224b0e7ad0
A macro is needed because otherwise we couldn't ensure type safety. Some simple tests are included. No functional change intended.
792 lines
28 KiB
C
792 lines
28 KiB
C
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
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/***
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This file is part of systemd.
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Copyright 2015 Lennart Poettering
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systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
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under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
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the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
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(at your option) any later version.
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systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
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WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
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Lesser General Public License for more details.
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You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
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along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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***/
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#include "sd-messages.h"
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#include "alloc-util.h"
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#include "conf-files.h"
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#include "def.h"
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#include "dns-domain.h"
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#include "fd-util.h"
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#include "fileio.h"
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#include "hexdecoct.h"
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#include "parse-util.h"
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#include "resolved-dns-trust-anchor.h"
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#include "resolved-dns-dnssec.h"
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#include "set.h"
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#include "string-util.h"
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#include "strv.h"
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static const char trust_anchor_dirs[] = CONF_PATHS_NULSTR("dnssec-trust-anchors.d");
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/* The first DS RR from https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.xml, retrieved December 2015 */
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static const uint8_t root_digest1[] =
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{ 0x49, 0xAA, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0x7B, 0x6F, 0x64, 0x46, 0x70, 0x2E, 0x54, 0xA1, 0x60, 0x73, 0x71, 0x60,
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0x7A, 0x1A, 0x41, 0x85, 0x52, 0x00, 0xFD, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xDE, 0x32, 0xF2, 0x4E, 0x8F, 0xB5 };
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/* The second DS RR from https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.xml, retrieved February 2017 */
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static const uint8_t root_digest2[] =
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{ 0xE0, 0x6D, 0x44, 0xB8, 0x0B, 0x8F, 0x1D, 0x39, 0xA9, 0x5C, 0x0B, 0x0D, 0x7C, 0x65, 0xD0, 0x84,
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0x58, 0xE8, 0x80, 0x40, 0x9B, 0xBC, 0x68, 0x34, 0x57, 0x10, 0x42, 0x37, 0xC7, 0xF8, 0xEC, 0x8D };
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static bool dns_trust_anchor_knows_domain_positive(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const char *name) {
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assert(d);
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/* Returns true if there's an entry for the specified domain
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* name in our trust anchor */
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return
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hashmap_contains(d->positive_by_key, &DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_CONST(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY, name)) ||
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hashmap_contains(d->positive_by_key, &DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_CONST(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DS, name));
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}
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static int add_root_ksk(
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DnsAnswer *answer,
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DnsResourceKey *key,
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uint16_t key_tag,
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uint8_t algorithm,
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uint8_t digest_type,
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const void *digest,
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size_t digest_size) {
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_cleanup_(dns_resource_record_unrefp) DnsResourceRecord *rr = NULL;
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int r;
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rr = dns_resource_record_new(key);
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if (!rr)
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return -ENOMEM;
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rr->ds.key_tag = key_tag;
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rr->ds.algorithm = algorithm;
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rr->ds.digest_type = digest_type;
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rr->ds.digest_size = digest_size;
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rr->ds.digest = memdup(digest, rr->ds.digest_size);
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if (!rr->ds.digest)
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return -ENOMEM;
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r = dns_answer_add(answer, rr, 0, DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED);
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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return 0;
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}
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static int dns_trust_anchor_add_builtin_positive(DnsTrustAnchor *d) {
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_cleanup_(dns_answer_unrefp) DnsAnswer *answer = NULL;
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_cleanup_(dns_resource_key_unrefp) DnsResourceKey *key = NULL;
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int r;
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assert(d);
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r = hashmap_ensure_allocated(&d->positive_by_key, &dns_resource_key_hash_ops);
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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/* Only add the built-in trust anchor if there's neither a DS nor a DNSKEY defined for the root domain. That
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* way users have an easy way to override the root domain DS/DNSKEY data. */
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if (dns_trust_anchor_knows_domain_positive(d, "."))
