/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #if HAVE_SELINUX #include #include #include #include #endif #include "alloc-util.h" #include "errno-util.h" #include "fd-util.h" #include "log.h" #include "macro.h" #include "path-util.h" #include "selinux-util.h" #include "stdio-util.h" #include "time-util.h" #if HAVE_SELINUX DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(context_t, context_free); #define _cleanup_context_free_ _cleanup_(context_freep) static int mac_selinux_reload(int seqno); static int cached_use = -1; static bool initialized = false; static int (*enforcing_status_func)(void) = security_getenforce; static int last_policyload = 0; static struct selabel_handle *label_hnd = NULL; #define log_enforcing(...) \ log_full(mac_selinux_enforcing() ? LOG_ERR : LOG_WARNING, __VA_ARGS__) #define log_enforcing_errno(error, ...) \ ({ \ bool _enforcing = mac_selinux_enforcing(); \ int _level = _enforcing ? LOG_ERR : LOG_WARNING; \ int _e = (error); \ \ int _r = (log_get_max_level() >= LOG_PRI(_level)) \ ? log_internal_realm(_level, _e, PROJECT_FILE, __LINE__, __func__, __VA_ARGS__) \ : -ERRNO_VALUE(_e); \ _enforcing ? _r : 0; \ }) #endif bool mac_selinux_use(void) { #if HAVE_SELINUX if (_unlikely_(cached_use < 0)) { cached_use = is_selinux_enabled() > 0; log_debug("SELinux enabled state cached to: %s", cached_use ? "enabled" : "disabled"); } return cached_use; #else return false; #endif } bool mac_selinux_enforcing(void) { #if HAVE_SELINUX return enforcing_status_func() != 0; #else return false; #endif } void mac_selinux_retest(void) { #if HAVE_SELINUX cached_use = -1; #endif } #if HAVE_SELINUX # if HAVE_MALLINFO static struct mallinfo mallinfo_nowarn(void) { /* glibc has deprecated mallinfo(), but the replacement malloc_info() returns an XML blob ;=[ */ DISABLE_WARNING_DEPRECATED_DECLARATIONS return mallinfo(); REENABLE_WARNING } # else # warning "mallinfo() is missing, add mallinfo2() supported instead." # endif static int open_label_db(void) { struct selabel_handle *hnd; usec_t before_timestamp, after_timestamp; char timespan[FORMAT_TIMESPAN_MAX]; # if HAVE_MALLINFO struct mallinfo before_mallinfo = mallinfo_nowarn(); # endif before_timestamp = now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC); hnd = selabel_open(SELABEL_CTX_FILE, NULL, 0); if (!hnd) return log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to initialize SELinux labeling handle: %m"); after_timestamp = now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC); # if HAVE_MALLINFO struct mallinfo after_mallinfo = mallinfo_nowarn(); int l = after_mallinfo.uordblks > before_mallinfo.uordblks ? after_mallinfo.uordblks - before_mallinfo.uordblks : 0; log_debug("Successfully loaded SELinux database in %s, size on heap is %iK.", format_timespan(timespan, sizeof(timespan), after_timestamp - before_timestamp, 0), DIV_ROUND_UP(l, 1024)); # else log_debug("Successfully loaded SELinux database in %s.", format_timespan(timespan, sizeof(timespan), after_timestamp - before_timestamp, 0)); # endif /* release memory after measurement */ if (label_hnd) selabel_close(label_hnd); label_hnd = TAKE_PTR(hnd); return 0; } #endif int mac_selinux_init(void) { #if HAVE_SELINUX int r; bool have_status_page = false; if (initialized) return 0; if (!mac_selinux_use()) return 0; r = selinux_status_open(/* netlink fallback */ 1); if (r < 0) { if (!ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(errno)) return log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to open SELinux status page: %m"); log_warning_errno(errno, "selinux_status_open() with netlink fallback failed, not checking for policy reloads: %m"); } else if (r == 1) log_warning("selinux_status_open() failed to open the status page, using the netlink fallback."); else have_status_page = true; r = open_label_db(); if (r < 0) { selinux_status_close(); return r; } /* Save the current policyload sequence number, so mac_selinux_maybe_reload() does not trigger on * first call without any actual change. */ last_policyload = selinux_status_policyload(); if (have_status_page) /* Now that the SELinux status page has been successfully opened, retrieve the enforcing * status over it (to avoid system calls in security_getenforce()). */ enforcing_status_func = selinux_status_getenforce; initialized = true; #endif return 0; } void mac_selinux_maybe_reload(void) { #if HAVE_SELINUX int r; if (!initialized) return; r = selinux_status_updated(); if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to update SELinux from status page: %m"); if (r > 0) { int policyload; log_debug("SELinux status page update"); /* from libselinux > 3.1 callbacks gets automatically called, see https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/commit/05bdc03130d741e53e1fb45a958d0a2c184be503 */ /* only reload on policy