Systemd/src/test/test-capability.c
Topi Miettinen 3c14dc61f7 tests: various small fixes for strict systems
Don't assume that 4MB can be allocated from stack since there could be smaller
DefaultLimitSTACK= in force, so let's use malloc(). NUL terminate the huge
strings by hand, also ensure termination in test_lz4_decompress_partial() and
optimize the memset() for the string.

Some items in /proc and /etc may not be accessible to poor unprivileged users
due to e.g. SELinux, BOFH or both, so check for EACCES and EPERM.

/var/tmp may be a symlink to /tmp and then path_compare() will always fail, so
let's stick to /tmp like elsewhere.

/tmp may be mounted with noexec option and then trying to execute scripts from
there would fail.

Detect and warn if seccomp is already in use, which could make seccomp test
fail if the syscalls are already blocked.

Unset $TMPDIR so it will not break specifier tests where %T is assumed to be
/tmp and %V /var/tmp.
2020-04-26 20:18:48 +02:00

279 lines
7.8 KiB
C

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "alloc-util.h"
#include "capability-util.h"
#include "errno-util.h"
#include "fd-util.h"
#include "fileio.h"
#include "macro.h"
#include "missing_prctl.h"
#include "parse-util.h"
#include "string-util.h"
#include "tests.h"
static uid_t test_uid = -1;
static gid_t test_gid = -1;
#if HAS_FEATURE_ADDRESS_SANITIZER
/* Keep CAP_SYS_PTRACE when running under Address Sanitizer */
static const uint64_t test_flags = UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SYS_PTRACE;
#else
/* We keep CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE to avoid errors with gcov when doing test coverage */
static const uint64_t test_flags = UINT64_C(1) << CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE;
#endif
/* verify cap_last_cap() against /proc/sys/kernel/cap_last_cap */
static void test_last_cap_file(void) {
_cleanup_free_ char *content = NULL;
unsigned long val = 0;
int r;
r = read_one_line_file("/proc/sys/kernel/cap_last_cap", &content);
if (r == -ENOENT || ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r)) /* kernel pre 3.2 or no access */
return;
assert_se(r >= 0);
r = safe_atolu(content, &val);
assert_se(r >= 0);
assert_se(val != 0);
assert_se(val == cap_last_cap());
}
/* verify cap_last_cap() against syscall probing */
static void test_last_cap_probe(void) {
unsigned long p = (unsigned long)CAP_LAST_CAP;
if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ, p) < 0) {
for (p--; p > 0; p --)
if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ, p) >= 0)
break;
} else {
for (;; p++)
if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ, p+1) < 0)
break;
}
assert_se(p != 0);
assert_se(p == cap_last_cap());
}
static void fork_test(void (*test_func)(void)) {
pid_t pid = 0;
pid = fork();
assert_se(pid >= 0);
if (pid == 0) {
test_func();
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
} else if (pid > 0) {
int status;
assert_se(waitpid(pid, &status, 0) > 0);
assert_se(WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0);
}
}
static void show_capabilities(void) {
cap_t caps;
char *text;
caps = cap_get_proc();
assert_se(caps);
text = cap_to_text(caps, NULL);
assert_se(text);
log_info("Capabilities:%s", text);
cap_free(caps);
cap_free(text);
}
static int setup_tests(bool *run_ambient) {
struct passwd *nobody;
int r;
nobody = getpwnam(NOBODY_USER_NAME);
if (!nobody)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOENT), "Could not find nobody user: %m");
test_uid = nobody->pw_uid;
test_gid = nobody->pw_gid;
*run_ambient = false;
r = prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL, 0, 0, 0);
/* There's support for PR_CAP_AMBIENT if the prctl() call
* succeeded or error code was something else than EINVAL. The
* EINVAL check should be good enough to rule out false
* positives. */
if (r >= 0 || errno != EINVAL)
*run_ambient = true;
return 0;
}
static void test_drop_privileges_keep_net_raw(void) {