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return 0;
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key = dns_resource_key_new(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DS, "");
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if (!key)
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return -ENOMEM;
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answer = dns_answer_new(2);
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if (!answer)
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return -ENOMEM;
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/* Add the two RRs from https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.xml */
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r = add_root_ksk(answer, key, 19036, DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256, DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA256, root_digest1, sizeof(root_digest1));
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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r = add_root_ksk(answer, key, 20326, DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256, DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA256, root_digest2, sizeof(root_digest2));
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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r = hashmap_put(d->positive_by_key, key, answer);
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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answer = NULL;
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return 0;
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}
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static int dns_trust_anchor_add_builtin_negative(DnsTrustAnchor *d) {
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static const char private_domains[] =
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/* RFC 6761 says that .test is a special domain for
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* testing and not to be installed in the root zone */
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"test\0"
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/* RFC 6761 says that these reverse IP lookup ranges
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* are for private addresses, and hence should not
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* show up in the root zone */
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"10.in-addr.arpa\0"
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"16.172.in-addr.arpa\0"
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"17.172.in-addr.arpa\0"
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"18.172.in-addr.arpa\0"
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"19.172.in-addr.arpa\0"
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"20.172.in-addr.arpa\0"
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"21.172.in-addr.arpa\0"
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"22.172.in-addr.arpa\0"
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"23.172.in-addr.arpa\0"
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"24.172.in-addr.arpa\0"
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"25.172.in-addr.arpa\0"
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"26.172.in-addr.arpa\0"
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"27.172.in-addr.arpa\0"
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"28.172.in-addr.arpa\0"
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"29.172.in-addr.arpa\0"
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"30.172.in-addr.arpa\0"
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"31.172.in-addr.arpa\0"
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"168.192.in-addr.arpa\0"
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/* The same, but for IPv6. */
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"d.f.ip6.arpa\0"
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/* RFC 6762 reserves the .local domain for Multicast
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* DNS, it hence cannot appear in the root zone. (Note
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* that we by default do not route .local traffic to
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* DNS anyway, except when a configured search domain
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* suggests so.) */
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"local\0"
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/* These two are well known, popular private zone
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* TLDs, that are blocked from delegation, according
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* to:
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* http://icannwiki.com/Name_Collision#NGPC_Resolution
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*
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* There's also ongoing work on making this official
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* in an RRC:
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* https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-chapin-additional-reserved-tlds-02.txt */
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"home\0"
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"corp\0"
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/* The following four TLDs are suggested for private
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* zones in RFC 6762, Appendix G, and are hence very
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* unlikely to be made official TLDs any day soon */
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"lan\0"
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"intranet\0"
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"internal\0"
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"private\0";
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const char *name;
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int r;
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assert(d);
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/* Only add the built-in trust anchor if there's no negative
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* trust anchor defined at all. This enables easy overriding
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* of negative trust anchors. */
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if (set_size(d->negative_by_name) > 0)
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return 0;
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r = set_ensure_allocated(&d->negative_by_name, &dns_name_hash_ops);
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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/* We add a couple of domains as default negative trust
