n, "arm")) *ret = SCMP_ARCH_ARM; else if (streq(n, "arm64")) *ret = SCMP_ARCH_AARCH64; else if (streq(n, "mips")) *ret = SCMP_ARCH_MIPS; else if (streq(n, "mips64")) *ret = SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64; else if (streq(n, "mips64-n32")) *ret = SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64N32; else if (streq(n, "mips-le")) *ret = SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL; else if (streq(n, "mips64-le")) *ret = SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64; else if (streq(n, "mips64-le-n32")) *ret = SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32; else if (streq(n, "ppc")) *ret = SCMP_ARCH_PPC; else if (streq(n, "ppc64")) *ret = SCMP_ARCH_PPC64; else if (streq(n, "ppc64-le")) *ret = SCMP_ARCH_PPC64LE; #ifdef SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64 else if (streq(n, "riscv64")) *ret = SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64; #endif else if (streq(n, "s390")) *ret = SCMP_ARCH_S390; else if (streq(n, "s390x")) *ret = SCMP_ARCH_S390X; else return -EINVAL; return 0; } int seccomp_init_for_arch(scmp_filter_ctx *ret, uint32_t arch, uint32_t default_action) { _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; int r; /* Much like seccomp_init(), but initializes the filter for one specific architecture only, without affecting * any others. Also, turns off the NNP fiddling. */ seccomp = seccomp_init(default_action); if (!seccomp) return -ENOMEM; if (arch != SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE && arch != seccomp_arch_native()) { r = seccomp_arch_remove(seccomp, seccomp_arch_native()); if (r < 0) return r; r = seccomp_arch_add(seccomp, arch); if (r < 0) return r; assert(seccomp_arch_exist(seccomp, arch) >= 0); assert(seccomp_arch_exist(seccomp, SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE) == -EEXIST); assert(seccomp_arch_exist(seccomp, seccomp_arch_native()) == -EEXIST); } else { assert(seccomp_arch_exist(seccomp, SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE) >= 0); assert(seccomp_arch_exist(seccomp, seccomp_arch_native()) >= 0); } r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_ACT_BADARCH, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); if (r < 0) return r; r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0); if (r < 0) return r; #if SCMP_VER_MAJOR >= 3 || (SCMP_VER_MAJOR == 2 && SCMP_VER_MINOR >= 4) if (getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_LOG_SECCOMP") > 0) { r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_LOG, 1); if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to enable seccomp event logging: %m"); } #endif *ret = TAKE_PTR(seccomp); return 0; } static bool is_basic_seccomp_available(void) { return prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, 0, 0, 0, 0) >= 0; } static bool is_seccomp_filter_available(void) { return prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, 0, 0) < 0 && errno == EFAULT; } bool is_seccomp_available(void) { static int cached_enabled = -1; if (cached_enabled < 0) { int b; b = getenv_bool_secure("SYSTEMD_SECCOMP"); if (b != 0) { if (b < 0 && b != -ENXIO) /* ENXIO: env var unset */ log_debug_errno(b, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_SECCOMP value, ignoring."); cached_enabled = is_basic_seccomp_available() && is_seccomp_filter_available(); } else cached_enabled = false; } return cached_enabled; } const SyscallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[_SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX] = { [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT] = { .name = "@default", .help = "System calls that are always permitted", .value = "brk\0" "cacheflush\0" "clock_getres\0" "clock_getres_time64\0" "clock_gettime\0" "clock_gettime64\0" "clock_nanosleep\0" "clock_nanosleep_time64\0" "execve\0" "exit\0" "exit_group\0" "futex\0" "futex_time64\0" "get_robust_list\0" "get_thread_area\0" "getegid\0" "getegid32\0" "geteuid\0" "geteuid32\0" "getgid\0" "getgid32\0" "getgroups\0" "getgroups32\0" "getpgid\0" "getpgrp\0" "getpid\0" "getppid\0" "getresgid\0" "getresgid32\0" "getresuid\0" "getresuid32\0" "getrlimit\0" /* make sure processes can query stack size and such */ "getsid\0" "gettid\0" "gettimeofday\0" "getuid\0" "getuid32\0" "membarrier\0" "mmap\0" "mmap2\0" "munmap\0" "nanosleep\0" "pause\0" "prlimit64\0" "restart_syscall\0" "rseq\0" "rt_sigreturn\0" "sched_yield\0" "set_robust_list\0" "set_thread_area\0" "set_tid_address\0" "set_tls\0" "sigreturn\0" "time\0" "ugetrlimit\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_AIO] = { .name = "@aio", .help = "Asynchronous IO", .value = "io_cancel\0" "io_destroy\0" "io_getevents\0" "io_pgetevents\0" "io_pgetevents_time64\0" "io_setup\0" "io_submit\0" "io_uring_enter\0" "io_uring_register\0" "io_uring_setup\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_BASIC_IO] = { .name = "@basic-io", .help = "Basic IO", .value = "_llseek\0" "close\0" "close_range\0" "dup\0" "dup2\0" "dup3\0" "lseek\0" "pread64\0" "preadv\0" "preadv2\0" "pwrite64\0" "pwritev\0" "pwritev2\0" "read\0" "readv\0" "write\0" "writev\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CHOWN] = { .name = "@chown", .help = "Change ownership of files and directories", .value = "chown\0" "chown32\0" "fchown\0" "fchown32\0" "fchownat\0" "lchown\0" "lchown32\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CLOCK] = { .name = "@clock", .help = "Change the system time", .value = "adjtimex\0" "clock_adjtime\0" "clock_adjtime64\0" "clock_settime\0" "clock_settime64\0" "settimeofday\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CPU_EMULATION] = { .name = "@cpu-emulation", .help = "System calls for CPU emulation functionality", .value = "modify_ldt\0" "subpage_prot\0" "switch_endian\0" "vm86\0" "vm86old\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEBUG] = { .name = "@debug", .help = "Debugging, performance monitoring and tracing functionality", .value = "lookup_dcookie\0" "perf_event_open\0" "pidfd_getfd\0" "ptrace\0" "rtas\0" #if defined __s390__ || defined __s390x__ "s390_runtime_instr\0" #endif "sys_debug_setcontext\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_FILE_SYSTEM] = { .name = "@file-system", .help = "File system operations", .value = "access\0" "chdir\0" "chmod\0" "close\0" "creat\0" "faccessat\0" "faccessat2\0" "fallocate\0" "fchdir\0" "fchmod\0" "fchmodat\0" "fcntl\0" "fcntl64\0" "fgetxattr\0" "flistxattr\0" "fremovexattr\0" "fsetxattr\0" "fstat\0" "fstat64\0" "fstatat64\0" "fstatfs\0" "fstatfs64\0" "ftruncate\0" "ftruncate64\0" "futimesat\0" "getcwd\0" "getdents\0" "getdents64\0" "getxattr\0" "inotify_add_watch\0" "inotify_init\0" "inotify_init1\0" "inotify_rm_watch\0" "lgetxattr\0" "link\0" "linkat\0" "listxattr\0" "llistxattr\0" "lremovexattr\0" "lsetxattr\0" "lstat\0" "lstat64\0" "mkdir\0" "mkdirat\0" "mknod\0" "mknodat\0" "newfstatat\0" "oldfstat\0" "oldlstat\0" "oldstat\0" "open\0" "openat\0" "openat2\0" "readlink\0" "readlinkat\0" "removexattr\0" "rename\0" "renameat\0" "renameat2\0" "rmdir\0" "setxattr\0" "stat\0" "stat64\0" "statfs\0" "statfs64\0" "statx\0" "symlink\0" "symlinkat\0" "truncate\0" "truncate64\0" "unlink\0" "unlinkat\0" "utime\0" "utimensat\0" "utimensat_time64\0" "utimes\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_IO_EVENT] = { .name = "@io-event", .help = "Event loop system calls", .value = "_newselect\0" "epoll_create\0" "epoll_create1\0" "epoll_ctl\0" "epoll_ctl_old\0" "epoll_pwait\0" "epoll_wait\0" "epoll_wait_old\0" "eventfd\0" "eventfd2\0" "poll\0" "ppoll\0" "ppoll_time64\0" "pselect6\0" "pselect6_time64\0" "select\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_IPC] = { .name = "@ipc", .help = "SysV IPC, POSIX Message Queues or other IPC", .value = "ipc\0" "memfd_create\0" "mq_getsetattr\0" "mq_notify\0" "mq_open\0" "mq_timedreceive\0" "mq_timedreceive_time64\0" "mq_timedsend\0" "mq_timedsend_time64\0" "mq_unlink\0" "msgctl\0" "msgget\0" "msgrcv\0" "msgsnd\0" "pipe\0" "pipe2\0" "process_vm_readv\0" "process_vm_writev\0" "semctl\0" "semget\0" "semop\0" "semtimedop\0" "semtimedop_time64\0" "shmat\0" "shmctl\0" "shmdt\0" "shmget\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_KEYRING] = { .name = "@keyring", .help = "Kernel keyring access", .value = "add_key\0" "keyctl\0" "request_key\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MEMLOCK] = { .name = "@memlock", .help = "Memory locking control", .value = "mlock\0" "mlock2\0" "mlockall\0" "munlock\0" "munlockall\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE] = { .name = "@module", .help = "Loading and unloading of kernel modules", .value = "delete_module\0" "finit_module\0" "init_module\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MOUNT] = { .name = "@mount", .help = "Mounting and unmounting of file systems", .value = "chroot\0" "fsconfig\0" "fsmount\0" "fsopen\0" "fspick\0" "mount\0" "move_mount\0" "open_tree\0" "pivot_root\0" "umount\0" "umount2\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_NETWORK_IO] = { .name = "@network-io", .help = "Network or Unix socket IO, should not be needed if not network facing", .value = "accept\0" "accept4\0" "bind\0" "connect\0" "getpeername\0" "getsockname\0" "getsockopt\0" "listen\0" "recv\0" "recvfrom\0" "recvmmsg\0" "recvmmsg_time64\0" "recvmsg\0" "send\0" "sendmmsg\0" "sendmsg\0" "sendto\0" "setsockopt\0" "shutdown\0" "socket\0" "socketcall\0" "socketpair\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_OBSOLETE] = { /* some unknown even to libseccomp */ .name = "@obsolete", .help = "Unusual, obsolete or unimplemented system calls", .value = "_sysctl\0" "afs_syscall\0" "bdflush\0" "break\0" "create_module\0" "ftime\0" "get_kernel_syms\0" "getpmsg\0" "gtty\0" "idle\0" "lock\0" "mpx\0" "prof\0" "profil\0" "putpmsg\0" "query_module\0" "security\0" "sgetmask\0" "ssetmask\0" "stime\0" "stty\0" "sysfs\0" "tuxcall\0" "ulimit\0" "uselib\0" "ustat\0" "vserver\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_PKEY] = { .name = "@pkey", .help = "System calls used for memory protection keys", .value = "pkey_alloc\0" "pkey_free\0" "pkey_mprotect\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_PRIVILEGED] = { .name = "@privileged", .help = "All system calls which need super-user capabilities", .value = "@chown\0" "@clock\0" "@module\0" "@raw-io\0" "@reboot\0" "@swap\0" "_sysctl\0" "acct\0" "bpf\0" "capset\0" "chroot\0" "fanotify_init\0" "fanotify_mark\0" "nfsservctl\0" "open_by_handle_at\0" "pivot_root\0" "quotactl\0" "setdomainname\0" "setfsuid\0" "setfsuid32\0" "setgroups\0" "setgroups32\0" "sethostname\0" "setresuid\0" "setresuid32\0" "setreuid\0" "setreuid32\0" "setuid\0" /* We list the explicit system calls here, as @setuid also includes setgid() which is not necessarily privileged */ "setuid32\0" "vhangup\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_PROCESS] = { .name = "@process", .help = "Process control, execution, namespacing operations", .value = "arch_prctl\0" "capget\0" /* Able to query arbitrary processes */ "clone\0" "clone3\0" "execveat\0" "fork\0" "getrusage\0" "kill\0" "pidfd_open\0" "pidfd_send_signal\0" "prctl\0" "rt_sigqueueinfo\0" "rt_tgsigqueueinfo\0" "setns\0" "swapcontext\0" /* Some archs e.g. powerpc32 are using it to do userspace context switches */ "tgkill\0" "times\0" "tkill\0" "unshare\0" "vfork\0" "wait4\0" "waitid\0" "waitpid\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO] = { .name = "@raw-io", .help = "Raw I/O port access", .value = "ioperm\0" "iopl\0" "pciconfig_iobase\0" "pciconfig_read\0" "pciconfig_write\0" #if defined __s390__ || defined __s390x__ "s390_pci_mmio_read\0" "s390_pci_mmio_write\0" #endif }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_REBOOT] = { .name = "@reboot", .help = "Reboot and reboot preparation/kexec", .value = "kexec_file_load\0" "kexec_load\0" "reboot\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RESOURCES] = { .name = "@resources", .help = "Alter resource settings", .value = "ioprio_set\0" "mbind\0" "migrate_pages\0" "move_pages\0" "nice\0" "sched_setaffinity\0" "sched_setattr\0" "sched_setparam\0" "sched_setscheduler\0" "set_mempolicy\0" "setpriority\0" "setrlimit\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SETUID] = { .name = "@setuid", .help = "Operations for changing user/group credentials", .value = "setgid\0" "setgid32\0" "setgroups\0" "setgroups32\0" "setregid\0" "setregid32\0" "setresgid\0" "setresgid32\0" "setresuid\0" "setresuid32\0" "setreuid\0" "setreuid32\0" "setuid\0" "setuid32\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SIGNAL] = { .name = "@signal", .help = "Process signal handling", .value = "rt_sigaction\0" "rt_sigpending\0" "rt_sigprocmask\0" "rt_sigsuspend\0" "rt_sigtimedwait\0" "rt_sigtimedwait_time64\0" "sigaction\0" "sigaltstack\0" "signal\0" "signalfd\0" "signalfd4\0" "sigpending\0" "sigprocmask\0" "sigsuspend\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SWAP] = { .name = "@swap", .help = "Enable/disable swap devices", .value = "swapoff\0" "swapon\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SYNC] = { .name = "@sync", .help = "Synchronize files and memory to storage", .value = "fdatasync\0" "fsync\0" "msync\0" "sync\0" "sync_file_range\0" "sync_file_range2\0" "syncfs\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SYSTEM_SERVICE] = { .name = "@system-service", .help = "General system service operations", .value = "@aio\0" "@basic-io\0" "@chown\0" "@default\0" "@file-system\0" "@io-event\0" "@ipc\0" "@keyring\0" "@memlock\0" "@network-io\0" "@process\0" "@resources\0" "@setuid\0" "@signal\0" "@sync\0" "@timer\0" "capget\0" "capset\0" "copy_file_range\0" "fadvise64\0" "fadvise64_64\0" "flock\0" "get_mempolicy\0" "getcpu\0" "getpriority\0" "getrandom\0" "ioctl\0" "ioprio_get\0" "kcmp\0" "madvise\0" "mprotect\0" "mremap\0" "name_to_handle_at\0" "oldolduname\0" "olduname\0" "personality\0" "readahead\0" "readdir\0" "remap_file_pages\0" "sched_get_priority_max\0" "sched_get_priority_min\0" "sched_getaffinity\0" "sched_getattr\0" "sched_getparam\0" "sched_getscheduler\0" "sched_rr_get_interval\0" "sched_rr_get_interval_time64\0" "sched_yield\0" "sendfile\0" "sendfile64\0" "setfsgid\0" "setfsgid32\0" "setfsuid\0" "setfsuid32\0" "setpgid\0" "setsid\0" "splice\0" "sysinfo\0" "tee\0" "umask\0" "uname\0" "userfaultfd\0" "vmsplice\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_TIMER] = { .name = "@timer", .help = "Schedule operations by time", .value = "alarm\0" "getitimer\0" "setitimer\0" "timer_create\0" "timer_delete\0" "timer_getoverrun\0" "timer_gettime\0" "timer_gettime64\0" "timer_settime\0" "timer_settime64\0" "timerfd_create\0" "timerfd_gettime\0" "timerfd_gettime64\0" "timerfd_settime\0" "timerfd_settime64\0" "times\0" }, [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_KNOWN] = { .name = "@known", .help = "All known syscalls declared in the kernel", .value = #include "syscall-list.h" }, }; const SyscallFilterSet *syscall_filter_set_find(const char *name) { if (isempty(name) || name[0] != '@') return NULL; for (unsigned i = 0; i < _SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX; i++) if (streq(syscall_filter_sets[i].name, name)) return syscall_filter_sets + i; return NULL; } static int add_syscall_filter_set( scmp_filter_ctx seccomp, const SyscallFilterSet *set, uint32_t action, char **exclude, bool log_missing, char ***added); int seccomp_add_syscall_filter_item( scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp, const char *name, uint32_t action, char **exclude, bool log_missing, char ***added) { assert(seccomp); assert(name); if (strv_contains(exclude, name)) return 0; /* Any syscalls that are handled are added to the *added strv. The pointer * must be either NULL or point to a valid pre-initialized possibly-empty strv. */ if (name[0] == '@') { const SyscallFilterSet *other; other = syscall_filter_set_find(name); if (!other) return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Filter set %s is not known!", name); return add_syscall_filter_set(seccomp, other, action, exclude, log_missing, added); } else { int id, r; id = seccomp_syscall_resolve_name(name); if (id == __NR_SCMP_ERROR) { if (log_missing) log_debug("System call %s is not known, ignoring.", name); return 0; } r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(seccomp, action, id, 0); if (r < 0) { /* If the system call is not known on this architecture, then that's fine, let's ignore it */ bool ignore = r == -EDOM; if (!ignore || log_missing) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add rule for system call %s() / %d%s: %m", name, id, ignore ? ", ignoring" : ""); if (!ignore) return r; } if (added) { r = strv_extend(added, name); if (r < 0) return r; } return 0; } } static int add_syscall_filter_set( scmp_filter_ctx seccomp, const SyscallFilterSet *set, uint32_t action, char **exclude, bool log_missing, char ***added) { const char *sys; int r; /* Any syscalls that are handled are added to the *added strv. It needs to be initialized. */ assert(seccomp); assert(set); NULSTR_FOREACH(sys, set->value) { r = seccomp_add_syscall_filter_item(seccomp, sys, action, exclude, log_missing, added); if (r < 