On Linux the former is a compat alias to the latter, and that's really
weird, as inside the kernel the two are distinct. Which means we really
should stay away from it.
Let's be more restrictive when validating PID files and MAINPID=
messages: don't accept PIDs that make no sense, and if the configuration
source is not trusted, don't accept out-of-cgroup PIDs. A configuratin
source is considered trusted when the PID file is owned by root, or the
message was received from root.
This should lock things down a bit, in case service authors write out
PID files from unprivileged code or use NotifyAccess=all with
unprivileged code. Note that doing so was always problematic, just now
it's a bit less problematic.
When we open the PID file we'll now use the CHASE_SAFE chase_symlinks()
logic, to ensure that we won't follow an unpriviled-owned symlink to a
privileged-owned file thinking this was a valid privileged PID file,
even though it really isn't.
Fixes: #6632
The new --uid= switch allows selecting the UID from which the
notificaiton messages shall originate.
This is primarily useful for testing purposes, but might have other
uses.
Let's be explicit, and always send the messages from our UID and never
our EUID. Previously this behaviour was conditionalized only on whether
the PID was specified, which made this non-obvious.
If we have to chose between truncated escape sequences and strings
exploded to 4 times the desried length by fully escaping, prefer the
latter.
It's for debug only, hence doesn't really matter much.
The new flag returns the O_PATH fd of the final component, which may be
converted into a proper fd by open()ing it again through the
/proc/self/fd/xyz path.
Together with O_SAFE this provides us with a somewhat safe way to open()
files in directories potentially owned by unprivileged code, where we
want to refuse operation if any symlink tricks are played pointing to
privileged files.
When the flag is specified we won't transition to a privilege-owned
file or directory from an unprivileged-owned one. This is useful when
privileged code wants to load data from a file unprivileged users have
write access to, and validates the ownership, but want's to make sure
that no symlink games are played to read a root-owned system file
belonging to a different context.
On systems that only use resolved for name resolution, there are usecases that
require resolved to be started before sysinit target, such that network name
resolution is available before network-online/sysinit targets. For example,
cloud-init for some datasources hooks into the boot process ahead of sysinit
target and may need network name resolution at that point already.
systemd-resolved already starts pretty early in the process, thus starting it
slightly earlier should not have negative side effects.
However, this depends on resolved ability to connect to system DBus once that
is up.
- Coverity scan analysis tasks run as scheduled cron jobs
- Stage separation for Build, Test and Coverity scan phase
- Travis CI now uses Fedora container to build and run tests
- Containers are accessible from Docker Hub and failed builds
can be reproduced and examined
- coverity.sh: separate build and upload
Let's include netinet/in.h instead of linux/in6.h, as the former is the
official libc location for these definitions, and the latter is a
linux-specific version that conflicts.
This hopefully makes systemd compile on current Semaphore again.
This takes e410b07d2a into consideration,
but makes us use glibc rather than kernel headers.
While we are at it, let's also sort our #include lines. Since kernel
headers are notoriously crappy we won't strictly order them globally,
but first include non-kernel headers in a sorted way, and then include
kernel headers in a somewhat sorted way (i.e. generic stuff first and
somewhat alphabetical, and specific stuff last)
By default systemd-shutdown will wait for 90s after SIGTERM was sent
for all processes to exit. This is way too long and effectively defeats
an emergency watchdog reboot via "reboot-force" actions. Instead now
use DefaultTimeoutStopSec which is configurable.
First, let's rename it to disable_coredumps(), as in the rest of our
codebase we spell it "coredump" rather than "core_dump", so let's stick
to that.
However, also log about failures to turn off core dumpling on LOG_DEBUG,
because debug logging is always a good idea.
Let's rename it manager_sanitize_environment() which is a more precise
name. Moreover, sort the environment implicitly inside it, as all our
callers do that anyway afterwards and we can save some code this way.
Also, update the list of env vars to drop, i.e. the env vars we manage
ourselves and don't want user code to interfear with. Also sort this
list to make it easier to update later on.
This is quite ugly, but provides us with an avenue for moving
distributions to define the "nobody" user properly without breaking legacy
systems that us the name for other stuff.
The idea is basically, that the distribution adopts the new definition
of "nobody" (and thus recompiles systemd with it) and then touches
/etc/systemd/dont-synthesize-nobody on legacy systems to turn off
possibly conflicting synthesizing of the nobody name by systemd.
We should be careful with errno in cleanup functions, and not alter it
under any circumstances. In the safe_close cleanup handlers we are
already safe in that regard, but let's add similar protections on other
cleanup handlers that invoke system calls.
Why bother? Cleanup handlers insert code at function return in
non-obvious ways. Hence, code that sets errno and returns should not be
confused by us overrding the errno from a cleanup handler.
This is a paranoia fix only, I am not aware where this actually mattered
in real-life situations.
Both netinet/icmp6.h and linux/in6.h will define struct in6_addr, and in
user space we want to use the netinet/icmp6.h variant.
Fixes build problem:
In file included from src/libsystemd-network/sd-radv.c:23:0:
/home/hegtvedt/work/os/product/sunrise/root/_build/v2/include/linux/in6.h:30:8:
error: redefinition of 'struct in6_addr'
If the system is finally shutting down it makes no sense to write core
dumps as the last remaining processes are terminated / killed. This is
especially significant in case of a "force reboot" where all processes
are hit concurrently with a SIGTERM and no orderly shutdown of
processes takes place.
This also adds the ability to incorporate arrays into netlink messages
and to determine when a netlink message is too big, used by some generic
netlink protocols.
commit 7715629 (networkd: Fix race condition in [RoutingPolicyRule] handling (#7615)).
Does not fix race. Still there is a race in case of bride because the
bride goes down and up .
calling route_configure then link_set_routing_policy_rule and the
link_check_ready makes a race between routing_policy_rule_messages and route_messages.
While bride comes up and we call the call again route_configure if finds
it self in the callback function LINK_STATE_CONFIGURED networkd dies.
Let's handle first routing policy rules then route_configure. This fixes
the crash.
Closes#7797
Lennart Poettering