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* anchors, where it's very unlikely they will be installed in
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* the root zone. If they exist they must be private, and thus
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* unsigned. */
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NULSTR_FOREACH(name, private_domains) {
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if (dns_trust_anchor_knows_domain_positive(d, name))
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continue;
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r = set_put_strdup(d->negative_by_name, name);
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static int dns_trust_anchor_load_positive(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const char *path, unsigned line, const char *s) {
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_cleanup_(dns_resource_record_unrefp) DnsResourceRecord *rr = NULL;
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_cleanup_free_ char *domain = NULL, *class = NULL, *type = NULL;
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_cleanup_(dns_answer_unrefp) DnsAnswer *answer = NULL;
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DnsAnswer *old_answer = NULL;
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const char *p = s;
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int r;
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assert(d);
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assert(line);
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r = extract_first_word(&p, &domain, NULL, EXTRACT_QUOTES);
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if (r < 0)
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return log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to parse domain in line %s:%u: %m", path, line);
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if (!dns_name_is_valid(domain)) {
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log_warning("Domain name %s is invalid, at line %s:%u, ignoring line.", domain, path, line);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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r = extract_many_words(&p, NULL, 0, &class, &type, NULL);
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if (r < 0)
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return log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to parse class and type in line %s:%u: %m", path, line);
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if (r != 2) {
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log_warning("Missing class or type in line %s:%u", path, line);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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if (!strcaseeq(class, "IN")) {
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log_warning("RR class %s is not supported, ignoring line %s:%u.", class, path, line);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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if (strcaseeq(type, "DS")) {
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_cleanup_free_ char *key_tag = NULL, *algorithm = NULL, *digest_type = NULL, *digest = NULL;
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_cleanup_free_ void *dd = NULL;
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uint16_t kt;
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int a, dt;
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size_t l;
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r = extract_many_words(&p, NULL, 0, &key_tag, &algorithm, &digest_type, &digest, NULL);
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if (r < 0) {
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log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse DS parameters on line %s:%u: %m", path, line);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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if (r != 4) {
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log_warning("Missing DS parameters on line %s:%u", path, line);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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r = safe_atou16(key_tag, &kt);
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if (r < 0)
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return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse DS key tag %s on line %s:%u: %m", key_tag, path, line);
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a = dnssec_algorithm_from_string(algorithm);
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if (a < 0) {
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log_warning("Failed to parse DS algorithm %s on line %s:%u", algorithm, path, line);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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dt = dnssec_digest_from_string(digest_type);
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if (dt < 0) {
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log_warning("Failed to parse DS digest type %s on line %s:%u", digest_type, path, line);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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r = unhexmem(digest, strlen(digest), &dd, &l);
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if (r < 0) {
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log_warning("Failed to parse DS digest %s on line %s:%u", digest, path, line);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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rr = dns_resource_record_new_full(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DS, domain);
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if (!rr)
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return log_oom();
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rr->ds.key_tag = kt;
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rr->ds.algorithm = a;
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rr->ds.digest_type = dt;
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rr->ds.digest_size = l;
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rr->ds.digest = dd;
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dd = NULL;
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} else if (strcaseeq(type, "DNSKEY")) {
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_cleanup_free_ char *flags = NULL, *protocol = NULL, *algorithm = NULL, *key = NULL;
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_cleanup_free_ void *k = NULL;
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uint16_t f;
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size_t l;
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int a;
