Suppose that foo.service/start is a job waiting on other job bar.service/start
to finish. And then foo.service/restart is enqueued (not using
--ignore-dependencies).
Currently this makes foo.service start immediately, forgetting about the
ordering to bar.service.
The runnability check for JOB_RESTART jobs looks only at dependencies for
stopping. That's actually correct, because restart jobs should be treated the
same as stop jobs at first. The bug is that job_run_and_invalidate() does not
treat them exactly the same as stop jobs. unit_start() gets called without
checking for the runnability of the converted JOB_START job.
The fix is to simplify the switch in job_run_and_invalidate(). Handle
JOB_RESTART identically to JOB_STOP.
Also simplify the handling of JOB_TRY_RESTART - just convert it to JOB_RESTART
if the unit is active and let it fall through to the JOB_RESTART case.
Similarly for JOB_RELOAD_OR_START - have a fall through to JOB_START.
In job_finish_and_invalidate() it's not necessary to check for JOB_TRY_RESTART
with JOB_DONE, because JOB_TRY_RESTART jobs will have been converted to
JOB_RESTART already.
Speeding up the restart of services in "auto-restart" state still works as
before.
Improves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=753586
but it's still not perfect. With this fix the try-restart action will wait for
the restart to complete in the right order, but the optimal behaviour would be
to finish quickly (without disturbing the start job).
If we try to locate a monotonic time in a file that doesn't have any
entries with the matching boot id, then don't fail on it, simply
fall back to calendar time.
The default setups should be a stateless as possible. /tmp as tmpfs is
the intended default for general purpose systems.
Small temporary files should not be stored on disk; lager files, or
files which should potentially survive a reboot, belong into /var/tmp.
Also catch up with some good old UNIX history.
More details are here:
https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Features/tmp-on-tmpfs
Since a number of distribitions don't need this compat glue anymore drop
it from systemd upstream. Distributions which still haven't converted
to /run can steal these unit files from the git history if they need to.
udisks2 doesn't use /media anymore, instead mounts removable media in a
user-private directory beneath /run. /media is hence mostly obsolete and
hence it makes little sense to continue to mount a tmpfs to it.
Distributions should consider dropping the mount point entirely since
nothing uses it anymore.
Let's make things a bit easier to type, drop the systemd- prefix for
journalctl and loginctl, but provide the old names for compat.
All systemd binaries are hence now prefixed with "systemd-" with the
exception of the three primary user interface binaries:
systemctl
loginctl
journalctl
For those three we do provide systemd-xyz names as well, via symlinks:
systemd-systemctl → systemctl
systemd-loginctl → loginctl
systemd-journalctl → journalctl
We do this only for the *primary* user tools, in order to avoid
unnecessary namespace problems. That means tools like systemd-notify
stay the way they are.
For clean session endings ask logind explicitly to get rid of the FIFO
before closing it so that the FIFO logic doesn't result in su/sudo to be
terminated immediately.
This is an S/MIME signed message
The new function ima_setup() loads an IMA custom policy from a file in the
default location '/etc/ima/ima-policy', if present, and writes it to the
path 'ima/policy' in the security filesystem. This function is executed
at early stage in order to avoid that some file operations are not measured
by IMA and it is placed after the initialization of SELinux because IMA
needs the latter (or other security modules) to understand LSM-specific
rules. This feature is enabled by default and can be disabled by providing
the option '--disable-ima' to the configure script.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it>
This is an S/MIME signed message
The mount of the securityfs filesystem is now performed in the main systemd
executable as it is used by IMA to provide the interface for loading custom
policies. The unit file 'units/sys-kernel-security.mount' has been removed
because it is not longer necessary.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it>
The function checks if the entry is a directory before recursing, but
there is a window between the check and the open, during which the
directory could be replaced with a symlink.
CVE-2012-1174
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=803358