int sock;
sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_UDP);
assert_se(sock >= 0);
safe_close(sock);
assert_se(drop_privileges(test_uid, test_gid, test_flags | (1ULL << CAP_NET_RAW)) >= 0);
assert_se(getuid() == test_uid);
assert_se(getgid() == test_gid);
show_capabilities();
sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_UDP);
assert_se(sock >= 0);
safe_close(sock);
}
static void test_drop_privileges_dontkeep_net_raw(void) {
int sock;
sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_UDP);
assert_se(sock >= 0);
safe_close(sock);
assert_se(drop_privileges(test_uid, test_gid, test_flags) >= 0);
assert_se(getuid() == test_uid);
assert_se(getgid() == test_gid);
show_capabilities();
sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_UDP);
assert_se(sock < 0);
}
static void test_drop_privileges_fail(void) {
assert_se(drop_privileges(test_uid, test_gid, test_flags) >= 0);
assert_se(getuid() == test_uid);
assert_se(getgid() == test_gid);
assert_se(drop_privileges(test_uid, test_gid, test_flags) < 0);
assert_se(drop_privileges(0, 0, test_flags) < 0);
}
static void test_drop_privileges(void) {
fork_test(test_drop_privileges_keep_net_raw);
fork_test(test_drop_privileges_dontkeep_net_raw);
fork_test(test_drop_privileges_fail);
}
static void test_have_effective_cap(void) {
assert_se(have_effective_cap(CAP_KILL));
assert_se(have_effective_cap(CAP_CHOWN));
assert_se(drop_privileges(test_uid, test_gid, test_flags | (1ULL << CAP_KILL)) >= 0);
assert_se(getuid() == test_uid);
assert_se(getgid() == test_gid);
assert_se(have_effective_cap(CAP_KILL));
assert_se(!have_effective_cap(CAP_CHOWN));
}
static void test_update_inherited_set(void) {
cap_t caps;
uint64_t set = 0;
cap_flag_value_t fv;
caps = cap_get_proc();
assert_se(caps);
set = (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_CHOWN);
assert_se(!capability_update_inherited_set(caps, set));
assert_se(!cap_get_flag(caps, CAP_CHOWN, CAP_INHERITABLE, &fv));
assert(fv == CAP_SET);
cap_free(caps);
}
static void test_apply_ambient_caps(void) {
cap_t caps;
uint64_t set = 0;
cap_flag_value_t fv;
assert_se(prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET, CAP_CHOWN, 0, 0) == 0);
set = (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_CHOWN);
assert_se(!capability_ambient_set_apply(set, true));
caps = cap_get_proc();
assert_se(caps);
assert_se(!cap_get_flag(caps, CAP_CHOWN, CAP_INHERITABLE, &fv));
assert_se(fv == CAP_SET);
cap_free(caps);
assert_se(prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET, CAP_CHOWN, 0, 0) == 1);
assert_se(!capability_ambient_set_apply(0, true));
caps = cap_get_proc();
assert_se(caps);
assert_se(!cap_get_flag(caps, CAP_CHOWN, CAP_INHERITABLE, &fv));
assert_se(fv == CAP_CLEAR);
cap_free(caps);
assert_se(prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET, CAP_CHOWN, 0, 0) == 0);
}
static void test_ensure_cap_64bit(void) {
_cleanup_free_ char *content = NULL;
unsigned long p = 0;
int r;
r = read_one_line_file("/proc/sys/kernel/cap_last_cap", &content);
if (r == -ENOENT || ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r)) /* kernel pre 3.2 or no access */
return;
assert_se(r >= 0);
assert_se(safe_atolu(content, &p) >= 0);
/* If caps don't fit into 64bit anymore, we have a problem, fail the test. */
assert_se(p <= 63);
/* Also check for the header definition */
assert_se(CAP_LAST_CAP <= 63);
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
bool run_ambient;
test_setup_logging(LOG_INFO);
test_ensure_cap_64bit();
test_last_cap_file();
test_last_cap_probe();
log_info("have ambient caps: %s", yes_no(ambient_capabilities_supported()));
if (getuid() != 0)
return log_tests_skipped("not running as root");
if (setup_tests(&run_ambient) < 0)
return log_tests_skipped("setup failed");
show_capabilities();
test_drop_privileges();
test_update_inherited_set();
fork_test(test_have_effective_cap);
if (run_ambient)
fork_test(test_apply_ambient_caps);
return 0;
}