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r = extract_many_words(&p, NULL, 0, &flags, &protocol, &algorithm, &key, NULL);
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if (r < 0)
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return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse DNSKEY parameters on line %s:%u: %m", path, line);
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if (r != 4) {
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log_warning("Missing DNSKEY parameters on line %s:%u", path, line);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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if (!streq(protocol, "3")) {
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log_warning("DNSKEY Protocol is not 3 on line %s:%u", path, line);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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r = safe_atou16(flags, &f);
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if (r < 0)
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return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse DNSKEY flags field %s on line %s:%u", flags, path, line);
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if ((f & DNSKEY_FLAG_ZONE_KEY) == 0) {
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log_warning("DNSKEY lacks zone key bit set on line %s:%u", path, line);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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if ((f & DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE)) {
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log_warning("DNSKEY is already revoked on line %s:%u", path, line);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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a = dnssec_algorithm_from_string(algorithm);
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if (a < 0) {
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log_warning("Failed to parse DNSKEY algorithm %s on line %s:%u", algorithm, path, line);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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r = unbase64mem(key, strlen(key), &k, &l);
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if (r < 0)
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return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse DNSKEY key data %s on line %s:%u", key, path, line);
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rr = dns_resource_record_new_full(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY, domain);
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if (!rr)
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return log_oom();
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rr->dnskey.flags = f;
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rr->dnskey.protocol = 3;
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rr->dnskey.algorithm = a;
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rr->dnskey.key_size = l;
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rr->dnskey.key = k;
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k = NULL;
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} else {
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log_warning("RR type %s is not supported, ignoring line %s:%u.", type, path, line);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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if (!isempty(p)) {
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log_warning("Trailing garbage on line %s:%u, ignoring line.", path, line);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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r = hashmap_ensure_allocated(&d->positive_by_key, &dns_resource_key_hash_ops);
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if (r < 0)
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return log_oom();
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old_answer = hashmap_get(d->positive_by_key, rr->key);
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answer = dns_answer_ref(old_answer);
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r = dns_answer_add_extend(&answer, rr, 0, DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED);
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if (r < 0)
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return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add trust anchor RR: %m");
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r = hashmap_replace(d->positive_by_key, rr->key, answer);
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if (r < 0)
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return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add answer to trust anchor: %m");
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old_answer = dns_answer_unref(old_answer);
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answer = NULL;
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return 0;
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}
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static int dns_trust_anchor_load_negative(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const char *path, unsigned line, const char *s) {
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_cleanup_free_ char *domain = NULL;
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const char *p = s;
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int r;
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assert(d);
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assert(line);
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r = extract_first_word(&p, &domain, NULL, EXTRACT_QUOTES);
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if (r < 0)
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return log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to parse line %s:%u: %m", path, line);
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if (!dns_name_is_valid(domain)) {
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log_warning("Domain name %s is invalid, at line %s:%u, ignoring line.", domain, path, line);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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if (!isempty(p)) {
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log_warning("Trailing garbage at line %s:%u, ignoring line.", path, line);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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r = set_ensure_allocated(&d->negative_by_name, &dns_name_hash_ops);
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if (r < 0)
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return log_oom();
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r = set_put(d->negative_by_name, domain);
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if (r < 0)