changes, not enforcing status changes */ policyload = selinux_status_policyload(); if (policyload != last_policyload) { mac_selinux_reload(policyload); last_policyload = policyload; } } #endif } void mac_selinux_finish(void) { #if HAVE_SELINUX if (label_hnd) { selabel_close(label_hnd); label_hnd = NULL; } enforcing_status_func = security_getenforce; selinux_status_close(); initialized = false; #endif } #if HAVE_SELINUX static int mac_selinux_reload(int seqno) { log_debug("SELinux reload %d", seqno); (void) open_label_db(); return 0; } #endif int mac_selinux_fix_container(const char *path, const char *inside_path, LabelFixFlags flags) { assert(path); assert(inside_path); #if HAVE_SELINUX _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1; /* if mac_selinux_init() wasn't called before we are a NOOP */ if (!label_hnd) return 0; /* Open the file as O_PATH, to pin it while we determine and adjust the label */ fd = open(path, O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH); if (fd < 0) { if ((flags & LABEL_IGNORE_ENOENT) && errno == ENOENT) return 0; return -errno; } return mac_selinux_fix_container_fd(fd, path, inside_path, flags); #endif return 0; } int mac_selinux_fix_container_fd(int fd, const char *path, const char *inside_path, LabelFixFlags flags) { assert(fd >= 0); assert(inside_path); #if HAVE_SELINUX char procfs_path[STRLEN("/proc/self/fd/") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int)]; _cleanup_freecon_ char* fcon = NULL; struct stat st; int r; /* if mac_selinux_init() wasn't called before we are a NOOP */ if (!label_hnd) return 0; if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) return -errno; /* Check for policy reload so 'label_hnd' is kept up-to-date by callbacks */ mac_selinux_maybe_reload(); if (selabel_lookup_raw(label_hnd, &fcon, inside_path, st.st_mode) < 0) { /* If there's no label to set, then exit without warning */ if (errno == ENOENT) return 0; r = -errno; goto fail; } xsprintf(procfs_path, "/proc/self/fd/%i", fd); if (setfilecon_raw(procfs_path, fcon) < 0) { _cleanup_freecon_ char *oldcon = NULL; /* If the FS doesn't support labels, then exit without warning */ if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(errno)) return 0; /* It the FS is read-only and we were told to ignore failures caused by that, suppress error */ if (errno == EROFS && (flags & LABEL_IGNORE_EROFS)) return 0; r = -errno; /* If the old label is identical to the new one, suppress any kind of error */ if (getfilecon_raw(procfs_path, &oldcon) >= 0 && streq(fcon, oldcon)) return 0; goto fail; } return 0; fail: return log_enforcing_errno(r, "Unable to fix SELinux security context of %s (%s): %m", strna(path), strna(inside_path)); #endif return 0; } int mac_selinux_apply(const char *path, const char *label) { assert(path); #if HAVE_SELINUX if (!mac_selinux_use()) return 0; assert(label); if (setfilecon(path, label) < 0) return log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to set SELinux security context %s on path %s: %m", label, path); #endif return 0; } int mac_selinux_apply_fd(int fd, const char *path, const char *label) { assert(fd >= 0); #if HAVE_SELINUX if (!mac_selinux_use()) return 0; assert(label); if (fsetfilecon(fd, label) < 0) return log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to set SELinux security context %s on path %s: %m", label, strna(path)); #endif return 0; } int mac_selinux_get_create_label_from_exe(const char *exe, char **label) { #if HAVE_SELINUX _cleanup_freecon_ char *mycon = NULL, *fcon = NULL; security_class_t sclass; int r; assert(exe); assert(label); if (!mac_selinux_use()) return -EOPNOTSUPP; r = getcon_raw(&mycon); if (r < 0) return -errno; r = getfilecon_raw(exe, &fcon); if (r < 0) return -errno; sclass = string_to_security_class("process"); if (sclass == 0) return -ENOSYS; r = security_compute_create_raw(mycon, fcon, sclass, label); if (r < 0) return -errno; return 0; #else return -EOPNOTSUPP; #endif } int mac_selinux_get_our_label(char **label) { #if HAVE_SELINUX int r; assert(label); if (!mac_selinux_use()) return -EOPNOTSUPP; r = getcon_raw(label); if (r < 0) return -errno; return 0; #else return -EOPNOTSUPP; #endif } int mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(int socket_fd, const char *exe, const char *exec_label, char **label) { #if HAVE_SELINUX _cleanup_freecon_ char *mycon = NULL, *peercon = NULL, *fcon = NULL; _cleanup_context_free_ context_t pcon = NULL, bcon = NULL; security_class_t sclass; const char *range = NULL; int r; assert(socket_fd >= 0); assert(exe); assert(label); if (!mac_selinux_use()) return -EOPNOTSUPP; r = getcon_raw(&mycon); if (r < 0) return -errno; r = getpeercon_raw(socket_fd, &peercon); if (r < 0) return -errno; if (!exec_label) { /* If there is no context set for next exec let's use context of target