eaad4f9e8f
Rather than buffering 16 MiB of entropy in userspace (by way of chacha20), simply call getrandom() every time. This approach is doubtlessly slower, for now, but trying to prematurely optimize arc4random appears to be leading toward all sorts of nasty properties and gotchas. Instead, this patch takes a much more conservative approach. The interface is added as a basic loop wrapper around getrandom(), and then later, the kernel and libc together can work together on optimizing that. This prevents numerous issues in which userspace is unaware of when it really must throw away its buffer, since we avoid buffering all together. Future improvements may include userspace learning more from the kernel about when to do that, which might make these sorts of chacha20-based optimizations more possible. The current heuristic of 16 MiB is meaningless garbage that doesn't correspond to anything the kernel might know about. So for now, let's just do something conservative that we know is correct and won't lead to cryptographic issues for users of this function. This patch might be considered along the lines of, "optimization is the root of all evil," in that the much more complex implementation it replaces moves too fast without considering security implications, whereas the incremental approach done here is a much safer way of going about things. Once this lands, we can take our time in optimizing this properly using new interplay between the kernel and userspace. getrandom(0) is used, since that's the one that ensures the bytes returned are cryptographically secure. But on systems without it, we fallback to using /dev/urandom. This is unfortunate because it means opening a file descriptor, but there's not much of a choice. Secondly, as part of the fallback, in order to get more or less the same properties of getrandom(0), we poll on /dev/random, and if the poll succeeds at least once, then we assume the RNG is initialized. This is a rough approximation, as the ancient "non-blocking pool" initialized after the "blocking pool", not before, and it may not port back to all ancient kernels, though it does to all kernels supported by glibc (≥3.2), so generally it's the best approximation we can do. The motivation for including arc4random, in the first place, is to have source-level compatibility with existing code. That means this patch doesn't attempt to litigate the interface itself. It does, however, choose a conservative approach for implementing it. Cc: Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Cristian Rodríguez <crrodriguez@opensuse.org> Cc: Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu> Cc: Mark Harris <mark.hsj@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
103 lines
2.9 KiB
C
103 lines
2.9 KiB
C
/* Pseudo Random Number Generator
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Copyright (C) 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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This file is part of the GNU C Library.
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The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
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License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
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version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
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Lesser General Public License for more details.
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You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
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License along with the GNU C Library; if not, see
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<https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <not-cancel.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <sys/mman.h>
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/random.h>
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static void
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arc4random_getrandom_failure (void)
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{
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__libc_fatal ("Fatal glibc error: cannot get entropy for arc4random\n");
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}
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void
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__arc4random_buf (void *p, size_t n)
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{
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static int seen_initialized;
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size_t l;
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int fd;
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if (n == 0)
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return;
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for (;;)
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{
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l = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY (__getrandom_nocancel (p, n, 0));
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if (l > 0)
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{
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if ((size_t) l == n)
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return; /* Done reading, success. */
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p = (uint8_t *) p + l;
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n -= l;
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continue; /* Interrupted by a signal; keep going. */
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}
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else if (l < 0 && errno == ENOSYS)
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break; /* No syscall, so fallback to /dev/urandom. */
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arc4random_getrandom_failure ();
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}
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if (atomic_load_relaxed (&seen_initialized) == 0)
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{
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/* Poll /dev/random as an approximation of RNG initialization. */
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struct pollfd pfd = { .events = POLLIN };
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pfd.fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY (
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__open64_nocancel ("/dev/random", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC | O_NOCTTY));
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if (pfd.fd < 0)
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arc4random_getrandom_failure ();
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if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY (__poll_infinity_nocancel (&pfd, 1)) < 0)
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arc4random_getrandom_failure ();
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if (__close_nocancel (pfd.fd) < 0)
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arc4random_getrandom_failure ();
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atomic_store_relaxed (&seen_initialized, 1);
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}
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fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY (
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__open64_nocancel ("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC | O_NOCTTY));
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if (fd < 0)
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arc4random_getrandom_failure ();
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for (;;)
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{
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l = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY (__read_nocancel (fd, p, n));
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if (l <= 0)
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arc4random_getrandom_failure ();
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if ((size_t) l == n)
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break; /* Done reading, success. */
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p = (uint8_t *) p + l;
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n -= l;
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}
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if (__close_nocancel (fd) < 0)
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arc4random_getrandom_failure ();
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}
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libc_hidden_def (__arc4random_buf)
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weak_alias (__arc4random_buf, arc4random_buf)
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uint32_t
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__arc4random (void)
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{
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uint32_t r;
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__arc4random_buf (&r, sizeof (r));
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return r;
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}
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libc_hidden_def (__arc4random)
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weak_alias (__arc4random, arc4random)
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