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return log_oom();
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if (r > 0)
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domain = NULL;
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return 0;
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}
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static int dns_trust_anchor_load_files(
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DnsTrustAnchor *d,
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const char *suffix,
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int (*loader)(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const char *path, unsigned n, const char *line)) {
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_cleanup_strv_free_ char **files = NULL;
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char **f;
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int r;
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assert(d);
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assert(suffix);
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assert(loader);
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r = conf_files_list_nulstr(&files, suffix, NULL, 0, trust_anchor_dirs);
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if (r < 0)
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return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to enumerate %s trust anchor files: %m", suffix);
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STRV_FOREACH(f, files) {
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_cleanup_fclose_ FILE *g = NULL;
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char line[LINE_MAX];
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unsigned n = 0;
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g = fopen(*f, "r");
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if (!g) {
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if (errno == ENOENT)
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continue;
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log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to open %s: %m", *f);
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continue;
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}
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FOREACH_LINE(line, g, log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to read %s, ignoring: %m", *f)) {
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char *l;
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n++;
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l = strstrip(line);
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if (isempty(l))
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continue;
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if (*l == ';')
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continue;
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(void) loader(d, *f, n, l);
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static int domain_name_cmp(const void *a, const void *b) {
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char **x = (char**) a, **y = (char**) b;
|
|
|
|
return dns_name_compare_func(*x, *y);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int dns_trust_anchor_dump(DnsTrustAnchor *d) {
|
|
DnsAnswer *a;
|
|
Iterator i;
|
|
|
|
assert(d);
|
|
|
|
if (hashmap_isempty(d->positive_by_key))
|
|
log_info("No positive trust anchors defined.");
|
|
else {
|
|
log_info("Positive Trust Anchors:");
|
|
HASHMAP_FOREACH(a, d->positive_by_key, i) {
|
|
DnsResourceRecord *rr;
|
|
|
|
DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, a)
|
|
log_info("%s", dns_resource_record_to_string(rr));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (set_isempty(d->negative_by_name))
|
|
log_info("No negative trust anchors defined.");
|
|
else {
|
|
_cleanup_free_ char **l = NULL, *j = NULL;
|
|
|
|
l = set_get_strv(d->negative_by_name);
|
|
if (!l)
|
|
return log_oom();
|
|
|
|
qsort_safe(l, set_size(d->negative_by_name), sizeof(char*), domain_name_cmp);
|
|
|
|
j = strv_join(l, " ");
|
|
if (!j)
|
|
return log_oom();
|
|
|
|
log_info("Negative trust anchors: %s", j);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dns_trust_anchor_load(DnsTrustAnchor *d) {
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
assert(d);
|
|
|
|
/* If loading things from disk fails, we don't consider this fatal */
|
|
(void) dns_trust_anchor_load_files(d, ".positive", dns_trust_anchor_load_positive);
|
|
(void) dns_trust_anchor_load_files(d, ".negative", dns_trust_anchor_load_negative);
|
|
|
|
/* However, if the built-in DS fails, then we have a problem. */
|
|
r = dns_trust_anchor_add_builtin_positive(d);
|
|
if (r < 0)
|
|
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add built-in positive trust anchor: %m");
|
|
|
|
r = dns_trust_anchor_add_builtin_negative(d);
|
|
if (r < 0)
|
|
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add built-in negative trust anchor: %m");
|
|
|
|
dns_trust_anchor_dump(d);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void dns_trust_anchor_flush(DnsTrustAnchor *d) {
|
|
assert(d);
|
|
|
|
d->positive_by_key = hashmap_free_with_destructor(d->positive_by_key, dns_answer_unref);
|
|
d->revoked_by_rr = set_free_with_destructor(d->revoked_by_rr, dns_resource_record_unref);
|
|
d->negative_by_name = set_free_free(d->negative_by_name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dns_trust_anchor_lookup_positive(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const DnsResourceKey *key, DnsAnswer **ret) {
|
|
DnsAnswer *a;
|
|
|
|
assert(d);
|
|
assert(key);
|
|
assert(ret);
|
|
|
|
/* We only serve DS and DNSKEY RRs. */
|
|
if (!IN_SET(key->type, DNS_TYPE_DS, DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
a = hashmap_get(d->positive_by_key, key);
|
|
if (!a)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
*ret = dns_answer_ref(a);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dns_trust_anchor_lookup_negative(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const char *name) {
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
assert(d);
|
|
assert(name);
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
/* If the domain is listed as-is in the NTA database, then that counts */
|
|
if (set_contains(d->negative_by_name, name))
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
/* If the domain isn't listed as NTA, but is listed as positive trust anchor, then that counts. See RFC
|
|
* 7646, section 1.1 */
|
|
if (hashmap_contains(d->positive_by_key, &DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_CONST(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DS, name)))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