0) return r; } return 0; } int seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(uint32_t default_action, const SyscallFilterSet *set, uint32_t action, bool log_missing) { uint32_t arch; int r; assert(set); /* The one-stop solution: allocate a seccomp object, add the specified filter to it, and apply it. Once for * each local arch. */ SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; log_debug("Operating on architecture: %s", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, default_action); if (r < 0) return r; r = add_syscall_filter_set(seccomp, set, action, NULL, log_missing, NULL); if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter set: %m"); r = seccomp_load(seccomp); if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) return r; if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to install filter set for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); } return 0; } int seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(uint32_t default_action, Hashmap* set, uint32_t action, bool log_missing) { uint32_t arch; int r; /* Similar to seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(), but takes a raw Set* of syscalls, instead of a * SyscallFilterSet* table. */ if (hashmap_isempty(set) && default_action == SCMP_ACT_ALLOW) return 0; SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; void *syscall_id, *val; log_debug("Operating on architecture: %s", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, default_action); if (r < 0) return r; HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(val, syscall_id, set) { uint32_t a = action; int id = PTR_TO_INT(syscall_id) - 1; int error = PTR_TO_INT(val); if (error == SECCOMP_ERROR_NUMBER_KILL) a = scmp_act_kill_process(); #ifdef SCMP_ACT_LOG else if (action == SCMP_ACT_LOG) a = SCMP_ACT_LOG; #endif else if (action != SCMP_ACT_ALLOW && error >= 0) a = SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(error); r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(seccomp, a, id, 0); if (r < 0) { /* If the system call is not known on this architecture, then that's fine, let's ignore it */ _cleanup_free_ char *n = NULL; bool ignore; n = seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE, id); ignore = r == -EDOM; if (!ignore || log_missing) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add rule for system call %s() / %d%s: %m", strna(n), id, ignore ? ", ignoring" : ""); if (!ignore) return r; } } r = seccomp_load(seccomp); if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) return r; if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to install filter set for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); } return 0; } int seccomp_parse_syscall_filter( const char *name, int errno_num, Hashmap *filter, SeccompParseFlags flags, const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line) { int r; assert(name); assert(filter); if (name[0] == '@') { const SyscallFilterSet *set; const char *i; set = syscall_filter_set_find(name); if (!set) { if (!(flags & SECCOMP_PARSE_PERMISSIVE)) return -EINVAL; log_syntax(unit, flags & SECCOMP_PARSE_LOG ? LOG_WARNING : LOG_DEBUG, filename, line, 0, "Unknown system call group, ignoring: %s", name); return 0; } NULSTR_FOREACH(i, set->value) { /* Call ourselves again, for the group to parse. Note that we downgrade logging here (i.e. take * away the SECCOMP_PARSE_LOG flag) since any issues in the group table are our own problem, * not a problem in user configuration data and we shouldn't pretend otherwise by complaining * about them. */ r = seccomp_parse_syscall_filter(i, errno_num, filter, flags &~ SECCOMP_PARSE_LOG, unit, filename, line); if (r < 0) return r; } } else { int id; id = seccomp_syscall_resolve_name(name); if (id == __NR_SCMP_ERROR) { if (!(flags & SECCOMP_PARSE_PERMISSIVE)) return -EINVAL; log_syntax(unit, flags & SECCOMP_PARSE_LOG ? LOG_WARNING : LOG_DEBUG, filename, line, 0, "Failed to parse system call, ignoring: %s", name); return 0; } /* If we previously wanted to forbid a syscall and now * we want to allow it, then remove it from the list. */ if (!(flags & SECCOMP_PARSE_INVERT) == !!(flags & SECCOMP_PARSE_ALLOW_LIST)) { r = hashmap_put(filter, INT_TO_PTR(id + 1), INT_TO_PTR(errno_num)); if (r < 0) switch (r) { case -ENOMEM: return flags & SECCOMP_PARSE_LOG ? log_oom() : -ENOMEM; case -EEXIST: assert_se(hashmap_update(filter, INT_TO_PTR(id + 1), INT_TO_PTR(errno_num)) == 0); break; default: return r; } } else (void) hashmap_remove(filter, INT_TO_PTR(id + 1)); } return 0; } int seccomp_restrict_namespaces(unsigned long retain) { uint32_t arch; int r; if (DEBUG_LOGGING) { _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL; (void) namespace_flags_to_string(retain, &s); log_debug("Restricting namespace to: %s.", strna(s)); } /* NOOP? */ if (FLAGS_SET(retain, NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL)) return 0; SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; log_debug("Operating on architecture: %s", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); if (r < 0) return r; if ((retain & NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL) == 0) /* If every single kind of namespace shall be prohibited, then let's block the whole setns() syscall * altogether. */ r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(setns), 0); else /* Otherwise, block only the invocations with the appropriate flags in the loop below, but also the * special invocation with a zero flags argument, right here. */ r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(setns), 1, SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_EQ, 0)); if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add