This adds a new crypttab option for volumes "pkcs11-uri=" which takes a
PKCS#11 URI. When used the key stored in the line's key file is
decrypted with the private key the PKCS#11 URI indiciates.
This means any smartcard that can store private RSA keys is usable for
unlocking LUKS devices.
This adds a udev tag that is supposed to be attached to all devices
that might potentially expose a PKCS#11 slot, i.e. CCID smartcards and
similar. We can then use the appearance of devices of this type as
trigger to rescan PKCS#11 slots.
If a daemon is not started as root, most likely it also can't create its
directory and let's not try to resolve the user in that case either.
Create /run/systemd/netif/lldp with tmpfiles.d like other netif directories.
This is also very helpful for preparing a RootImage for the daemons as NSS crud
is not needed.
Intermediate Functional Block
The Intermediate Functional Block (ifb) pseudo network interface acts as a QoS concentrator for multiple different sources of traffic. Packets from or to other interfaces have to be redirected to it using the mirred action in order to be handled, regularly routed traffic will be dropped. This way, a single stack of qdiscs, classes and filters can be shared between multiple interfaces.
Here's a simple example to feed incoming traffic from multiple interfaces through a Stochastic Fairness Queue (sfq):
(1) # modprobe ifb
(2) # ip link set ifb0 up
(3) # tc qdisc add dev ifb0 root sfq
CID 1409488.
This code was added in 903659e7b2. The change
that is done here is a simple fix to avoid use of a
unitialized/wrongly-initialized variable, but the bigger issue is that nothing
looks at the returned result to distinguish between 0 and a positive return
value.
If the interface is in initialized state, no network file is assigned to
the interface. If an interface is not managed by networkd, previously,
the foreign configs of the interface was dropped.
Fixes#14250.
This option is an indication for PID1 that the entry in crypttab is handled by
initrd only and therefore it shouldn't interfer during the usual start-up and
shutdown process.
It should be primarily used with the encrypted device containing the root FS as
we want to keep it (and thus its encrypted device) until the very end of the
shutdown process, i.e. when initrd takes over.
This option is the counterpart of "x-initrd.mount" used in fstab.
Note that the slice containing the cryptsetup services also needs to drop the
usual shutdown dependencies as it's required by the cryptsetup services.
Fixes: #14224
Like with shmat already the actual results of the test
test_memory_deny_write_execute_mmap depend on kernel/libseccomp/glibc
of the platform it is running on.
There are known-good platforms, but on the others do not assert success
(which implies test has actually failed as no seccomp blocking was achieved),
but instead make the check dependent to the success of the mmap call
on that platforms.
Finally the assert of the munmap on that valid pointer should return ==0,
so that is what the check should be for in case of p != MAP_FAILED.
Signed-off-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
At the beginning of seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute architectures
can set individual filter_syscall, block_syscall, shmat_syscall values.
The former two are then used in the call to add_seccomp_syscall_filter
but shmat_syscall is not.
Right now all shmat_syscall values are the same, so the change is a
no-op, but if ever an architecture is added/modified this would be a
subtle source for a mistake so fix it by using shmat_syscall later.
Signed-off-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
If seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute was fatally failing to load rules it
already returned a bad retval.
But if any adding filters failed it skipped the subsequent seccomp_load and
always returned an rc of 0 even if no rule was loaded at all.
Lets fix this requiring to (non fatally-failing) load at least one rule set.
Signed-off-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
This switches detect_container() to path_is_read_only_rw("/sys"), as if
systemd-udevd.service is conditionalized with that way.
This also updates the log message.
If /sys is read only filesystem, e.g., nspawn is running in container,
then usually udev is not running. In such a case, let's assume that
the interface is already initialized. Also, this makes nspawn refuse
to use the network interface which is under renaming.
Fixes#14223.
Properties marked this way really shouldn't be sent around willy-nilly,
that's what the flag is about, hence exclude it from InterfacesAdded
signals (and in fact anything that is a signal).
This allows marking messages that contain "sensitive" data with a flag.
If it's set then the messages are erased from memory when the message is
freed.
Similar, a flag may be set on vtable entries: incoming/outgoing message
matching the entry will then automatically be flagged this way.
This is supposed to be an easy method to mark messages containing
potentially sensitive data (such as passwords) for proper destruction.
(Note that this of course is only is as safe as the broker in between is
doing something similar. But let's at least not be the ones at fault
here.)