if (hashmap_contains(d->positive_by_key, &DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_CONST(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_KEY, name)))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
/* And now, let's look at the parent, and check that too */
|
|
r = dns_name_parent(&name);
|
|
if (r < 0)
|
|
return r;
|
|
if (r == 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int dns_trust_anchor_revoked_put(DnsTrustAnchor *d, DnsResourceRecord *rr) {
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
assert(d);
|
|
|
|
r = set_ensure_allocated(&d->revoked_by_rr, &dns_resource_record_hash_ops);
|
|
if (r < 0)
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
r = set_put(d->revoked_by_rr, rr);
|
|
if (r < 0)
|
|
return r;
|
|
if (r > 0)
|
|
dns_resource_record_ref(rr);
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int dns_trust_anchor_remove_revoked(DnsTrustAnchor *d, DnsResourceRecord *rr) {
|
|
_cleanup_(dns_answer_unrefp) DnsAnswer *new_answer = NULL;
|
|
DnsAnswer *old_answer;
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
/* Remember that this is a revoked trust anchor RR */
|
|
r = dns_trust_anchor_revoked_put(d, rr);
|
|
if (r < 0)
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
/* Remove this from the positive trust anchor */
|
|
old_answer = hashmap_get(d->positive_by_key, rr->key);
|
|
if (!old_answer)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
new_answer = dns_answer_ref(old_answer);
|
|
|
|
r = dns_answer_remove_by_rr(&new_answer, rr);
|
|
if (r <= 0)
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
/* We found the key! Warn the user */
|
|
log_struct(LOG_WARNING,
|
|
"MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_DNSSEC_TRUST_ANCHOR_REVOKED_STR,
|
|
LOG_MESSAGE("DNSSEC Trust anchor %s has been revoked. Please update the trust anchor, or upgrade your operating system."), strna(dns_resource_record_to_string(rr)),
|
|
"TRUST_ANCHOR=%s", dns_resource_record_to_string(rr),
|
|
NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (dns_answer_size(new_answer) <= 0) {
|
|
assert_se(hashmap_remove(d->positive_by_key, rr->key) == old_answer);
|
|
dns_answer_unref(old_answer);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r = hashmap_replace(d->positive_by_key, new_answer->items[0].rr->key, new_answer);
|
|
if (r < 0)
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
new_answer = NULL;
|
|
dns_answer_unref(old_answer);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int dns_trust_anchor_check_revoked_one(DnsTrustAnchor *d, DnsResourceRecord *revoked_dnskey) {
|
|
DnsAnswer *a;
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
assert(d);
|
|
assert(revoked_dnskey);
|
|
assert(revoked_dnskey->key->type == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY);
|
|
assert(revoked_dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE);
|
|
|
|
a = hashmap_get(d->positive_by_key, revoked_dnskey->key);
|
|
if (a) {
|
|
DnsResourceRecord *anchor;
|
|
|
|
/* First, look for the precise DNSKEY in our trust anchor database */
|
|
|
|
DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(anchor, a) {
|
|
|
|
if (anchor->dnskey.protocol != revoked_dnskey->dnskey.protocol)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (anchor->dnskey.algorithm != revoked_dnskey->dnskey.algorithm)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (anchor->dnskey.key_size != revoked_dnskey->dnskey.key_size)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* Note that we allow the REVOKE bit to be
|
|
* different! It will be set in the revoked
|
|
* key, but unset in our version of it */
|
|
if (((anchor->dnskey.flags ^ revoked_dnskey->dnskey.flags) | DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE) != DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(anchor->dnskey.key, revoked_dnskey->dnskey.key, anchor->dnskey.key_size) != 0)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
dns_trust_anchor_remove_revoked(d, anchor);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
a = hashmap_get(d->positive_by_key, &DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_CONST(revoked_dnskey->key->class, DNS_TYPE_DS, dns_resource_key_name(revoked_dnskey->key)));
|
|
if (a) {
|
|
DnsResourceRecord *anchor;
|
|
|
|
/* Second, look for DS RRs matching this DNSKEY in our trust anchor database */
|
|
|
|
DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(anchor, a) {
|
|
|
|
/* We set mask_revoke to true here, since our
|
|
* DS fingerprint will be the one of the
|
|
* unrevoked DNSKEY, but the one we got passed
|
|
* here has the bit set. */
|
|
r = dnssec_verify_dnskey_by_ds(revoked_dnskey, anchor, true);
|
|
if (r < 0)
|
|
return r;
|
|
if (r == 0)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
dns_trust_anchor_remove_revoked(d, anchor);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dns_trust_anchor_check_revoked(DnsTrustAnchor *d, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsAnswer *rrs) {
|
|
DnsResourceRecord *rrsig;
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
assert(d);
|
|
assert(dnskey);
|
|
|
|
/* Looks if "dnskey" is a self-signed RR that has been revoked
|
|
* and matches one of our trust anchor entries. If so, removes
|
|
* it from the trust anchor and returns > 0. */
|
|
|
|
if (dnskey->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Is this DNSKEY revoked? */
|
|
if ((dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE) == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Could this be interesting to us at all? If not,
|
|
* there's no point in looking for and verifying a
|
|
* self-signed RRSIG. */
|
|
if (!dns_trust_anchor_knows_domain_positive(d, dns_resource_key_name(dnskey->key)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Look for a self-signed RRSIG in the other rrs belonging to this DNSKEY */
|
|
DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rrsig, rrs) {
|
|
DnssecResult result;
|
|
|
|
if (rrsig->key->type != DNS_TYPE_RRSIG)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
r = dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(rrsig, dnskey, true);
|
|
if (r < 0)
|
|
return r;
|
|
if (r == 0)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
r = dnssec_verify_rrset(rrs, dnskey->key, rrsig, dnskey, USEC_INFINITY, &result);
|
|
if (r < 0)
|
|
return r;
|
|
if (result != DNSSEC_VALIDATED)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* Bingo! This is a revoked self-signed DNSKEY. Let's
|
|
* see if this precise one exists in our trust anchor
|
|
* database, too. */
|
|
r = dns_trust_anchor_check_revoked_one(d, dnskey);
|
|
if (r < 0)
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dns_trust_anchor_is_revoked(DnsTrustAnchor *d, DnsResourceRecord *rr) {
|
|
assert(d);
|
|
|
|
if (!IN_SET(rr->key->type, DNS_TYPE_DS, DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return set_contains(d->revoked_by_rr, rr);
|
|
}
|