setns() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); continue; } for (unsigned i = 0; namespace_flag_map[i].name; i++) { unsigned long f; f = namespace_flag_map[i].flag; if (FLAGS_SET(retain, f)) { log_debug("Permitting %s.", namespace_flag_map[i].name); continue; } log_debug("Blocking %s.", namespace_flag_map[i].name); r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(unshare), 1, SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, f, f)); if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add unshare() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); break; } /* On s390/s390x the first two parameters to clone are switched */ if (!IN_SET(arch, SCMP_ARCH_S390, SCMP_ARCH_S390X)) r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(clone), 1, SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, f, f)); else r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(clone), 1, SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, f, f)); if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add clone() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); break; } if ((retain & NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL) != 0) { r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(setns), 1, SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, f, f)); if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add setns() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); break; } } } if (r < 0) continue; r = seccomp_load(seccomp); if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) return r; if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to install namespace restriction rules for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); } return 0; } int seccomp_protect_sysctl(void) { uint32_t arch; int r; SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; log_debug("Operating on architecture: %s", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); if (IN_SET(arch, SCMP_ARCH_AARCH64, #ifdef SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64 SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64, #endif SCMP_ARCH_X32 )) /* No _sysctl syscall */ continue; r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); if (r < 0) return r; r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(_sysctl), 0); if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add _sysctl() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); continue; } r = seccomp_load(seccomp); if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) return r; if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to install sysctl protection rules for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); } return 0; } int seccomp_protect_syslog(void) { uint32_t arch; int r; SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); if (r < 0) return r; r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(syslog), 0); if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add syslog() rule for architecture %s, skipping %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); continue; } r = seccomp_load(seccomp); if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) return r; if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to install syslog protection rules for architecture %s, skipping %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); } return 0; } int seccomp_restrict_address_families(Set *address_families, bool allow_list) { uint32_t arch; int r; SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; bool supported; log_debug("Operating on architecture: %s", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); switch (arch) { case SCMP_ARCH_X86_64: case SCMP_ARCH_X32: case SCMP_ARCH_ARM: case SCMP_ARCH_AARCH64: case SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32: case SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64N32: case SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64: case SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64: #ifdef SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64 case SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64: #endif /* These we know we support (i.e. are the ones that do not use socketcall()) */ supported = true; break; case SCMP_ARCH_S390: case SCMP_ARCH_S390X: case SCMP_ARCH_X86: case SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL: case SCMP_ARCH_MIPS: case SCMP_ARCH_PPC: case SCMP_ARCH_PPC64: case SCMP_ARCH_PPC64LE: default: /* These we either know we don't support (i.e. are the ones that do use socketcall()), or we * don't know */ supported = false; break; } if (!supported) continue; r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); if (r < 0) return r; if (allow_list) { int first = 0, last = 0; void *afp; /* If this is an allow list, we first block the address families that are out of * range and then everything that is not in the set. First, we find the lowest and * highest address family in the set. */ SET_FOREACH(afp, address_families) { int af = PTR_TO_INT(afp); if (af <= 0 || af >= af_max()) continue; if (first == 0 || af < first) first = af; if (last == 0 || af > last) last = af; } assert((first == 0) == (last == 0)); if (first == 0) { /* No entries in the valid range, block everything */ r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EAFNOSUPPORT), SCMP_SYS(socket), 0); if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add socket() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); continue; } } else { /* Block everything below the first entry */ r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EAFNOSUPPORT), SCMP_SYS(socket), 1, SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_LT, first)); if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add