This is useful to prohibit execution of non-native processes on systems,
for example 32bit binaries on 64bit systems, this lowering the attack
service on incorrect syscall and ioctl 32→64bit mappings.
- Allow configuration of an errno error to return from blacklisted
syscalls, instead of immediately terminating a process.
- Fix parsing logic when libseccomp support is turned off
- Only keep the actual syscall set in the ExecContext, and generate the
string version only on demand.
Udev does not run in containers, so instead of relying on it to tell us when a
network device is ready to be used by networkd, we simply assume that any
device was fully initialized before being added to the container.
This allows customization of the arguments used by less. The main
motivation is that some folks might not like having --no-init on every
invocation of less.
Let's remove the tests for cg_path_get_machine_name(), since they no
longer operate solely on the cgroup path, but actually look up data in
/run. Since we have a test for cg_pid_get_machine_name() this shouldn't
be too much of a loss.
Otherwise we get a (harmless) message like:
systemd-logind[30845]: Failed to process message [type=signal sender=:1.36 path=/org/freedesktop/systemd1/job/4674 interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties member=PropertiesChanged signature=sa{sv}as]: Invalid argument
In function user_get_state() remove the session_is_active() check, just
count on the session_get_state() function to get the correct session
state.
session_is_active() may return true before starting the session scope
and user service, this means it will return true even before the creation
of the session fifo_fd which will produce incorrect states.
So be consistent and just use session_get_state().
Also limit the range of vlan ids. Other implementations and
documentation use the ranges {0,1}-{4094,4095}, but we use
the one accepted by the kernel: 0-4094.
Reported-by: Oleksii Shevchuk <alxchk@gmail.com>
Let's always call the security labels the same way:
SMACK: "Smack Label"
SELINUX: "SELinux Security Context"
And the low-level encapsulation is called "seclabel". Now let's hope we
stick to this vocabulary in future, too, and don't mix "label"s and
"security contexts" and so on wildly.
This permit to let system administrators decide of the domain of a service.
This can be used with templated units to have each service in a différent
domain ( for example, a per customer database, using MLS or anything ),
or can be used to force a non selinux enabled system (jvm, erlang, etc)
to start in a different domain for each service.
This was noticed in Brussels at the hackfest. The fstab-generator currently
creates a broken symlink pointing to itself in
/run/systemd/generator/local-fs.target.wants/ for systemd-fsck-root.service