executable */ r = getfilecon_raw(exe, &fcon); if (r < 0) return -errno; } bcon = context_new(mycon); if (!bcon) return -ENOMEM; pcon = context_new(peercon); if (!pcon) return -ENOMEM; range = context_range_get(pcon); if (!range) return -errno; r = context_range_set(bcon, range); if (r) return -errno; freecon(mycon); mycon = strdup(context_str(bcon)); if (!mycon) return -ENOMEM; sclass = string_to_security_class("process"); if (sclass == 0) return -ENOSYS; r = security_compute_create_raw(mycon, fcon, sclass, label); if (r < 0) return -errno; return 0; #else return -EOPNOTSUPP; #endif } char* mac_selinux_free(char *label) { #if HAVE_SELINUX freecon(label); #else assert(!label); #endif return NULL; } #if HAVE_SELINUX static int selinux_create_file_prepare_abspath(const char *abspath, mode_t mode) { _cleanup_freecon_ char *filecon = NULL; int r; assert(abspath); assert(path_is_absolute(abspath)); /* Check for policy reload so 'label_hnd' is kept up-to-date by callbacks */ mac_selinux_maybe_reload(); r = selabel_lookup_raw(label_hnd, &filecon, abspath, mode); if (r < 0) { /* No context specified by the policy? Proceed without setting it. */ if (errno == ENOENT) return 0; return log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to determine SELinux security context for %s: %m", abspath); } if (setfscreatecon_raw(filecon) < 0) return log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to set SELinux security context %s for %s: %m", filecon, abspath); return 0; } #endif int mac_selinux_create_file_prepare_at(int dirfd, const char *path, mode_t mode) { #if HAVE_SELINUX _cleanup_free_ char *abspath = NULL; int r; assert(path); if (!label_hnd) return 0; if (!path_is_absolute(path)) { _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL; if (dirfd == AT_FDCWD) r = safe_getcwd(&p); else r = fd_get_path(dirfd, &p); if (r < 0) return r; path = abspath = path_join(p, path); if (!path) return -ENOMEM; } return selinux_create_file_prepare_abspath(path, mode); #else return 0; #endif } int mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(const char *path, mode_t mode) { #if HAVE_SELINUX int r; _cleanup_free_ char *abspath = NULL; assert(path); if (!label_hnd) return 0; r = path_make_absolute_cwd(path, &abspath); if (r < 0) return r; return selinux_create_file_prepare_abspath(abspath, mode); #else return 0; #endif } void mac_selinux_create_file_clear(void) { #if HAVE_SELINUX PROTECT_ERRNO; if (!mac_selinux_use()) return; setfscreatecon_raw(NULL); #endif } int mac_selinux_create_socket_prepare(const char *label) { #if HAVE_SELINUX assert(label); if (!mac_selinux_use()) return 0; if (setsockcreatecon(label) < 0) return log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to set SELinux security context %s for sockets: %m", label); #endif return 0; } void mac_selinux_create_socket_clear(void) { #if HAVE_SELINUX PROTECT_ERRNO; if (!mac_selinux_use()) return; setsockcreatecon_raw(NULL); #endif } int mac_selinux_bind(int fd, const struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen) { /* Binds a socket and label its file system object according to the SELinux policy */ #if HAVE_SELINUX _cleanup_freecon_ char *fcon = NULL; const struct sockaddr_un *un; bool context_changed = false; char *path; int r; assert(fd >= 0); assert(addr); assert(addrlen >= sizeof(sa_family_t)); if (!label_hnd) goto skipped; /* Filter out non-local sockets */ if (addr->sa_family != AF_UNIX) goto skipped; /* Filter out anonymous sockets */ if (addrlen < offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + 1) goto skipped; /* Filter out abstract namespace sockets */ un = (const struct sockaddr_un*) addr; if (un->sun_path[0] == 0) goto skipped; path = strndupa(un->sun_path, addrlen - offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path)); /* Check for policy reload so 'label_hnd' is kept up-to-date by callbacks */ mac_selinux_maybe_reload(); if (path_is_absolute(path)) r = selabel_lookup_raw(label_hnd, &fcon, path, S_IFSOCK); else { _cleanup_free_ char *newpath = NULL; r = path_make_absolute_cwd(path, &newpath); if (r < 0) return r; r = selabel_lookup_raw(label_hnd, &fcon, newpath, S_IFSOCK); } if (r < 0) { /* No context specified by the policy? Proceed without setting it */ if (errno == ENOENT) goto skipped; r = log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to determine SELinux security context for %s: %m", path); if (r < 0) return r; } else { if (setfscreatecon_raw(fcon) < 0) { r = log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to set SELinux security context %s for %s: %m", fcon, path); if (r < 0) return r; } else context_changed = true; } r = bind(fd, addr, addrlen) < 0 ? -errno : 0; if (context_changed) (void) setfscreatecon_raw(NULL); return r; skipped: #endif if (bind(fd, addr, addrlen) < 0) return -errno; return 0; }