socket() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); continue; } /* Block everything above the last entry */ r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EAFNOSUPPORT), SCMP_SYS(socket), 1, SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_GT, last)); if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add socket() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); continue; } /* Block everything between the first and last entry */ for (int af = 1; af < af_max(); af++) { if (set_contains(address_families, INT_TO_PTR(af))) continue; r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EAFNOSUPPORT), SCMP_SYS(socket), 1, SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ, af)); if (r < 0) break; } if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add socket() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); continue; } } } else { void *af; /* If this is a deny list, then generate one rule for each address family that are * then combined in OR checks. */ SET_FOREACH(af, address_families) { r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EAFNOSUPPORT), SCMP_SYS(socket), 1, SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ, PTR_TO_INT(af))); if (r < 0) break; } if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add socket() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); continue; } } r = seccomp_load(seccomp); if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) return r; if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to install socket family rules for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); } return 0; } int seccomp_restrict_realtime(void) { static const int permitted_policies[] = { SCHED_OTHER, SCHED_BATCH, SCHED_IDLE, }; int r, max_policy = 0; uint32_t arch; unsigned i; /* Determine the highest policy constant we want to allow */ for (i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(permitted_policies); i++) if (permitted_policies[i] > max_policy) max_policy = permitted_policies[i]; SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; int p; log_debug("Operating on architecture: %s", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); if (r < 0) return r; /* Go through all policies with lower values than that, and block them -- unless they appear in the * allow list. */ for (p = 0; p < max_policy; p++) { bool good = false; /* Check if this is in the allow list. */ for (i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(permitted_policies); i++) if (permitted_policies[i] == p) { good = true; break; } if (good) continue; /* Deny this policy */ r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(sched_setscheduler), 1, SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_EQ, p)); if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add scheduler rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); continue; } } /* Deny-list all other policies, i.e. the ones with higher values. Note that all comparisons * are unsigned here, hence no need no check for < 0 values. */ r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(sched_setscheduler), 1, SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_GT, max_policy)); if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add scheduler rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); continue; } r = seccomp_load(seccomp); if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) return r; if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to install realtime protection rules for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); } return 0; } static int add_seccomp_syscall_filter(scmp_filter_ctx seccomp, uint32_t arch, int nr, unsigned arg_cnt, const struct scmp_arg_cmp arg) { int r; r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), nr, arg_cnt, arg); if (r < 0) { _cleanup_free_ char *n = NULL; n = seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(arch, nr); log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add %s() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", strna(n), seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); } return r; } /* For known architectures, check that syscalls are indeed defined or not. */ #if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__arm__) || defined(__aarch64__) || (defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 64) assert_cc(SCMP_SYS(shmget) > 0); assert_cc(SCMP_SYS(shmat) > 0); assert_cc(SCMP_SYS(shmdt) > 0); #endif int seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute(void) { uint32_t arch; unsigned loaded = 0; SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; int filter_syscall = 0, block_syscall = 0, shmat_syscall = 0, r; log_debug("Operating on architecture: %s", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); switch (arch) { /* Note that on some architectures shmat() isn't available, and the call is multiplexed through ipc(). * We ignore that here, which means there's still a way to get writable/executable * memory, if an IPC key is mapped like this. That's a pity, but no total loss. */ case SCMP_ARCH_X86: case SCMP_ARCH_S390: filter_syscall = SCMP_SYS(mmap2); block_syscall = SCMP_SYS(mmap); /* shmat multiplexed, see above */ break; case SCMP_ARCH_PPC: case SCMP_ARCH_PPC64: case SCMP_ARCH_PPC64LE: case SCMP_ARCH_S390X: filter_syscall = SCMP_SYS(mmap); /* shmat multiplexed, see above */ break; case SCMP_ARCH_ARM: filter_syscall = SCMP_SYS(mmap2); /* arm has only mmap2 */ shmat_syscall = SCMP_SYS(shmat); break; case SCMP_ARCH_X86_64: case SCMP_ARCH_X32: case SCMP_ARCH_AARCH64: #ifdef SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64 case SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64: #endif filter_syscall = SCMP_SYS(mmap); /* amd64, x32, arm64 and riscv64 have only mmap */ shmat_syscall = SCMP_SYS(shmat); break; /* Please add more definitions here, if you port systemd to other architectures! */ #if !defined(__i386__) && !defined(__x86_64__) && !defined(__powerpc__) && !defined(__powerpc64__) && !defined(__arm__) && !defined(__aarch64__) && !defined(__s390__) && !defined(__s390x__) && !(defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 64) #warning "Consider adding the right mmap() syscall definitions here!" #endif } /* Can't filter mmap() on this arch, then skip it */ if (filter_syscall == 0) continue; r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); if (r < 0) return r; r = add_seccomp_syscall_filter(seccomp, arch, filter_syscall, 1, SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, PROT_EXEC|PROT_WRITE, PROT_EXEC|PROT_WRITE)); if (r < 0) continue; if (block_syscall != 0) { r = add_seccomp_syscall_filter(seccomp, arch, block_syscall, 0, (const struct scmp_arg_cmp){} ); if (r < 0) continue; } r = add_seccomp_syscall_filter(seccomp, arch, SCMP_SYS(mprotect), 1, SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, PROT_EXEC, PROT_EXEC)); if (r < 0) continue; #ifdef __NR_pkey_mprotect r = add_seccomp_syscall_filter(seccomp, arch, SCMP_SYS(pkey_mprotect), 1, SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, PROT_EXEC, PROT_EXEC)); if (r < 0) continue; #endif if (shmat_syscall > 0) { r = add_seccomp_syscall_filter(seccomp, arch, shmat_syscall, 1, SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, SHM_EXEC, SHM_EXEC)); if (r < 0) continue; } r = seccomp_load(seccomp); if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) return r; if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to install MemoryDenyWriteExecute= rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); loaded++; } if (loaded == 0) log_debug("Failed to install any seccomp rules for MemoryDenyWriteExecute=."); return loaded; } int seccomp_restrict_archs(Set *archs) { _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; int r; bool blocked_new = false; /* This installs a filter with no rules, but that restricts the system call architectures to the specified * list. * * There are some qualifications. However the most important use is to stop processes from bypassing * system call restrictions, in case they used a broader (multiplexing) syscall which is only available * in a non-native architecture. There are no holes in this use case, at least so far. */ /* Note libseccomp includes our "native" (current) architecture in the filter by default. * We do not remove it. For example, our callers expect to be able to call execve() afterwards * to run a program with the restrictions applied. */ seccomp = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); if (!seccomp) return -ENOMEM; for (unsigned i = 0; seccomp_local_archs[i] != SECCOMP_LOCAL_ARCH_END; ++i) { uint32_t arch = seccomp_local_archs[i]; /* That architecture might have already been blocked by a previous call to seccomp_restrict_archs. */ if (arch == SECCOMP_LOCAL_ARCH_BLOCKED) continue; bool block = !set_contains(archs, UINT32_TO_PTR(arch + 1)); /* The vdso for x32 assumes that x86-64 syscalls are available. Let's allow them, since x32 * x32 syscalls should basically match x86-64 for everything except the pointer type. * The important thing is that you can block the old 32-bit x86 syscalls. * https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=850047 */ if (block && arch == SCMP_ARCH_X86_64 && seccomp_arch_native() == SCMP_ARCH_X32) block = !set_contains(archs, UINT32_TO_PTR(SCMP_ARCH_X32 + 1)); if (block) { seccomp_local_archs[i] = SECCOMP_LOCAL_ARCH_BLOCKED; blocked_new = true; } else { r = seccomp_arch_add(seccomp, arch); if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST) return r; } } /* All architectures that will be blocked by the seccomp program were * already blocked. */ if (!blocked_new) return 0; r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0); if (r < 0) return r; r = seccomp_load(seccomp); if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) return r; if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to restrict system call architectures, skipping: %m"); return 0; } int parse_syscall_archs(char **l, Set **ret_archs) { _cleanup_set_free_ Set *archs = NULL; char **s; int r; assert(l); assert(ret_archs); STRV_FOREACH(s, l) { uint32_t a; r = seccomp_arch_from_string(*s, &a); if (r < 0) return -EINVAL; r = set_ensure_put(&archs, NULL, UINT32_TO_PTR(a + 1)); if (r < 0) return -ENOMEM; } *ret_archs = TAKE_PTR(archs); return 0; } int seccomp_filter_set_add(Hashmap *filter, bool add, const SyscallFilterSet *set) { const char *i; int r; assert(set); NULSTR_FOREACH(i, set->value) { if (i[0] == '@') { const SyscallFilterSet *more; more = syscall_filter_set_find(i); if (!more) return -ENXIO; r = seccomp_filter_set_add(filter, add, more); if (r < 0) return r; } else { int id; id = seccomp_syscall_resolve_name(i); if (id == __NR_SCMP_ERROR) { log_debug("Couldn't resolve system call, ignoring: %s", i); continue; } if (add) { r = hashmap_put(filter, INT_TO_PTR(id + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)); if (r < 0) return r; } else (void) hashmap_remove(filter, INT_TO_PTR(id + 1)); } } return 0; } int seccomp_lock_personality(unsigned long personality) { uint32_t arch; int r; if (personality >= PERSONALITY_INVALID) return -EINVAL; SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); if (r < 0) return r; r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(personality), 1, SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_NE, personality)); if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add scheduler rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); continue; } r = seccomp_load(seccomp); if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) return r; if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to enable personality lock for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); } return 0; } int seccomp_protect_hostname(void) { uint32_t arch; int r; SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); if (r < 0) return r; r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(sethostname), 0); if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add sethostname() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); continue; } r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(setdomainname), 0); if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add setdomainname() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); continue; } r = seccomp_load(seccomp); if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) return r; if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to apply hostname restrictions for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); } return 0; } static int seccomp_restrict_sxid(scmp_filter_ctx seccomp, mode_t m) { /* Checks the mode_t parameter of the following system calls: * * → chmod() + fchmod() + fchmodat() * → open() + creat() + openat() * → mkdir() + mkdirat() * → mknod() + mknodat() * * Returns error if *everything* failed, and 0 otherwise. */ int r; bool any = false; r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(chmod), 1, SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m)); if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for chmod: %m"); else any = true; r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(fchmod), 1, SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m)); if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for fchmod: %m"); else any = true; r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(fchmodat), 1, SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m)); if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for fchmodat: %m"); else any = true; r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(mkdir), 1, SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m)); if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for mkdir: %m"); else any = true; r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(mkdirat), 1, SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m)); if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for mkdirat: %m"); else any = true; r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(mknod), 1, SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m)); if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for mknod: %m"); else any = true; r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(mknodat), 1, SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m)); if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for mknodat: %m"); else any = true; #if SCMP_SYS(open) > 0 r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(open), 2, SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_CREAT, O_CREAT), SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m)); if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for open: %m"); else any = true; #endif r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(openat), 2, SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_CREAT, O_CREAT), SCMP_A3(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m)); if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for openat: %m"); else any = true; #if defined(__SNR_openat2) /* The new openat2() system call can't be filtered sensibly, since it moves the flags parameter into * an indirect structure. Let's block it entirely for now. That should be a reasonably OK thing to do * for now, since openat2() is very new and code generally needs fallback logic anyway to be * compatible with kernels that are not absolutely recent. */ r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(openat2), 0); if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for openat2: %m"); else any = true; #endif r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(creat), 1, SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m)); if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for creat: %m"); else any = true; return any ? 0 : r; } int seccomp_restrict_suid_sgid(void) { uint32_t arch; int r, k; SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); if (r < 0) return r; r = seccomp_restrict_sxid(seccomp, S_ISUID); if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add suid rule for architecture %s, ignoring: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); k = seccomp_restrict_sxid(seccomp, S_ISGID); if (k < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add sgid rule for architecture %s, ignoring: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); if (r < 0 && k < 0) continue; r = seccomp_load(seccomp); if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) return r; if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to apply suid/sgid restrictions for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); } return 0; } uint32_t scmp_act_kill_process(void) { /* Returns SCMP_ACT_KILL_PROCESS if it's supported, and SCMP_ACT_KILL_THREAD otherwise. We never * actually want to use SCMP_ACT_KILL_THREAD as its semantics are nuts (killing arbitrary threads of * a program is just a bad idea), but on old kernels/old libseccomp it is all we have, and at least * for single-threaded apps does the right thing. */ #ifdef SCMP_ACT_KILL_PROCESS if (seccomp_api_get() >= 3) return SCMP_ACT_KILL_PROCESS; #endif return SCMP_ACT_KILL; /* same as SCMP_ACT_KILL_THREAD */ }